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I. INTRODUCTION 
In less developed countries where most of the population is engaged 
in agriculture, defects in agrarian structures have been emphasized as 
obstacles to economic development of both the agricultural sector and the 
national economy. Agrarian reforms have been proposed, developed and ap­
plied as a major means for remedying these defects in agrarian structures 
in the pursuit of agricultural and national economic development. 
This study deals with defects in agrarian structures within the 
Central Sierra of Peru. It also analyzes the current agrarian reform in 
this area being carried out under the 1964 Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law. 
Methodology for this analysis is developed and applied both (1) to the 
defects in agrarian structures and (2) to the remedies for these defects 
currently being attempted under the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Program. 
Certain conclusions are drawn regarding strengths and weaknesses of cur­
rent efforts to improve agrarian structures. 
A. Agrarian Structures 
Economic as well as social activities are carried on under more or 
less rigid structures. These structures are the ways and means of ac­
complishing economic and social objectives under the sanction of law and 
custom. 
Structures, however, might become obsolete due, for instance, to a 
substantial change of circumstances. When this is the case such structures 
defeat, totally or partially, the very purpose for which they were es-
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tablished and hence become obstacles to progress. 
It seems obvious that obsolete, useless or less suited structures 
should be changed and replaced by more suitable ones. Most structures, 
however, once they are accepted and consecrated by time, are not easy to 
change or modify. This is especially true when they have at one time 
proven to be useful and when their change might presuppose changes in other 
aspects of traditional life and upset vested interests of the ruling class. 
Agriculture, which 1^; one of the oldest economic activities, is 
carried on under a set of structures which had proven to be rather im­
pervious to change. This is quite true in communities where rural people 
have lived for centuries on the same land and where the impact of indus­
trialization has not had appreciable effects. 
This is clearly the case of the agricultural structures in the Sierra 
of Peru, which have remained unchanged for centuries. This secular structur­
al immobility has been the result, at least partly, of the lack of any 
appreciable exogenous force such as industrialization and of a positive 
interest of the ruling class to maintain the status quo. 
Peru enacted an Agrarian Reform Law in May 21, 1964 (Ley 1503 7)^ 
through which the nation intends to change the centuries old agricultural 
V 
pattern. It is therefore of fundamental importance for the economic de­
velopment of the country to establish new structures which, in the specific 
situation found in Peru, could help the country to develop its economy. 
^The.Law has XV Titles and 244 articles, with two special dispositions, 
four temporal dispositions and a final disposition. A more detailed pre­
sentation of the parts of the Law relevant to this study will be given in 
the Appendix. 
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Many economists have either ignored structures as means for ob­
structing or facilitating economic change or they have largely neglected 
the analysis of the economic effects of structural change (29, p. 2) 
(33, p. 84). When agrarian reforms, which tend to change structures^ 
enter into the picture, it takes some economists a little by surprise and 
leaves them somewhat unprepared to give answers as to the advisability of 
one structure rather than another. However, it is on decisions of this 
nature that rests heavily the greater or lesser success that agrarian re­
form might have in bringing about economic development. 
B. Agricultural Development and National Economic Development 
Economic development is defined as an increase in per capita real in­
come and a distribution of such income among the factor contributors, that 
is, among everyone involved in the production process, according to their 
productivity contributions. 
The agricultural sector contributes to the Gross National Product 
hereafter designated as GNP, at a varying rate depending on its importance 
in the total economy of the nation. In underdeveloped countries where the 
other sectors of the economy have not yet developed very much, the con­
tribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP represents a high percentage 
Though agrarian reform is being defined by various authors in differ­
ent ways, the differences refer more to the scope of agrarian reform rather 
than to the essential elements of agrarian reform. At any rate, one es­
sential element which is always present in the definitions is the change 
of land tenure structures. 
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of the total. Typically the expansion of other sectors, while reducing 
the relative contribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP, does not 
reduce at the same rate the relative number of active population engaged 
in agricultural activities. In Peru, for instance, the percentage con­
tribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP in 1960, was approximately 
22 per cent, while the active population in agriculture was approximately 
60 per cent (1). Thus the productivity and per capita income of three-
fifths of the nation's population engaged in agriculture was considerably 
below that of the remaining two-fifths. Furthermore, if structural de­
fects distort the distribution of the agricultural income among the factor 
contributors, as is the case in most underdeveloped countries, a wider 
range of individual income takes place with serious implications for pro­
ductivity, levels of living and purchasing power. A low per capita income 
of the large majority of the population lessens the expansion of the domes­
tic market and consequently retards cumulative economic development. 
The agricultural sector can induce economic development in the nation 
through its own development. This would consist of 1) an increase in pro­
duction of agricultural products for which there is a market (domestic and/ 
or foreign) and an improvement of the quality of such production, while at 
the same time the productivity of the production factors is also increased 
and 2) an increase in the demand for non-agricultural products by people 
engaged in agriculture as a result of improved purchasing power. 
The effects of such agricultural development would be an increase in 
the income to the agricultural sector,. Insofar as the prices that the 
consumers have to pay for the agricultural products are reduced, there would 
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be an increase of real income for the consumer group. This increase of real 
income might lessen the pressure for higher wages in industry and service 
sectors, and consequently, might reduce production and services costs, 
hence industrial products might become more competitive with foreign pro­
ducts in the national and international market. Likewise, the increase 
of real income would tend to expand the internal market for national in­
dustrial products because more money would be available to the consumer after 
the food needs are satisfied. At least in the beginning there would be 
also an expansion of the internal market for agricultural products if the 
development of the industrial and service sectors provides more people of 
the low income group with higher incomes. 
Further economic national development would be created by an improved 
distribution of income among farmers which would encourage investments in 
the agricultural, sector and eventually in other sectors of the economy. 
This would enable the rural population to participate effectively in the 
demand for industrial products and services. 
Less foreign exchange would be needed for the import of agricultural 
products as the home production expands and consequently more foreign ex­
change would be available for other imports that might contribute to the 
economic development of the country. If conditions permit, the agricultur­
al sector might also become a net foreign exchange earner through exports. 
Further increase in the agricultural sector productivity would finally 
release production factors, especially labor, for employment in other 
sectors of the economy as employment opportunities become available. 
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G. Defects in Agrarian Structures in Peru 
Statistical data in Peru, like in most of the less developed countries 
in the world, are at best only rough approximations. Since, however, data 
collecting is a major and difficult undertaking which oftentimes takes more 
time and resources than Peru has been able to afford, one is forced to 
operate with imperfect data. The "Primer Genso Nacional Apropecurio" (17) 
and "Estadistica Agraria" (36) are the main and best sources of aggregate 
data now available to study the agrarian structures of Peru. On the basis 
of these sources the following data elaborations have been made. 
The entire territory of Pery has 128,521,560 hectares (1 hectare = 
2.47 acres) but only 18,604,500 hectares (14.48 per cent) are considered 
as agricultural land. Of these 18,604,500 has., 3,285,587 has. are un­
productive,^ 2,284,754 has. are forest and mountains (also unproductive), 
and 9,151,276 has. are natural pastures, generally very poor, which total 
14,721,617 has. The remaining 3,882,883 has. is the amount of cultivated 
land. 
This, however, is not completely true because 1,336,169 has. which are 
2 
considered cultivable are in fact not cultivated and another 500,000 has. 
are left fallow each year (455,123 has. were left fallow the year of the 
latest Census, 1961). (Figure 1.) 
^Unproductive land, according to the definition given in the "Genso" 
(17, p. XV) is the area under marshes, rocky land, and so on, which is not 
suitable for any agricultural use. 
2 The "Genso" from where the data are taken does not give any reason 
why this cultivable land is not cultivated. 
7 
18,604,500 HAS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I - PERENNIAL PLANTATIONS AND CULTIVATED 1 
PASTURES 
2- LAND UNDER YEARLY CROPS I, 
3- LAND FALLOW 
4 - CULTIVABLE LAND BUT NOT CULTIVATED I,; 
5 - FOREST AND MOUNTAINS 2,1 
6 - UNPRODUCTIVE LAND 3,1 
7 - LAND UNDER NATURAL PASTURES 9,1 
T O T A L  1 8 , (  
FIGURE I. AREA OF THE PRESENT AGRICULTURAL LAND IN PERU 
(TOTALTËRRITORY OF PERU = 128,521,560 HECTi 
TATIONS AND CULTIVATED 
EARLY CROPS 
D BUT NOT CULTIVATED 
UNTAINS 
AND 
TURAL PASTURES 
727,304 HECTARES 
1,364,287 
455,123 
1,336,169 
2,284,754 
3,28 5,587 
9,15 I , 276 
T O T A L  1 8 , 6 0 4 , 5 0 0  H E C T A R E S  
SENT AGRICULTURAL LAND IN PERU (18,604,500 HECTARES) 
ÎITORY OF PERU = 128,521,560 HECTARES) 
8 
With all preceding data considered, this leaves Peru with 2,091,591 
has. of cultivated land (items 1 and 2 in Figure 1) which amounts to 1,63 
per cent of the total national land area and only 0.16 has. of cultivated 
land for each inhabitant. 
Estimates of potential farm-land and other land uses in Peru point to 
the following approximations; (23) 
Land suitable for intensive agricultural production is 12,658,912 
has. or 9.90 per cent of national land area.^ 
Land suitable for forests and pastures is 40,663,293 has. or 31.8 
per cent of the national land area. 
Marginal land that is suitable for extensive livestock operations is 
31,113,700 has. or 24.3 per cent of the national land area. 
Land that is not suitable for agricultural purposes amounts to 
43,566,027 has. or 34.0 per cent of the national land area (Figure 2). 
The confrontations of the two sets of data just given, namely, the 
actual and the potential usable lands in Peru, provide a basis for several 
considerations about agrarian structures in Peru and their related problems, 
a) If all the land actually used for cultivation in Peru could be 
classified as suitable for intensive agricultural production in the sense 
given by Oficina Nacional de Evaluacion de Recursos Naturales hereafter 
called ONSRN (23) Peru would be at the present time using only approxi­
mately 16 per cent of its good land, 
b) A substantial part of the land actually cultivated in Peru, most 
of the Sierra cultivated land, is not by any standard suitable for intensive 
cultivation. Consequently, much less than 16 per cent of Peru's land suit­
able for intensive cultivation is actually being used. 
^Approximately 30 per cônt of it is in Costa which is vary fertile 
if irrigated. 
1) LAND SUITABLE FOR INTENSIVE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
2) LAND SUITABLE FOR FOREST AND PASTURES 
3) LAND SUITABLE FOR EXTENSIVE LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS 
4) LAND NOT SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURAL PUPOSES 
FIGURE 2. ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL AGRICULTURAL USE 
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c) On the basis of 16 per cent of the good land actually being used, 
Peru could support by her own means a population over 68 millions at cur­
rent standards both of cultivation and levels of living, if Peru were able 
to place into use 100 per cent of its good land in the span of 60 years, 
which is the approximate estimated time for Peru to reach 58 million 
people at the rate of doubling her population every 25 years. 
A few considerations should be noted on this point. First, Peru is 
not self supporting in food stuffs at the present time. Secondly, it does 
not seem realistic to think that Peru will maintain the present rate of 
population growth for the next 60 years. Thirdly, new lands are in the 
first years of cultivation more productive. Fourthly, it is unrealistic to 
expect that Peru will not improve her methods of cultivation in the years 
to come. And finally, it is also unrealistic to assume that the Peruvian 
population will not improve its level of living. 
d) Estimates of the cost to place the potential land into operation 
have not been made. However, with the knowledge 1) that 30 per cent of 
that potential is in the Costa region and 2) of the high costs incurred 
in the San Lorenzo irrigation project, and 3) assuming most of the remain­
ing 70 per cent is in the jungle where a basic infrastructure has to be 
built under very unfavorable physical conditions, it may be assumed that the 
price would be very high. 
e) In Peru, 58 per cent of the total population largely associated 
with livestock raising and farming is living now in the low productive land 
of the Sierra. 
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The ownership distribution of the 2,546,714 has. of cultivated land, 
(items 1, 2 and 3, Figure 1), of which 356,313 has. are in perennial 
plantations and the remaining 2,190,401 has. are in yearly crops, culti­
vated pastures and land in fallow, which for convenience will be called 
here arable land, is as follows; 7,265 owners (individual persons, com­
mercial companies and 348 Indian Communities) namely 0.83 per cent of the 
total land owners own 1) 756,671 has. of arable land (33.03 per cent of 
the total arable land) and 2) 140,073 has. of land under plantations (39 
per cent of the total land in plantations). 
On the other hand 871,401 owners (99.17 per cent of the total) own 
1,433,730 has. of arable land (66.97 per cent of the total arable land) and 
216,240 has. of land under plantations (60.10 per cent of the total land 
under plantation) (Figure 3). 
In other words 99.17 per cent of the land-owners possess an average 
of 1,64 has. of arable land and 0.25 has. of land under perennial planta­
tions. On the other hand 0.83 per cent of the land-owners possess an 
average of 104.2 has. of arable land each and 10 has. of land under planta­
tions. 
The land ownership distribution of Peru can still be stated in another 
and perhaps more realistic way. According to the data of the Census (17), 
36.11 per cent of the Peruvian land-owners have less than one hectare of 
land. (In this estimate the natural pastures and unproductive land, the land 
under forest and mountains as well as the cultivated land, is included) 
(all the items of Figure 1), 58,01 per cent (almost one half a million 
farmers) have less than two hectares, 70.36 per cent have less than 3 
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hectares and 83,65 per cent have less than 5 hectares. 
Apart from the land-owners there are about three quarters of a million 
farm workers who own no land and most of them have no other means than 
farm work from which to earn a living.^ 
It is clear, therefore, that latifundia or the concentration of land 
in the hands of a few is neither the only nor the main problem of the 
Peruvian agrarian structure. Munifundia or the constant division and sub­
division of the land into smaller plots is also a most grievous problem. 
If the Agrarian Reform would distribute evenly all the land actually 
2 
cultivated among all the land owners, each would have less than 3 has. 
Furthermore, if all the landless rural workers were to receive a share of 
the actual cultivated land, all landless and land owners would receive 
3 less than 1.5 has. each. 
Further, 46.2 per cent of the rural population in the Peruvian high­
lands, where the main concentration and the greatest number of rural people 
exist, are under 16 years of age. In a few years this young population 
will be looking for jobs and a large part of them will seek opportunities 
4he Production Year Book 1964 (9) (Census VII, 1951) gives a figure 
of 1,556,000 active population in agriculture in Peru. The number of land­
owners according to the Census is 878,666. On the basis of these figures 
the number of landless agricultural workers would be 677,334. 
2 
Here the cultivable but not cultivated land is not included. If it 
were, the average per land owner would be 4.5 has. 
^Here again, the cultivable but not cultivated land is not included. 
It it were, the average for agricultural active population would be 2.26 
has. 
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in farming. 
The preceding considerations were made in order to stress two important 
points: 1) that land reform conceived as a mere land redistribution is 
not the answer to the pressing problems of Peru, and 2) that general economic 
development of the nation with the consequent creation of new job oppor­
tunities is an essential part of the relevant solution of the problem. The 
practical consequence of these two points is that agrarian reform if it is 
to help Peru, has to be conceived primarily as an instrument for economic 
development. This consequence will be further elaborated in the main body 
of the present study. 
D. Peru's Approach to Ameliorate These Defects 
Some efforts have been made by the Peruvian Government, especially in 
recent times, to colonize or open up land in the high jungle (right bank 
of Apurimac River, Central region of the Huallaga River, "Huallaga central") 
and to implement irrigation projects in the Coast (i.e. San Lorenzo in the 
north. La Joya in the south). International technical and financial agencies, 
especially the World Bank and the Interamerican Bank of Development, BID, 
have helped in the planning and implementation of these projects. 
Private settlers have moved into the jungle land, some of them, many 
years ago, like the Austrian and German immigrants who arrived in Peru • 
more than a hundred years ago and settled in the Pozuzo area which even today 
^The 46.2 per cent was found in a Census of 30 Communities in the Pasco 
Department including 30,527 inhabitants which represent the 69.44 per cent 
of the total Communal population in Pasco. The Census was taken by person­
nel of the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Project in 1964 with the author's 
assistance (24). The National Demographical Census gives the figure of 
43.33 per cent of the total population of Peru under 15 years of age (3 7). 
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has only a mule track leading into the area. Other Germans settled more 
recently in the Oxapampa area and other immigrants and natives in different 
areas of the Geja de Montana (high jungle). Due to lack of capital and in­
frastructure, such as communication and transportation facilities and 
organized markets, schools and health centers, many of the settlers have 
not prospered to any degree. There are a few settlers, however, who are 
located in privileged areas with access to markets and with good natural 
resources and these have been able to build up substantial fortunes. 
In general, the government has not effectively encouraged successful 
colonization in the past. Oftentimes, the acquisition of land rights in 
the jungle was done only for speculative purposes by people who had no 
intention whatsoever to work the land by themselves but only wanted it for 
resale when land prices would advance. 
In recent times large numbers of the Indians from different parts of 
the Sierra have moved, rather promiscuously, into the high jungle creating 
legal problems of land ownership, encouraging speculation of land prices, 
destroying the natural qualities of the soil through inappropriate culti­
vation methods and planting crops such as coffee, for which there will be 
limited markets in the near future. 
A government agency, called "Tierras de Montana", was in charge of 
transferring legal land titles of jungle land to the applicants. Generally, 
this agency acted inefficiently and much too slowly. This agency has now 
ceased to function in the agrarian reform zones and has been absorbed by 
the agrarian reform agency in the area. 
The Agrarian Reform Law passed in May, 1964, has provisions for land 
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redistribution (Title I, II, and IV), for technical aid to farmers (Title 
IX), for colonization of new lands (Title III), for land consolidation 
(Title VII) and for organization of cooperatives (Title X). 
Under the Law (Title XII) a restructuring of the different govern­
mental agencies which dealt with agrarian problems prior to the Law of 
1964, has taken place. The former IRAG (Institute de Reforma Agraria y 
Golonizacion) is now called ONRA (Oficina Nacional de Reforma Agraria). 
The SIPA organization (gervicio de Investigacion y Promocion Agraria), a 
research and extension agency, remains unchanged but is subject as is ONRA, 
to a higher organization, IRPA (Institute de Reforma y Promocion Agraria) 
which coordinates its efforts. This higher organization is governed by 
the "Gonsejo Tecnico de Reforma y Promocion Agraria" in the implementation 
of the Agrarian Reform Law. (See Appendix.) 
E. Need for an Analytical Model to Appraise Agrarian 
Structures from an Economic Point of View and for a 
Planning Model for Agrarian Reform Implementation 
Most agrarian reforms have been planned and carried out without much 
help from economists. The reason for this fact seems to be as follows; 
a) the main preoccupation of the agrarian reform promoters is political 
and social rather than economic and b) economists, when available, cannot 
give much advice and guidance due to the existing gap in economic theory 
1 in the area of the economic implications of structural change. 
^Economic theory has been generally kept under the limitation that 
Hicks put on his "Value and Capital" namely without any inclusion of re­
ference to institutional controls (14, p. 7). 
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It is not surprising therefore, that most agrarian reforms are not 
having much success, at least from the economic point of view. 
A remedy for this situation is to build up this neglected part of 
economic theory. As a departure point an analytical model could be con­
structed. This analytical model could consist of two parts; The first 
one would provide the ways and means to investigate the possible contribu­
tion of the agricultural sector to the general economic development in a 
given situation. The second part would try to give the guidelines for the 
construction of new agrarian structures capable of making the contribution 
of the agrarian sector to the general economic development a success. 
To foresee the likely effects of one structure or another on the 
economic development of the country is not the only problem in agrarian 
reform implementation. There is inherently the basic problem of planning 
for the best use of scarce resources, especially personnel, money and time 
in the implementation of agrarian reform. There exists already planning 
models like ÇPM (Critical Path Model) and PERT (Program Evaluation and Re­
view Technique) which it seems can be usefully adapted and applied to 
agrarian reform planning. The adapted method itself and the practical ap­
plication of it to an agrarian reform program will be presented later in 
the study. 
F. The Problem and Area Delimited for This Study 
The present study will concentrate on the specific agrarian reform 
problems involved in the transfer of large livestock farms to the farm 
workers and to the neighboring Indian communities. This transfer is the 
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first land reform experience in Peru under the new Agrarian Reform Law. 
New structures are being tried out for the first time and problems in the 
implementation of the agrarian reform law and regulations appear also for 
the first time. Here an action planning model on the Critical Path vein 
has its first testing ground in an agrarian reform. The area, in the Central 
highland of Peru, will be described in the next chapter. 
G. Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of the study is to analyze the conditions under 
which the agrarian reform in the Central Sierra of Peru can be instrumental 
to economic development. Because agrarian reform implies structural change, 
the economic effects of such structural change are primarily sought in the 
study. 
Three specific objectives of the study are; 1) to develop a model 
which could help in the selection and construction of the new structures in 
light of their efficiency in the attainment of economic development, 2) 
to apply an action planning model in terms of Critical Path and PERT methods 
to the agrarian reform process, and 3) to offer some alternatives for the 
solution of the problems that the present application of the agrarian re­
form law encounters in the vital aspects of land expropriation and land 
valuation. 
H. Procedure Followed 
Once the area under study (the Central Sierra of Peru) and its problems 
ari identified, a set of hypotheses to be tested in the study are presented. 
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The testing of the hypotheses is preceeded by the construction and pre­
sentation of the two models, the efficiency model and the action implemen­
tation model. 
The testing of the hypotheses will be done in the main part of the 
study in the context of the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law and its application 
in the Central Sierra of Peru. 
I. Organization of This Report 
First, the agrarian problems of the Central Sierra of Peru are pre­
sented within the physical, economic and demographic characteristics of 
the region (Chapter II). 
Then the study proceeds to identify and explain the defects within 
present agrarian structures obstructing development (Chapter II). 
Several hypotheses are formulated about the delimiting, diagnosis 
and remedial stages, and from that point on the main effort of the study 
concentrates in the remedial stage (Chapter II). 
An efficiency model for testing structures which are considered 
remedial to the present situation and helpful to the general economic de­
velopment of the country is presented (Chapter III). 
An action planning and implementing model is also presented, which is 
considered vital for the successful agrarian reform implementation process 
(Chapter IV). 
The 1964 Agrarian Reform Law and its application in the Central Sierra 
is analyzed in the light of the facts and with the help of the efficiency 
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and planning models (Chapter V). 
Finally, the results of the inquiry and the recommendations are pre­
sented (Chapter VI), 
II. AGRARIAN PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CENTRAL SIERRA OF PERU 
This chapter of the study has three parts: The first part A) deals 
with the physical, economical and population conditions of the area de­
limited by the present study, namely the Central Sierra of Peru. This 
first part sets the background for the study. 
The second part B) is a search for defects in agricultural structures 
which obstruct development. This part intends to be a general guideline 
for the other parts of the study in their search for solutions. 
The third part G) formulates hypotheses that are thought to be rele­
vant (1) to the present unsatisfactory situation found in the first and 
second parts and (2) to the possible solutions. These hypotheses guide the 
effort throughout the following chapters. 
A. Characteristics of the Central Sierra 
1. Physical conditions 
The territory with which the present study is concerned is located in 
the heart of the Peruvian Andes, east of Lima, covering large parts of the 
Departments of Pasco and Junin and small parts of the neighboring Depart­
ments of Huancavelica, Lima and Huanuco (Figures 4 and 5). 
The area begins on the Central highway 13 5 Km. from Lima going east-
w^d_towards the Selva (Jungle) on the east side of the Andes. At this 
point the zone extends northwest and southeast for a total length of about 
3 85 Km. and with an average width of about 110 Kms. and with a total area 
of 27,876 Km^ (Figure 5). 
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CENTRAL 
SIERRA LIMA' 
FIGURE 4. LOCATION OF THE CENTRAL SIERRA WITHIN PERU 
Figure 5. Area of the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Project. 
Sources ONRA Programa Sierra Central, Departamento de Ingenieria, 
Tarma, Peru, Nov. 1965. 
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Two relatively large parts of this area are flat (Altiplano or high­
lands) including one part in the center around the Junin Lake and another 
part in the south including the Mantaro valley which extends from the town 
of Jauja into the south of Huancayo city. 
The entire area is at high altitude above sea level. Some deep intert-
andean valleys go somewhat below 3,000 metres; other areas are located at 
near 5,000 m. Many mountain peaks of the western fringes of the area are 
at altitudes above 5,000 m.; some reach 5,800 m. 
The main part of the area between 3,800 to 4,700 m, altitude is covered 
with pastures of poor quality due to the severe conditions of the altitude 
in which it is located and the latitude (between 10 and 12 degrees South). 
Crop land is found at lower levels especially in valleys and in protected 
areas. 
According to the studies of Joseph A. Tosi (35) the temperatures of the 
Central Sierra are below 0 degrees Centigrade during the entire year at 
altitudes above 5,000 m. At altitudes between 4,000 to 5,000 m. (Puna 
and Paramo) the average temperature varies between 0°G. in winter and 6°G. 
in summer. In the humid valleys between 3,200 to 4,200 m., the average 
temperature varies between 6°G. in winter and 12°C. in summer. In the sub-
humid and semi-arid valleys between 2,100 to 3,3 50 m. the average tempera-
o o 
ture is 12 C. during winter and 18 C. at summer. 
The significant rainfall occurs during the period from mid-September to 
the end of April. January, February and March are the months of more fre­
quent rains. The annual rainfall varies between 500 to 1,000 mm. (19.68 
to 3 9.37 in.). 
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2. Economic conditions 
The main economic activities in the zone under study are tourism, 
mining, transportation, trade, livestock (especially sheep) and crops. 
Tourism is almost totally centered in Huancayo city, famous for the 
Sunday Indian fair, where many Indian handicrafts are for sale. A small 
part of the tourist stream goes also to Tarma, particularly on some 
special days, like Holy Week and Easter and the 28th of July, a national 
holiday. 
Mining is carried on mainly by Cerro de Pasco Corporation that em­
ploys 14,500 people ( including 1,905 employees, 12,169 miners and metal 
workers and 426 staff personnel). Besides the mining activities, Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation has a melting plant and refinery in the town of La Oroya. 
The main mineral mined and treated by Cerro de Pasco Corporation is cop­
per (490,812 short tons of mineral with 81,3 79,204 lbs. of refined copper), 
followed by lead (228,112 short tons of mineral 178,034,377 lbs. of refined 
lead), zinc (163,187 short tons and 118,212 lbs. of refined zinc), silver 
(19,696,187 oz.) and gold (39,457 oz.). Other minerals produced in smaller 
1 
quantities are bismuth, cadmium, selenium, and tellurium. 
Transportation is partly based on mining activities. Cerro de Pasco 
Railway connects La Oroya with the town of Cerro de Pasco and the mining 
center of Goyllarisquizca in the north of the area, and Pachacayo with the 
mining district of Jatunhuasi (coal mines) and the nearby Yauricocha 
^Data from Cerro de Pasco Corporation information service, all re­
ferred to the year 1963. 
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(mineral mines) in the south. The railway is owned and operated by the 
Gerro de Pasco Company. The line serves part of the mining transportation 
needs but has also general cargo and passenger services between La Oroya 
and Gerro de Pasco city. 
The other railroad line in the area is the Ferrocarril Central del 
Peru, connecting Lima with La Oroya and Huancayo city. 
Highway transportation is constantly increasing with the improvement of 
the roads. The main roads are the Central Highway which connects Lima with 
La Oroya. From La Oroya, the Central Highway is divided into two branches, 
one goes southeast to Haneayo, the other subdivides further, the longest 
subbranch goes northwest to Gerro de Pasco, and from Gerro de Pasco east 
to Huanuco and Pucallpa (Jungle town by the Ucayali river, about 100 Km. 
toward the Brasilian border and at 70 m. above sea level). The shorter 
subbranch which goes to Tarma, 3,100 m. above sea level, and down to 
Ghanchamayo, 800 m. at San Ramon in the High Jungle. This is the shortest 
communication road between the Jungle and Lima. The Central Highway reaches 
its highest point at the Ticlio pass 4,843 m. (15,889.88 ft.) above sea 
level at Km. 13 5 from Lima. 
These roads need constant repair work because of basic building 
failures together with the severe climatic conditions. Some parts of the 
road need substantial improvements and other parts require complete recon­
struction. Road maintainance, repair and improvement occupies at present 
a small part of the area labor force, but could occupy a substantial part 
of it if the badly needed works were undertaken. 
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An increasing number of private cars, passenger buses, and trucks 
transporting minerals, fuel, vegetables (from Tarma and Mantara valley) 
wood and tropical fruits (from the nearby jungle), use the roads. The 
main stream of transporting units go to and from Lima which, with its two 
million inhabitants, is by far the largest market of Peru, 
There is an active trade, both locally and, from a relative point of 
view of Peru also, interregionally. There are town fairs once or twice a 
week in all major towns of the area. In these towns, there are also shop­
ping centers servicing the town population and the neighboring villages. 
Most important for the development of the area is the trade with the de­
partments capital cities, Lima and with the nearby jungle. 
Objects of trade are agricultural and livestock products, wool, and 
other fibers, textiles, handcrafts and manufactured products, fuel, wood 
and tropical fruits. 
Industrial activity; Aside from the Gerro de Pasco Corporation melt­
ing plant and refinery at La Oroya and the Gemento Andino Plant near Tarma 
there are no other large industrial operations in the area. There is con­
struction activity in the larger towns and growing truck and motorcar re­
pair shops and fuel (gasoline) distribution stations. 
Services are performed in large part by civil servants (including 
teachers) as well as by employees of bank agencies, doctors, and nurses. 
The numbers and percentages of people employed in different activities are 
presented later under the heading of population conditions. 
Livestock production; The main livestock operation is sheep raising. 
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followed by cattle and horse raising. The wool produced by the large 
farms (haciendas) is sold in large part to international markets. The 
wool production of the small farms (individuals grouped in Indian "Com-
unidades") or farm workers on the haciendas, is partly sold to Lima or 
local dealers for marketing, and partly used for home consumption (rudi-
mental textile and handicraft industry, and home use for the family cloth­
ing needs). Meat is sold mostly to the local people and also to Lima. 
Crop production; The main crop production consists of potatoes and 
other tubers (oca, olluco) and truck farming concentrated almost entirely 
in the Tarma and Huancayo valleys. Agricultural crop production serves the 
local needs and supplies the Lima market. The supply of vegetables from 
the area to the Lima Central market is important as the following annual 
percentages of some of the products clearly show (2 7): 
93.90 per cent of the carrots arriving at the Lima central market 
come from the Central Sierra area, 71.53 per cent or 6,83 5 M.T. from Tarma 
and 22.37 per cent or 2,13 7 M.T. from Huancayo. 
92.22 per cent of the lettuce supply to the Lima central market comes 
from Tarma (1,766 M.T.). 
67.98 per cent of the edible corn (choclo) supplied to the Lima cen­
tral market comes from two areas of the Central Sierra, namely Hancayo 
with 890 M.T. and Tarma with 747 M.T. 
The supply of potatoes from the Central Sierra to the Lima central 
market amounts to 3 6.82 per cent of the total. The three main areas in 
the Central Sierra supplying potatoes to Lima are Huancayo with a total of 
Data for other important products from the area like celery, spinach, 
beans, etc. is not available. 
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18,904 M.T., Jauja with 11,009 M.T. and Junin with 2,673 M.T.^ 
3. Population conditions 
The 1961 National Demographic Census (18, p. 5, 6) gives population 
data by Departments which do not coincide exactly with the area under 
study. The total population of Pasco according to the Census is 138,3 69 
inhabitants including 114,821 in the Sierra area Md 23,548 in the Selva. 
For Junin, the Census gives a total of 521,210 inhabitants with more than 
400,000 people living in the Sierra. The total population of the two De­
partments represents 6.7 per cent of the total population of Peru. 
The total Sierra population of the two Departments is therefore about 
538,369. Because the area under study extends beyond the two Departments, 
its total population is somewhat greater. However, there is no available 
data to determine exactly how much greater it is but it does not seem to 
go much beyond 600,000. 
2 
The active population in each Department according to the National 
^Data refer only to white potatoes. 
^The National Planning Institute (Instituto Nacionel de Planificacion, 
INP (18, p. 306) defines active workers including the following groups: 
1) Employed (ocupado) a person who at date of Census was working at the 
service of an employer or for himself and received remuneration in kind or 
money, 2) Unemployed (desocupado) a person who at the date of the Census 
was not working because of having lost his job that he had and was looking 
for a paying job. 3) Aspirant to work (aspirante a trabajar) a person who 
at the date of the Census, was looking for work for the first time, that 
is to say that until that time, he had never been employed. 4) Non-
remunerated family worker (trabajador familiar no remunerado) a person 
who at the date of the Census was working without remuneration in a firm 
or business that was operated by a member of his family and who worked at 
this job for at least one-third of the normal day's work. 
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Census is 41,086 persons for Pasco, approximately 2 9.7 per cent of the 
total population of the Department (17, p. 226), and 159,245 persons for 
Junin, approximately 3 0.4 per cent of the total population of the Junin De­
partment (17, p. 224). 
The census of the rural population undertaken by the "Instituto de 
Reforma Agraria, Proyecto Sierra Central" in 1964 (24)^, which in the future 
will be referred to as Regional Census, gave for the two areas studied in 
Pasco Department (namely Yanahuanca and La Quinua) 29.14 per cent and 27.02 
per cent of the total population actively employed. These figures are low­
er than the National Census percentage (29.7 per cent) but do not differ 
significantly considering that the Regional Census is concentrated in the 
rural area and includes only 34.26 per cent of the rural population of the 
2 Pasco Department. 
Of the Pasco active population, 48.10 per cent is engaged in Agricul­
ture according to the National Census (17, p. 230). The Regional Census 
gave an average figure for the two areas studied of 45.47 per cent. 
The National Census gives a figure of 53 per cent of the Junin popula­
tion engaged in agricultural and livestock occupations (17, p. 230). The 
Regional Census in the Junin Department' is toonfragmentary and not yet suffi­
ciently digested to enable us to make comparisons as it was done for Pasco. 
^Unpublished data. The discussion of the reliability of these data 
is left for Chapter V. 
2 Rural population according to the National Census, is 89,3 55 (17, p. 
226-227). Rural population included in the Regional Census is 30,52 7 cover­
ing 30 Indian Communities (75 per cent of total number of Communities in 
Pasco) and 69,44 per cent of total communal population of Pasco. Note also 
the different date of the two sources. The National Census was done in 1961 
though the results have not appeared until 1965, the Regional Census has 
been conducted in 1964 and early 1965. An increase, therefore of the young 
population could explain the lower figures of the Regional Census. 
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The percentual distribution of. the active population into four occu­
pational classifications in the two areas of the Pasco Department studied by 
the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Institute is given in Table 1. The ad­
vantage of the four classifications is to show the extent that the agricul­
tural activity occupies the active population of the two areas. Table 2 
gives the distribution of the active population between the different 
economic activities in a more comprehensive way and for the entire Depart­
ments of Pasco and Junin. 
Table 1. Distribution of the active population in two areas of Pasco 
Department^ 
Active population in; Zone 1 Zone 2 
La Quinua Yanahuanca 
Per cent Per cent 
a) Agricultural and livestock 
occupation only 37.74 63.2 
b) Agricultural and livestock occu­
pation as principal, but with a 
secondary occupation elsewhere 11.22 14.0 
c) Non agricultural or livestock occu­
pation as principal but with a 
secondary occupation in agriculture 
or livestock 20.36 12.2 
d) Non agricultural or livestock 
occupation only 30.68 10.60 
100 100 
^Results of the regional census taken by Instituto de Reforma Agraria, 
Proyecto Sierra Central in two areas of Pasco Department, 1964. Unpub­
lished data (24). 
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Table 2. Distribution of the active population between the different 
economic activities in the departments of Junin and Pasco^ 
Active population in; Junin Pasco 
Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Agriculture 84,057 53.00 19,807 48.10 
Mining 10,687 6.66 9,597 23.20 
Manufacturing 19,843 12,40 • 2,575 6.25 
Construction 4,313 2.70 928 2.60 
Electricity, gas, water 
and sanitation services 330 0.24 55 0.13 
Trade 12,309 7.70 2,164 5.25 
Transport 4,779 3.00 725 1.77 
Services 17,791 11.20 3,715 9.00 
Not specified 5,13 6 3.10 1,520 3.70 
159,245 100 41,086 100 
^ata taken from the 1961 National Demographic Census (17, p. 230-
231). 
According to Table 2 it can be seen that a larger percentage of the 
active population of Pasco is engaged in mining and a lesser percentage in 
agriculture than Junin. Junin, in the Mantaro valley, and Tarma valley 
have an intensive type of agriculture lacking in Pasco; Junin has also a 
more acute minifundia problem than Pasco, especially in the Mantaro valley. 
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Manufacturing industry as well as services are more developed in 
Junin than in Pasco. Electricity, gas, water and sanitation services are 
lacking in both Departments. Trade and transport are of some importance in 
both Departments. 
The National Census as well as the Regional Census show a high per­
centage of young population in the area. In the Regional Census it was 
found in 1964 that 46.20 per cent of the population is under 16 years of 
age, and 56 per cent is under 21 years of age (Figures 6 and 7). This 
seems to be confirmed by the low percentage of active population which is 
lower than in nations with an older population structure as in France which 
has a 42.4 per cent of her total population as active, and Sweden which 
has a 43.3 per cent of her population active, while the area of this study 
has only 29 to 30 per cent active according to the National Census, and 2 7 
to 29 per cent.active according to the Regional Census. 
Infant mortality^ is 13.5 per cent in Junin Department (year 1963) 
(28). For Peru the statistic is 9.48 per cent while for the same year it 
was 4.05 per cent for Spain, 2,52 per cent for USA, 2,34 per cent for 
France and 2.18 per cent for U.K. (3 7, pp. 140-141), 
2 
The illiteracy of the population over 17 years of age in Pasco and 
Junin Departments according to the National Demographic Census can be seen 
in Table 3. 
^Infant death rate for 100 live births under one year of age. 
2 — 
Illiteracy is taken in the strict sense of people unable to read or 
write. 
Figure 6. Population structure in the year 1964 of 30 Comunidades 
in the Pasco Department. 
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Table 3. Illiteracy of the population 
partments of Pasco and Junin^ 
over 17 years of age in the de-
Percent of total 
population 
Percent of urban 
population 
Percent of rural 
population 
Pasco 48 39.5 53 
Junin 38 27 49.5 
^Data from the 1961 National Demographic Census (17, pp. 178-179; 
202-203). 
In the Regional Census it was found that a mean 43.65 per cent of the 
heads of families of the Yanahuanca area and 32,8 per cent of the La Quinua 
area were illiterate. 
Figure 8 presents the land distribution in the Central Sierra. It 
shows the situation before the agrarian reform project started. The area 
of the Sierra is the one that concerns the study (in the graph the land of 
the jungle is also included). Of the 2,787,600 hectares (all land, 
agricultural and otherwise) 60.5 per cent is included in the "latifundios" 
(large states), owned by 33 landowners (individuals and corporations), 
while the remaining 3 9.5 per cent is owned by Communidades and individuals 
with a calculated total of 62,300 farmers. If then, the landlords are con­
sidered as individuals (they are not, because most of them are corporations, 
though including few persons, often only the members of a rich family, like 
the Fernandini family who owned Algolan), the uneven distribution of land 
is spectacular. In relative numbers, 0.053 per cent of the landowners have 
Figure 8. Land ownership distribution in the Central Sierra 
Agrarian Reform Area. Source: ONRA Programa Sierra 
Central, Departamento de Ingenieria, Tarma, Peru. 
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50.5 per cent of the land, while 99.947 per cent landowners have only 
3 9.5 per cent of the land. 
B. Defects within Agrarian Structures Obstructing Development 
Here a general statement of the defects which seem to obstruct de­
velopment is presented. Defects will be divided into three groups: 1) 
defects found within large land holdings (Haciendas), 2) defects exist­
ing within Comunidades, and 3) other related defects of a more aggrega­
tive nature. 
1. Defects within Haciendas 
One cannot speak of a single type of hacienda in the Pasco-Junin area. 
Some large enterprises comprising several haciendas like "Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation" (16 Haciendas, 334,483 Has.) and "Algolan" (16 Haciendas, 
309,092 Has.) and smaller operations like Corpacancha (2 Haciendas, 
53,649 Has.) all dedicated almost exclusively to livestock (sheep es­
pecially), are efficiently operated. They have contributed to the economic 
development of the area in many ways, like improving the local sheep, as­
sisting the neighboring Comunidades (Indian communities) with an informal 
extension service, training people, supplying meat to the people of the 
area (in the case of Cerro de Pasco Corporation at subsidized prices to 
the miners of the Company and their families) and finally, paying rela­
tively good wages to the farm laborers. 
The structure of these efficient types of haciendas might, however, 
obstruct development in different ways: a) insofar as all the available 
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land is not fully used or is not used in the best economic way inasmuch as 
the haciendas are contented with extensive types of operation, b) insofar 
as they do not help to develop among their workers a sense of responsibility, 
self-reliance and do not offer the farm worker a real possibility of im­
provement and advancement up the ladder, and c) insofar as the hacienda 
income is not somehow shared with the farm workers and not invested in any 
significant part in the area. 
Enterprises like Gerro de Pasco Corporation did reinvest in the area, 
in fact it seems they were investing more in farming than the profit they 
were actually getting from the farm operation. In this specific case, how­
ever, the subsidy to the farm operation was coming from the profits of the 
mining operation. Farming was considered as an instrument to increase 
mining efficiency because it provided better and larger food supplies to 
the miners keeping them better fed and more contented because the low food 
prices acted as an increase of their real net income. 
It is not easy to determine whether or not the above mentioned possi­
ble obstacles exist in this type of hacienda in the area. Existing reports 
appear biased and direct information through interviews may also be biased. 
However, it seems safe to say that land could possibly be used more in­
tensively and that the sense of self-reliance and responsibility among the 
farm workers is not especially enhanced. Reinvestment in the farm opera­
tions is done, profits however (except in the case of Cerro de Pasco) go 
almost entirely to the landowners, and are expended outside the area. But 
there exists some income distribution through the relatively good salaries 
which are above the mean farm salaries paid in the area. 
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There are in the area other types of agricultural and livestock 
operations obviously inefficiently operated and partly abandoned and where 
the farm workers are poorly paid. Most of these enterprises are owned by 
absentee landlords who left the administration of the haciendas to the 
care of foremen and administrators who often are incompetent. 
This latter type of haciendas obstructs development at various levels 
depending on the degree of resources misuse and maldistribution of income. 
2. Defects within comunidades 
Theoretically, the economic structure of a comunidad presupposes com­
mon ownership of the land and private ownership of implements, livestock, 
and product. In practice, the right to use the land, specifically agri­
cultural land, has become a pseudo-right of ownership and land is trans­
ferred from parents to children through inheritance. Common ownership of 
pasture land is generally still in force. 
The Constitution of Peru, intending to protect the Comunidades, 
states that ownership of the land of the Comunidades cannot in any way be 
alienated from the Comunidad. This legal prescription has been an obstacle 
to development. Banks have not been willing to loan money to the Comuni­
dades or to individual members of the Comunidad for lack of a guarantee 
based on security. Loans, therefore, are difficult to secure even from the 
Agropecuario Bank, owned by the State. The consequence has been that in­
dividuals have asked for loans only for emergencies and almost never for 
agricultural and livestock improvements, and generally from the money lenders 
who have mercilessly exploited them. 
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Common ownership of pasture land impairs the sense of responsibility 
of individuals and, practically, there are no pasture improvement and land 
conservation practices used. Pastures are overgrazed and left in such poor 
conditions that they have to be abandoned for long periods. This fact to­
gether with an excess number of sheep for the available land has impelled 
some Gomunidades to invade land belonging to haciendas which has generally 
been more rationally exploited than the Gomunidad land. After a short 
period of invasion, however, hacienda land has become as impoverished as 
the old Gomunidad land was. 
Because the livestock belongs to individuals while the land does not 
and there is no restriction on the number of animals one can graze on the 
communal lands. The individual members of the Gomunidad have tended to 
increase the number of their flock without any consideration of the avail­
able land and rational grazing practices. 
Of course, the main reason for the individuals to increase the number 
of their own livestock has been the low productivity of the animals. More 
than 50 per cent of the Gomunidades of Pasco and Junin area (according to 
the 1962 survey (16) have a mean production of less than 2 pounds of wool 
produced per year and per sheared sheep. The other 50 per cent does not go 
much higher above 2 lb. and none reach the average of the haciendas which 
is 6.5 lb. The Gomunidad that has the higher mean production of wool in 
Marcapomacocha with 3.4 lb. No other Gomunidad reaches 3 lb. 
The same low productivity per animal is found in the average kilograms 
of meat per sheep slaughtered. Only one Gomunidad out of 60, Jatunyacan, 
has a mean of 13 kilograms (1 kg. = 2.205 lb.); . 9 Gomunidades have a mean 
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of 12; 17 Gomunidades have a mean of 11 kgs.; 22 Gomunidades have a mean of 
10 kgs..; 8 Gomunidades have a mean of 9 kgs.; 2 Gomunidades have a mean of 
8 kgs. and one Gomunidad has a mean of 7 kgs. 
Gomunidades lack capital and technical knowledge. As stated earlier, 
communal structure is partly responsible for the lack of credit facilities. 
How much this structure is also responsible for the lack of an organization 
which could facilitate the utilization of technical innovations in case 
these were available in spite of the capital shortage, is not easy to judge. 
Production organization is basically individualistic in spite of the 
case often mentioned of the mutual help among "comuneros" for specific 
agricultural activities at determined times. There is no production plan­
ning, no association to work in common all or part of the land, to sell 
the products, to buy inputs and to care for the livestock. Some Gomunidades 
have organized, often without much success, cooperatives of different types 
and communal livestock farms in which as a rule only few participate. For 
many in the Gomunidad as well as outside, the cooperative organization is 
thought to be alien to the Gomunidad spirit and even obnoxious. The reasons 
given, however, are not convincing and often are based on a misconception 
both of the cooperative system and the Gomunidad as it exists today. Minifun-
dia and dispersion of efforts, therefore, characterize the actual production 
structure and organization of most of the Gomunidades. 
Moreover, Gomunidades are isolated entities at times deeply separated 
one from the other because of litigation and antagonism. Social and econom­
ic development can hardly be attained without cooperation between Gomuni­
dades leading to joint enterprises and common policies. 
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3. Related defects 
The Pasco and Junin area has means of communication and transporta» 
tion that although they need substantial improvements, are not completely 
inadequate. There are also marketing centers which could absorb easily 
the agricultural and livestock production of the area. The markets are 
located mainly in the towns of Gerro de Pasco and La Oroya (mining dis­
tricts), Huancayo and especially Lima with its population of above 2 
million and with Callao harbor open to international trade. Meat has a 
large potential market. For example, Peru had to import 40,074.7 M.T. of 
meat in 1963. 
The problem is therefore not the market demand but the entire struc­
ture and organization of these markets. Large haciendas have the marketing 
problem satisfactorily solved because they deal with large quantities and 
possess outlets and the means of transportation. But Gomunidades and gener­
ally small farmers have to sell through the middlemen, or go themselves to 
the local markets or to Lima to try to sell their products directly with 
the result of much time lost, often finishing with part of the product un­
sold and as a rule getting low prices. 
Tradition and routine, combined with lack of an efficient extension 
service, lack of credit facilities and lack of supplies of fertilizers, 
selected seeds, selected breeds and sanitary facilities, result in poor 
crops and poor livestock products both in quantity and quality. 
Lack of knowledge of market requirements and coordination in produc­
tion plans result often in a poor use of scarce resources with temporary 
over-productions. 
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Although the land in the area, particularly in the Sierra, is of poor 
quality, it appears that it could be better utilized if a more adequate 
rotation system and fertilizer use could be established. In the 1962 
survey (16) in the 31 Gomunidadès which had crop land, it was found that 
most of them did not use more than 20 per cent of their cultivable land 
each year (Table 4). In some Gomunidades only 4.16 and 5 per cent of the 
land was used. The three Gomunidades which were using more of their cul­
tivable land, used 40.81, 33.98 and 33.55 per cent respectively. 
Illiteracy in the strict sense of people unable to read or write, in 
the area is not as high as in other parts of Peru,^ but the educational 
level of the large majority is very low. Few in the area have received 
higher agricultural technical education and as a rule one who receives it 
does not go back to his own village and not even to the area. Tarma Valley 
and Ghanchamayo are exceptions to this rule, where also a more developed 
and productive agriculture exists. 
The general low educational level makes it more difficult to impart 
technical instruction and to develop an effective extension service. 
Living conditions are poor for the large majority of the population of 
the area. There are poor and inadequate housing facilities, deficient 
nutrition and abuse of "coca" and alcoholic beverages (Table 5). These 
poor conditions have an impact on the health of the population and conse­
quently affect adversely work productivity. 
^The Regional Gensus finds a mean of 32.8 per cent of heads of families 
to be illiterate, with the range of 48.5 per cènt at the top (Gomunidad de 
Gajamarquilla) and, 10.1 per cent at the other end (Gomunidad de Yurajhuanca 
which has 80.4 per cent of its active population in non-agricultural activi­
ties). The Gomunidad following Yurajhuanca has 21 per cent while the large 
majority of Gomunidades are situated between 30 and 40 per cent bracket. 
45 
Table 4. Crop land in crops and fallow in 31 Gomunidades of the Pasco 
' department, year 1962^ 
Gomunidad Total crop land^ Crop land in crops^ Percentage of total 
crop land in crops 
Ghacayan 1,430 300 21 
Ghango 798 148 18.55 
Mito 98 40 40.81 
Yacan 600 105 17.50 
Paucar 1,500 400 26.66 
Tangor 640 95 14.84 
Antapirca 700 150 21.42 
Tusi 2,523 105 4.16 
Pillao 2,000 515 25.75 
Michivilca 447 150 33.55 
Tapuc 2,502 430 17.80 
Cuchis 644 164 25.46 
Vilcabamba 1,100 208 18,90 
Huaylasjirca 431 73 16.93 
Rocco 382 65 17.01 
S.P. Yanahuanca 1,820 296 16.26 
Yancocha 3,000 150 5 
Ghaupimarca 3,500 510 14.57 
Huachon 650 190 29.23 
Quiparacra 1,500 290 19.33 
Chinchan 2,400 600. „ 25 
Huariaca 2,125 720 33.88 
Yarusyacan 1,900 420 22.10 
Ninacaca 656 150 22 ..86 
Pallanchacra 700 125 17.85 
Paucartambo 1,500 400 26.66 
Sunec 982 165 16.80 
Ticlacayan 1,000 250 25 
Yanacachi 280 70 25 
Cajamarquilla 400 100 25 
Huamanmarca 324 80 24.69 
Totals ; 38 , 532 8,264 21.4 
^Unpublished data. Agrarian Reform Institute, Central Sierra Survey, 
1962 (16). 
^In hectares. 
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Table 5.j Standard budget for a 
the Pasco department^ 
family of five in two sampled areas in 
Total yearly Areas 
expenditure for; Yanahuanca La Quinua 
Food 2,3 42.30 3,876.60 
Alcoholic beverages, 
coca and tobacco 1,200.00 1,824.00 
Clothing 925.00 894.00 
Total in soles^ 4,467.30 6,594.60 
Total in dollars 167,00 260.00 
^Source; unpublished data - Agrarian Reform Institute Central Sierra 
Project (24). 
^Money values at market local prices in 1964. The rate of exchange 
was 1 dollar = 26.80 soles. 
The methodology used to obtain the data in Table 5 is as follows. 
First an attempt was made to determine the products and services utilized 
during the year by the family, including quantities and prices. The prices 
were local prices. Normally, the local prices of locally produced products 
such as potatoes (the base of most meals in the Sierra) are lower than in 
Lima and in USA.^ This should be considered when viewing these figures, 
^In the area the average price of potatoes in 0.80 soles per kilo 
or almost 3 cents "of a dollar (1.3 6 cents of a dollar for a pound) the 
average price in Lima is double this, namely 1.60 soles. 
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but even considering this, the figures are very low. These data are es­
timated to be valid for 75 per cent of the communal population. The re­
maining 25 per cent have a higher level of consumption. 
It is interesting to note that the amount spent for alcoholic bever­
ages, coca, and tobacco is over one-half that spent on food in the Yana-
huanca region and nearly one-half in the La Quinua region. Speaking of 
cost and not of volume, it is evident that food items (most of them local­
ly produced) are a good deal cheaper than alcoholic beverages, which nor­
mally are not produced in the region and therefore have the added cost of 
transportation and commercialization. 
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The students at the Gentro de Gapacitacion Gampesina in La Quinua 
were asked what they thought would be necessary to adequately feed and 
clothe a family of five each year. 
The results translated in money terms at local prices were the 
following; 
Food S/. 15,804.00 
Clothing 5,500.00 
Total S/. 21,304.00 
In another survey made in 11 communities by agrarian reform personnel 
(24), the people interviewed estimated that an average of 13,446 soles for 
food and 5,454 soles for clothing per year or a total of S/. 18,900 would 
be adequate. This represented only wfeat they thought a family of five 
^Farmers Training Center established in the Central Sierra by the 
Agrarian Reform Institute in 1964. 
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needed. -, It did not represent what they actually spent. 
The official estimate of the Agrarian Reform Institute in Tarma is that 
S/. 25,000 is the minimum necessary for a family of five in the Sierra. 
However, the statistics show that in Yanahuanca less than one-fifth of 
this amount is actually spent Cor equivalently consumed when not bought 
but home raised) per year and in La Quinua a little more than one-fourth 
this amount is spent (or equivalently consumed). 
As far as food is concerned, the money value is not so important, 
what is important is the caloric and protein content of the food used. A 
very rough approximation based on FAQ studies (7) indicates that the 
calorie content of an average daily ration for the family of five con­
sidered above for la Quinua area is 7,800 to 8,000 calories; The require­
ment for such a family according to the FAG studies would be approximately 
13,100 calories (8, p. 44). Deficiency in protein requirements is much 
greater than caloric deficiency if the FAG-WHO findings are applied to 
this particular situation (10). 
Low income of the large majority of the people of the area restricts 
the possibilities of an expanding market for both industrial and agricul­
tural products. This is the typical feature of underdeveloped countries 
and the great stumbling block for the expansion of the industrial produc­
tion sector for home consumption goods. 
To appreciate better the income levels in the area it will be appro­
priate to present here the findings of the Regional Census on this matter. 
The population of the two zones (Yanahuanca and La Quinua) that the 
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Regional Census studied were stratified into four groups using the princi­
pal and secondary occupation of the head of the family as the base. See 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Family and individual average yearly net income in two areas 
of Pasco Department 
Group La Quinua Yanahuanca 
Family Individual Family Individual 
Soles^ Soles^ Soles^ Soles^ 
1. Exclusively engaged in 
agricultural activities 4,743 1,134 2,000 515 
2. Agricultural occupation 
as principal but with a 
secondary occupation 
elsewhere 7,648 1,493 3 ,674 747 
3. Agricultural occupation 
as secondary; principal 
occupation elsewhere 12,521 2,198 10,582 2,202 
4. Non agricultural 
occupation 11,282 2,526 9,521 1,738 
^Unpublished data. Regional census. Agrarian Reform Institute 
Central Sierra Project (24). 
^In soles (26,8 soles = 1 dollar). 
Looking at Table 6, it clearly appears that Yanahuanca region is 
poorer than La Quinua region. This fact was also apparent in Table 5, The 
source of the two tables is different. Table 6 is the result of the 
Regional Census, while Table 5 is a result of a survey undertaken inde­
pendently of the Census, thus the two sources confirm the same fact. 
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People exclusively engaged in agricultural activities have in both regions 
a lower income than any other group. This group in Yanahuanca not only 
has an income less than one half of the income for the corresponding group 
in La Quinua, but it has a larger percentage of its population in the ex­
clusively agricultural group than La Quinua (3 7,74 per cent in La Quinua, 
63.2 per cent in Yanahuanca) (see Table 1). 
It is worth noticing that the differences between family incomes among 
regions in the same group and in the same region between groups are greater 
than between individual incomes. This point will be pressed further in 
Chapter V. 
In every group the income is higher than in the preceding one, except 
for the family income of group 4 in La Quinua, and for the family and in­
dividual income of the same group four in Yanahuanca. It is necessary to 
consider when viewing this last group that it was not possible to obtain 
all the income information from this group, and thus in many cases some in­
come may not have been declared. For this reason the recorded averages in 
group 4 are probably lower than they should be. 
Maybe the most challenging new factor appearing in the scene in 
underdeveloped countries and specifically in the area under study is the 
rising of expectations and the impact of "demonstration effect". Peasants 
are realizing through modern communication channels that others are living 
under better conditions than they are. Also, political propaganda and 
well intentioned local and foreign experts of international organizations 
are telling them that things could be better for themselves, too. All 
this is having an impact even on the fundamentally passive Indian. 
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The impact is shown in different instances such as; a) Emigration 
principally to Lima which occurs mainly not because jobs are available in 
the city, often they are not, but because they want to escape the miserable 
conditions of the rural area. There is also a strong emigration towards 
the high jungle (Geja de Montana) where conditions are not as difficult as 
in the Sierra and where there seems to be better employment opportunities, 
b) Invasions of haciendas land; The climate of agitation was ever present 
in the early sixties and especially in 1962 and 1963. Promises of agrarian 
reform and some shows of force of the Army under government orders, quieted 
down the invasions and uprisings, c) Desire for education as a means to 
get other jobs than agricultural ones and escape from agriculture. The 
typical answer we got questioning parents as why they were sending their 
children to school, especially to secondary school, was that they do not 
want their children to work in the fields, d) Desire for acquiring modern 
conveniences even if this means to go hungry for awhile. Transistor radios, 
record players when electricity is available, and a lot of other, mostly 
imported modern devices, are a common sight in poor villages and houses. 
This revolution of aspirations is putting heavy pressure for immediate 
change. The pressure is increased by the political awareness of the masses 
exploited by the action of political groups working for their own interests. 
In this way a climate for immediate accomplishments is created* Id does 
not seem impossible to use this drive for constructive purposes, for social 
and economic development. However, to channel this driving force into the 
right direction is admidtedly not easy. Improvements are expected right now. 
Urgency and thoughtfulness are not frequently at ease together. 
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G. Formulation of Hypotheses 
The two first parts of this chapter dealt with the physical, economi­
cal and population conditions of the area delimited by the study and with 
the defects in agricultural structures which obstruct development. TQiis 
third part (G) of Chapter II will deal with the formulation of hypothesis 
that seems relevant both to the diagnosis of the situation and to its 
probable solution. The hypotheses thus formulated will guide the effort 
throughout the following chapters. 
1. Role of hypothesis in inquiry 
The American College Dictionary gives the following definition of 
hypothesis: "a proposition (or a set of propositions) proposed as an 
explanation for the occurrence of some specific group of phenomena, either 
asserted as merely provisional conjecture to guide investigation, a working 
hypothesis, or accepted as highly probable in the light of established 
facts." 
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines hypothesis as something supposed 
or taken for granted, with the object of following out its consequences. 
The word hypothesis is from the Greek "ypotiphenai", which means to put 
under; in Latin the same word is translated into "suppositio", from "sub" 
and "ponere". 
The most important modern use is in relation to scientific investi­
gation. A scientist is not merely concerned to accumulate such 
facts as he can discover by observations; he wants to discover 
the linkages between facts. He is guided by some problem which 
puzzles him; but he needs to have some clue as to what facts will 
help him to solve his problem. His best guide is a tentative 
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hypothesis, which fits in with the existing body of doctrine 
and which is so framed that with its help he can deduce that 
under certain factual conditions (initial conditions) certain 
other facts would be found if the hypothesis were correct 
(6, Vol. 12, p. 248). 
Historically, hypotheses have been used in mathematics to demonstrate 
new propositions in a logical way. In Economics, hypotheses can be used 
not only as a logic exercise in purely analytical theory but also as a 
powerful means for advancement in the search of practical solutions. 
Hypotheses as a tool of economic investigation have been used and de­
veloped in the elaboration of a program of research conducted by Iowa State 
University in Peru (34, pp. 21-22). The present writer believes that he 
can do no better than to make use of this category for his own inquiry. 
According to this methodological framework there are the following 
types of hypotheses entering into the process of inquiry; delimiting, 
diagnostic and remedial. 
The logic of such a conceptualization is seen as soon as we consider 
the process of inquiry. For, first, there must be some delimiting of the 
scope. One cannot investigate or solve all problems unless one has un­
limited time and resources at one's disposal. This delimiting stage itself 
embraces three main substages; 
a. definition of the purpose or end-»in-view. It is the "terminus 
ad quem", the "where-we-want-to-arrive". 
b. departure point, that is to say, the existing situation from 
which we take our departure. 
c. determination and measurement of the gap between a and b. 
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Substages one and two lead themselves to hypothesization. One can 
make different suppositions about what is to be achieved based on the 
possibility and advisability of applying the means to attain it. 
Similarly, one can suppose the situation which exists to be such or 
such. Whatever the supposition, however, it has to be tested and supported 
by an analysis of the reality. 
In this first phase of inquiry other hypotheses of a more general 
nature than the ones included in the three substages have to be made. 
Examples are; acceptance of the purposes or ends-in-view by the people 
concerned; willingness to apply the means to attain the goals by whoever 
has to apply them; dissatisfaction with the actual situation, objectively 
and subjectively considered; and so forth. Many of these general hypotheses 
are either evident or will have to be taken as given in order to limit the 
research to a manageable form. 
Once the purpose is clearly stated and delimited and the existing 
situation recognized, diagnostic hypotheses about the problems involved in 
opening or closing the gap, or on the reasons why the gap is of such specific 
nature, can be formulated. 
Diagnosis will normally concentrate on the success and failure ele­
ments which have shaped the actual situation and which are responsible for 
the existing failure to reach the purpose assumed as an end-in-view. 
The testing of diagnostic hypotheses is not easy, particularly be­
cause the various elements do not act in isolation but are inter-related, 
and also because some key element might not be apparent at first sight. 
Wrong diagnosis leads to wrong solutions; to remedies which far from 
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curing rather serve to increase the difficulties and to spread frustration 
and dissatisfaction both among the people concerned and in the mind of the 
researcher. 
Correct diagnosis, on the contrary, is already one-half of the solu­
tion. It will lead to a correct formulation of the remedial solutions 
which will follow. These, because based on correct diagnosis, can, after 
careful testing, be proposed for application with confidence as to their 
reliability. 
2. Delimiting hypotheses 
This study is delimited to the economic aspects of agrarian reform, 
especially to agrarian reform in the Central Sierra of Peru as a means 
of economic development. This delimitation is in accord with the stated 
objective of this study (Chapter I, G). The hypothesis in which the de­
limitation is based is that one of the purposes of agrarian reform in Peru 
is the economic development of the nation, and that if this purpose is not 
attained the other purposes will not be attained either. 
The Peruvian Government may obviously have several ends-in-view 
for carrying on the agrarian reform. These various ends-in-view, we may 
assume, are mainly of a social, economic and political nature. In the 
study it is assumed that no matter what other ends-in-view the Govern­
ment of Peru may have, economic development as an end or purpose is neces­
sary, in the sense that the Government is not willing (nor can it afford) 
to sacrifice economic development as guidelines in the implementation of 
agrarian reform. 
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Proof that the assumption is correst rests on the first article of 
the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law which states: 
Agrarian reform is an integral, peaceful and democratic process 
for changing the agrarian structure of this country and promoting 
our economic and social development by substituting the system of 
excessively large and small estates for a just system of land 
ownership, tenure and operation that will serve to increase produc­
tion and productivity of the land, complemented with timely and 
adequate credit, technical aid and marketing and distribution of 
the products in such a manner that the land becomes a basis for 
economic stability, the foundation of progressive welfare and the 
guarantee of the dignity and freedom of the man who works the land. 
The political and social aspects of agrarian reform are obviously 
very important, but they can hardly be attained without the attainment of 
the economic objective. In fact, the farmers receiving land will have 
little lasting satisfaction if the land does not provide them with better 
income levels. Nor will the national and particularly the non-farm sector 
objectives be satisfied if the agrarian reform investment effort does not 
result in general economic development. 
The study is further delimited to the Central Sierra of Peru where 
priority has been given by the Peruvian Government for the application of 
the Agrarian Reform Law. 
3. Diagnostic hypotheses 
The Peruvian Legislature having enacted an agrarian reform law in 
which structural changes of the agricultural sector and economic develop­
ment are the objectives, has implicitly diagnosed that the actual agrarian 
structures are not conduaive to economic development. The analysis of the 
agrarian structures presented in this Chapter II, B, and in Chapter I, C, 
confirm this diagnosis. Further, the legislature had diagnosed that 
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transformed or new agrarian structures can facilitate economic develop-
ment. 
Land tenure structure is the outstanding structure which the Law re-
quires to be changed, but it is not the only one mentioned, (see the first 
article of the Law). It is clear therefore that the Law does not conceive 
agrarian reform as mere land redistribution, however, there is a danger 
of interpreting the Law and implementing it as if land redistribution was 
the main and practically the sole objective. To help avoid this danger a 
hypothesis to this effect will be formulated here and tested in Chapter V. 
This hypothesis is as follows; 
a) "Agrarian reform conceived as mere land redistribution is not 
going to solve the problem of the agricultural sector of the Central Sierra". 
With the data presented in Chapter I, 3 for the entire country, the 
preceding hypothesis has been tested as far as an equal redistribution is 
concerned. The aim however, is to test to the extent that, even or uneven 
distribution, if it is not more than that, is not going to solve the problem. 
Further the following hypothesis is formulated; 
b) "Agrarian reform if it is to help in any significant way to solve 
the problems of the Central Sierra of Peru has to be conceived primarily 
as an instrument for economic development of the area and the nation". 
This hypothesis follows from the basis established for the delimita­
tion of the study to the economic aspects of agrarian reform (11, C, 3) 
and somehow has been tested already in Chapter I, page 14, and will be 
further tested in Chapter V. 
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4. Remedial hypotheses and how these hypotheses will be tested 
The remedial hypotheses follow the diagnostic hypotheses. If, there­
fore, the agrarian reform is going to contribute to economic development 
through new or reformed structures because the present ones are not con­
ducive to economic development, then the purpose of agrarian reform has to 
be the creation and establishment of suitable structures for economic de­
velopment. Furthermore, the existing intervening gap between the present 
agricultural situation and the situation of an agricultural sector that 
positively contributes to economic development has to be filled by per­
tinent agrarian reform programs implemented in a period of time as short 
as possible and with the best use of the scarce resources that the agrarian 
reform organization possesses. On these premises the following hypotheses 
are formulated; 
c) "Agrarian reform will be a successful instrument to bring about 
economic development insofar as the new structures thus created are care­
fully selected and adequately constructed. An efficiency model can help 
to test the structures as to their adequacy to contribute to the economic 
development goals". 
d) "The implementation stage of the agrarian reform proves to be a 
difficult and slow undertaking, but can be expedited with the use of an 
action planning model in the vein of Critical Path and PERT methods." 
Hypothesis c) will be developed in Chapter III where the model will 
be constructed and in Chapter V where the proposition .will be tested. 
Hypothesis d) will be developed in Chapter IV, where the model will 
be presented and in Chapter V where the proposition will be tested in the 
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context of the agrarian reform law implementation in the Central Sierra. 
A final hypothesis will be presented to satisfy the remaining objec­
tives of this study which can be stated as follows; 
e) "There are some suitable alternatives for the solution of the 
problems that the present application of the agrarian reform law encounters 
in the vital aspects of land expropriation and land valuation". 
These final hypotheses will be tested at the end of Chapter V as an 
outgrowth of the agrarian reform experience in the Central Sierra. 
With the testing of these hypotheses the objectives of the study 
stated in Chapter I are expected to be attained. ïhese objectives were 
as follows; 
1) General objective: To analyze the conditions under which the 
agrarian reform in the Central Sierra of Peru can be instrumental to 
economic development, 
2) Specific objectives; a) To develop a model which could help in 
the selection and construction of the new structures in light of their ef­
ficiency in the attainment of economic development, b) To apply an action 
planning model in terms of Critical Path and PERT methods to the agrarian 
reform process. 3) To offer some alternatives for the solution of the prob­
lem that the present application of the Agrarian Reform Law encounters in 
the vital aspects of land expropriation and land valuation. 
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III. EFFICIENCY MODEL FOR TESTING AOIARIAN STRUCTURES AS TO 
THEIR ADEQUACY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GOAL 
As stated before, agrarian structures are considered as variables, 
man-made and capable of being changed by man. This basic fact gives mean­
ing to our research, for it would be of little value to find out that a 
specific structure helps or is an obstacle to economic development, if 
after all, nothing could be done about it. 
Recommendations to policy makers derived from the research results of 
this study are based primarily on economic considerations. The policy 
makers, however, have to consider in their totality the problems involved 
in applying the recommendations as far as changing, improving or maintain­
ing determinate structures. It is not impossible, therefore, that the 
policy maker finds that other non-economic variables weigh more than the 
economic ones and consequently the recommendations cannot be followed as 
they are proposed. Whenever that happens, new recommendations have to be 
worked out which have to take into account the non-economic considerations 
which act as restrictions on the achievement of economic policy goals. 
The efficiency model presented here has two parts, as follows; 
The first part has to do with the determination of the targets or ob­
jectives of the agricultural sector in the over-all national economic de­
velopment. In this part it should be clearly specified what contributions 
are expected from the agricultural sector to the general economic develop­
ment of the nation. 
In the second part, agrarian structures are analyzed and designed In 
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the light of the objectives of the first part. In other words, this 
second part intends to identify, discover, develop or otherwise build 
structures which could be instrumental to the economic development role 
assigned to the agricultural sector. 
The first part can be carried out relatively easy when there is a 
national development plan that assigns specific roles to the different 
sectors of the economy at the national and regional levels. Then the 
targets are already specified in their roles for policy guidance. 
Oftentimes, however, there is no national development plan, or it is 
too general for the purpose of providing targets for the model. In this 
case the potentialities of the agricultural sector, the national needs of 
agricultural products and the resources with which the agricultural sector 
could contribute to the general development process have to be determined 
before any meaningful objectives can be established. 
In Peru there is not yet a national and regional development plan that 
can be used to determine the objectives of the agricultural sector in the 
Central Sierra, Until a more comprehensive plan comes into existence the 
following approach could be used for the establishment of the targets in 
the Central Sierra. 
(a) Appraisal of the agricultural potentialities of the area, 
(b) Estimate of the regional, national and international markets 
(actual and potential in the near future) for agricultural products that 
could likely be produced in the area. 
(c) Estimate of the other contributions that the agricultural sector 
could make to the general economic development. 
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In (a) the following steps are taken; 
(1) An estimate of the actual use and potentialities of the avail­
able land in the area. This is a technical appraisal that has to be made 
by agronomists, soil specialists, livestock specialists and other techni­
cians. The technical appraisal can be done at different levels of approxi­
mation. Generally there will be neither sufficient time nor enough re­
sources available for an exhaustive survey and consequently only approxi­
mations will be obtained from the appriasal.^ 
If land is found which is not actually in use but could be used for 
agricultural purposes, the cost and required time to put it into operation 
is also estimated. 
(2) An estimate of the actual productivity levels for different crops 
presently grown under different farm organization systems, like "hacienda", 
individual farmers and "Gomunidades". 
(3) An estimate of the production costs for different crops grown 
under different farm organization systems. 
In (b) at least an approximation of the effective present and potential 
demand for the agricultural products of the area has to be achieved. 
It is possible that the present and near future needs of the existing 
markets do not coincide with the supply of products for which the land of 
the region is most suitable. In such a case, alternative physical produc­
tion possibilities have to be considered in the light of the effective 
demand. 
The model could make good use, in this first part, of the linear 
A 
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programing techniques, considering all the possibilities and restrictions. 
However, it is beyond the purpose and limitations of the present study to 
develop further this part of the model with linear programing techniques. 
Once the investigations set forth in (a), (b) and (c) have been made 
at the best possible level, targets or objectives can be established for 
the Agricultural sector in a specified area. 
No systematic investigation of these three points (a, b, c) has been 
made in the Central Sierra because of data limitations. Therefore, only 
broad targets can be established here for the agricultural sector of the 
Central Sierra. 
Three propositions are thought to cover the fundamental points which 
have to guide the structural changes in the Central Sierra through the 
agrarian reform process. These propositions are; 
(A) Increase agricultural and livestock production, 
(B) Increase the efficiency of the production factors, and 
(C) Transfer production factors, especially manpower intra-sectorally 
and extra-sectorally, according to the different sector needs and consistent 
with a balanced national economic development. 
These three propositions will be taken às targets. Each one will be 
further specified presently. 
(A) Increase agricultural and livestock production; The proposition 
is based in part on the demand and in part on the actual possibility of 
production increase. 
The unsatisfied demand is clear in the case of meat. Peru is import­
ing meat for home consumption (40,074.7 M.T. need to be imported in 1963, 
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(36, p. 141). Furthermore, it is estimated that a large part of the Peru­
vian population is eating very little meat because it is not available or 
the price is too high for their budgets.^ However, one of the main ac­
tivities of the Central Sierra is livestock raising. 
In the case of other productions typical of the Central Sierra like 
barley, potatoes, and oca, it does not seem there will be a problem of 
shortage of demand for them if production is increased, but rather a prob­
lem of storage and market facilities. For vegetables and generally for 
truck farming, products, produced in the Central Sierra (Tarma Valley, 
Jauja and Huancayo) the demand should continue to increase if income of a 
large part of the population increases, and if the income elasticities of 
demand in Peru are similar to the ones in other parts of the world (30, 
pp. 71-73)Problems, however, might arise due to marketing deficiencies 
and to lack of production planning among producers which can lead to sur­
pluses and shortages at times. 
Estimates of the precise increases of production in kind and magnitude 
required to satisfy the demand will not be easy to make with available 
knowledge. Tentative approximations, however, might prove to be good 
enough in the beginning. 
^Total consumption of meat (produced + imported) for 1963 was 206,576.3 
M.T. (36, p. 142). As an average therefore, each individual in Peru ate 
18.-kgs/year or 49.2 grs. daily, equivalent to 1.74 oz. 
^H. Van de Metering has recently estimated that an annual increase 
of 19.08 per cent of supply of vegetables and an increase of 6.68 per cent 
of supply of tubers is needed between 1963 and 1970 to meet nutritional 
standards of an ideal diet in Peru in 1970 (38, p. 6). 
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Fernando Belaunde, the President of Peru, set up as an overall ob­
jective for Peru in the amount of an increase of 33 per cent of agricul­
tural output for the period 1964-70 (3, p. 451). Given the actual levels 
of production in the Central Sierra it does not seem difficult to reach 
the President's quantified target in the area. If the Gomumidades could 
attain the production levels of some of the haciendas and the production 
level of the haciendas' land that will be expropriated could be maintained, 
the increase in output could very easily be greater than 33 per cent in 
the period ending in 1970. 
Further, as it has been seen, not all available land is actually used 
(see preceding chapter, Table 4), and large percentages of labor are also 
underutilized. 
In the study of Gomunidades carried out in the Gentral Sierra by the 
Agrarian Reform Institute termed the Regional Census in the preceding 
chapter, the following excessive man-day utilizations were found in 25 
Gomunidades of the Pasco Department where cattle raising is the principal 
activity (see Table 7). 
(B) Increase the efficiency of the production factors; The low pro­
ductivity of the livestock of the Gomunidades has been seen in the preceding 
Chapter (II, B, 2). Likewise, the low productivity of labor and capital 
can be shown. In fact, the study of Gomunidades in the Gentral Sierra, 
cited earlier as the Regional Census, shows for all Gomunidades studied that 
the average gross agricultural productivity (crop and livestock combined) 
per man-day was only 11.87 soles in 1963-64 with a range from S/. 2.78 in 
the Gomunidad of Huayllay, to S/. 3 5.95 in the Comunidad of San Pedro de 
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Table 7. Inefficiencies in the use of manpower in 25 Gomunidades 
Number of Gomunidades Percentages use of excess 
man-days^ 
6 90 to 95 
85 to 89 
8 80 to 
CO 
3 75 to 79 
2 70 to 74 
2 65 to 69^ 
25 
By excess man-days it is meant the number of man-days worked which 
could be saved if the cattle operations were operated in a more efficient 
way, as under bigger units and without using more labor than it is con­
sidered necessary by the efficient Haciendas of the area for a given 
number of cattle. 
The formula used is: 
(U - N) X ICQ _ „ 
where U = number of man-days used 
N = number of man-days needed. 
^The range was from 65.22% in the Gomunidad of Paucar to 95% in the 
Gomunidad of Ghaupimarca. 
Racco. (Rate of exchange is 1 dollar equals 26,80 soles). 
The gross average productivity per man day in the Algolan haciendas 
was in the year 1963, 178.63 soles. In the Algolan haciendas, farm ac­
counts were well kept and, therefore, all gross income was registered, while 
some underestimation might have taken place in calculating the Gomunidades' 
gross income. On the other hand, the man days per year has probably been 
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overestimated in the Algolan haciendas. In fact, of the 380 men working 
in the haciendas it has been supposed that all of them had worked 365 
days, which is not true at least for the workers and foremen. 
A study done by the author in several Gomunidades on the net produc­
tivity of the capital invested in livestock production by those Gomunidades 
shows returns of less than one per cent (0.8 to 0.9 of one per cent). 
This is a very low rate of productivity for the capital, especially when it 
is considered (1) that only the capital invested in land (estimate price of 
the land at prices set by the agrarian reform valuation methods), in live­
stock and some installations (corrals only) was taken into consideration, 
(2) that the imputed salary to labor was set at the low level of 15 soles 
per day, and (3) that no other expenses than labor were considered. 
What in fact was considered in the preceding calculation was the fixed 
capital of land and installations and the variable capital, or more exactly 
the short term fixed capital, livestock. (The calculation of the livestock 
was done on the basis of an average number of heads, disregarding the in­
creases and decreases which took place during the year). In order to esti­
mate the net income with precision all the costs should be taken into con­
sideration (fixed and variable costs). Apparently there are no fixed costs 
that can be estimated in this case. Taxes are not paid, the rent paid by 
the members of the Comunidad was considered as income to the Gomunidad not 
as a cost because the over-all revenue of the Comunidad was the relevant 
point. There were some fixed costs for the outkeeping of the installations, 
but these appear to be small and certainly difficult to estimate. There 
are no land conservation practices, rather there is disinvestment with the 
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destruction of pastures due to the overgrazing practices which are the re­
sult of the excess number of livestock in relation to the supportability 
of the land. The care of the livestock represents to a certain extent a 
variable cost in relation to the number of livestock. The main part of 
this cost is in the form of labor wages, (paid or imputed). The other 
variable costs, like sanitary practices and the like, are, it seems, of 
some importance in spite of the actual low technical levels of production 
maintained by the Comunidades. Those costs, however, could not be calcu­
lated for lack of reliable data. This is the reason why only labor ex­
penses were taken into consideration. 
The net productivity of the capital invested in the Algolan haciendas 
was for the year 1963, 4.95 per cent. The estimate is based on the selling 
price of the Algolan haciendas and actually paid by the Peruvian Government, 
which includes land, roads, channels, drainage and other infrastructure 
improvements, buildings, furniture, equipment, telephone installations, and 
so on. If, however, the price stated in the Algolan books is taken instead 
of the price actually paid, the net productivity of the capital expressed 
in the price, would be about 4 per cent. For a more exact evaluation of 
the difference between the productivity of the capital invested in the 
agricultural operations of the Comunidades and in the haciendas, it has to 
be pointed out that the net income taken as a base for the calculation of 
the- productivity of Algolan invested capital, was the net income after 
taxes were paid (taxes amounted to S/. 1,158,3 96.75). In the Comunidades 
no tax deduction was made simply because Comunidades are tax exempt, and 
consequently do not pay taxes. 
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From comparisons among Gomunidades and much more between Comunidades 
and haciendas, it seems that there is a good possibility of improvement of 
the productivity of the production factors in the Gomunidades. 
Here, it can be asked why some Gomunidades are more efficient than 
others, and why some haciendas are much more efficient than Gomunidades in 
the use of the production factors. This question appears very relevant 
to the solution of the economic problems of the Gomunidades. Further 
analysis on this point will be made in Ghapter V. 
A study of the marginal costs could also be of great help for the im­
provement of the economic efficiency of the production factors in the agri­
cultural operations of the Gomunidades. Scant and unreliable data, however, 
will prevent conducting this kind of study in Ghapter V much beyond the 
conceptual stage. 
More important perhaps would be a study of the different production 
functions with which the Gomunidades are faced. On the basis of the actual 
knowledge of the Gomunidades of the Gentral Sierra, it can be hypothesized 
that the Gomunidades in their production functions are in the segment of 
increasing returns per new unit of input used in the form of new technology 
but they are in the falling segment or stage of decreasing returns in re­
lation to the number of livestock in a given land. 
Unless the productivity of the factors is increased, the cost of pro­
duction per unit produced will be high, because more inputs are used than 
necessary for the same level of production, and although the prices of some 
of the extra inputs might be very low, like labor in some cases, nonetheless 
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there is an unnecessary additionlto the cost. As a consequence of the high 
cost of production, the prices of the agricultural products will tend to be 
high. The main reason, however, for the actual high agricultural prices 
at retail level in Peru is the scarcity at times and always the high profits 
taken by the middleman. On the other hand, farm income will tend to be 
low because of the high costs of production, the low productivity levels 
and the limited power the Gomunidades have to increase selling prices, all 
of which reduces the margin of profits, 
(G) Transfer production factors, especially man power; Intra-
sectorally and extra-sectorally, according to the different sectors needs 
and consistent with a balanced national economic development. An important 
part of the contribution of Agriculture to other sectors of the economy 
and to the general economic development in the economically developed 
nations was made through the transfer from agriculture of land, capital 
and man power (19, 22, 25). 
Land was transferred from agriculture for the sites of cities, high­
ways, airports, factories. Capital was transferred in the form of direct 
farm savings as capital claims or as forced savings like taxes, and in­
directly through the industrial and service sectors' savings made possible 
by the low prices of the agricultural products. Some forms of embodied 
capital were also transferred like the expenses incurred in the upbringing 
of the transferred man power. Man power itself was transferred to industry 
and services to satisfy the increasing demand for it and allow the expansion 
of the industrial and services sectors. 
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Today's situation in underdeveloped^ countries does not seem to paral­
lel exactly the situation of the developed nations in a similar stage of 
development. This seems to be particularly true with reference to man 
power surplus. For one thing, the demographic increase rate seems to be 
higher in the underdeveloped countries than it was in the developed countries 
2 in a comparable development stage. Furthermore, most of the industries 
Underdeveloped or less developed are comparative terms. An under­
developed country is a country which is developed economically under what 
it could be. In this sense the Jacob Viner's definition could be used, 
"a country which has good potential prospects for using more capital or 
more labor or more available natural resources, or all of these, to support 
its present population on a higher level of living, or, if its per capita 
income level is already fairly high, to support a larger population on a 
not lower level of living" (39, p. 12). According to Viner's definition 
all nations, except the hopeless ones, are under developed. It is not, 
however, in terms of Viner's definition that we think when we employ the 
adjective underdeveloped. It is rather in the sense of poor nations -
poorer than others. Surely these nations could use more capital and so on, 
but it is not this characteristic which places them in the category of 
underdevelopment but the distance they find themselves behind the more 
developed nations. Then the comparison is made in relation to the devel­
opment of other nations in terms of the average per capita income, or in 
terms of per capita production of certain key products, like electricity, 
steel, cement and so on. If they do not reach certain levels, they are 
considered underdeveloped. 
2 
The evidence of the demographic tempo difference rests on the 
data of the National Demographic Census of the developedcountries re­
ferring to the past years when the economic development started, and on 
the other part on the National Demographic Census of the under­
developed countries, published yearly by the U,N, Demographic Year­
book. 
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established in underdeveloped countries tend to adopt the labor saving 
methods actually used in nations where labor is scarce and expensive. 
Certain kinds of new agricultural techniques adopted in underdeveloped 
countries tend also to reduce the labor need in the agricultural sector 
itself.^ 
Therefore, the labor available for transfer in the agricultural sector 
is larger than the demand for it. This surplus labor has become one of the 
most challenging problems of underdevelopment. 
In most of the Central Sierra the agricultural sector is confronted 
with the problem of over-population in the sense defined by Georgescu-
Roegen "a situation in which under conditions of full employment, the mar­
ginal productivity of labor falls short of the minimum subsistence of the 
worker" (12). This fact is easy to prove with the figures given above of 
the low average gross productivity of labor. 
Furthermore, in the previously mentioned study of the comunidades, 
(Regional Census) it was found that 46.2 per cent of the total population 
is under 16 years of age. Tomorrow's outlook of over-population problems 
is therefore darker than the today's reality. 
The agricultural sector, whether under the Capitalist (Mill-
Marshallian) or under the Marxist-Leninist model, has always been forced to 
^New technology and particularly agricultural technology, does not need 
to reduce labor inputs necessarily. Some types of technology increase out­
puts while increasing productivity of labor and the number of labor itself, 
for instance technology directed to the intensification of the use of land 
like fertilization and irrigation practices. There are, however, other 
types of technology which are purposely designed for labor saving (capital 
substituting for labor) whether it increases production or it keeps it at 
the same level, harvesting machinery for instance. ^ 
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make a greater sacrifice for the general economic development than other 
sectors of the economy (25). In underdeveloped countries a further hard­
ship seems to be imposed on the agricultural sector forcing it to keep and 
support the redundant farm labor. Conditions, however, may become so hard 
that substantial parts of the farm people might move into the cities, as it 
is actually happening in Latin America, even if the city cannot offer them 
any economically useful occupation. 
Although economic problems of the general economy and of the agricul­
tural sector will not be ultimately alleviated until the general economic 
development of the country takes place, it might not seem appropriate to 
completely subordinate the agricultural sector, and consequently the larger 
part of the nation's population to the general economic development. 
Insofar as the latter consideration merits to be taken into considera­
tion, a whole rethinking of the role of the agricultural sector in the re­
source transfer has to take place. 
When for instance the release rate of labor from agriculture must be 
slowed down because other sectors cannot absorb it, agriculture should be 
provided with adequate means to do so. These means may signify a reverse 
of the traditional tax concept imposed on the agricultural sector. 
The first part of the model is completed when the targets are deter­
mined. In the present case three basic targets have been identified. 
(A) Increase agricultural and livestock production 
(B) Increase the efficiency of the production factors 
(C) Transfer production factors, especially manpower, from agriculture 
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to other sectors of the economy, at a rate consistent with the general 
economic development of the nation. 
Targets, however, might be competitive rather than complementary, de­
pending on the circumstances of the agricultural sector in relation to 
other sectors of the economy. 
In the case of the Central Sierra, for example, productivity and re­
sources transfer appear competitive with respect to labor. Labor produc­
tivity cannot easily increase without having the redundant farm labor 
transferred. The transfer, however, is not possible, at least in substan­
tial quantities, because there are not enough job opportunities outside 
the agricultural sector of the area. 
In cases like these, workable solutions have to be found. The 
second part of the present model tries to find practical solutions to this 
and other problems. 
In the second part of the model two questions have to be answered; 
1) What are the crucial agrarian structures in the Central Sierra 
that could help most to attain the targets? 
2) How should these structures be designed to maximize their poten­
tialities in order to attain the targets and solve the possible conflicts 
among targets? 
The answer to these two questions gives a set of conceptual structures 
suitable for practical application. The application to reality, however, 
will be conditioned by the limitations imposed by legal, social and political 
restrictions which cannot be changed in the short run. A time constraint, 
therefore, can put a limit to the perfect flexibility required for imple­
mentation of ideal solutions. 
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The first questionsnamely what are the crucial agrarian structures 
in the Central Sierra that could contribute toward the attainment of the 
targets, will be answered here with an identification of structures, follow­
ed by an analysis of the inclusion of each of them. 
The crucial agrarian structures seem to be the following; a) Land 
tenure arrangements, b) marketing facilities, c) credit facilities and 
d) technical assistance and educational facilities, 
a) Land tenure arrangements; In the present study land tenure ar­
rangements mean the form of land ownership, the rights and obligations con­
nected with land ownership or land lease, land prices, the production or­
ganization and the extension and limitations of farm size. 
All enumerated aspects of land tenure may greatly effect production, 
productivity and factor transfer. This can be easily understood and will 
be shown later. 
b) Marketing facilities; The function of marketing is to bring the 
products from the producer to the consumer and reporting back to the pro­
ducer, through demand and prices, the desires of the consumers. Marketing, 
therefore, performs a service both to the producer and to the consumer. 
Marketing deficiencies discourage production and productivity in the 
part of the producer and may turn the consumer to other substitutes or to 
foreign imports. 
The marketing structure advocated here as remedial is an efficient 
agricultural marketing organization which could operate at the lowest 
possible cost and which as a consequence could reduce the retail prices 
to the consumer while paying the highest possible price to the farmer for 
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his products. Furthermore, market facilities should be an efficient dis­
tribution system avoiding delays and waste, a sales promoter and above all 
an orientation for the production and a stimulus for the farmer to orientate 
his production toward the market, or in other words to help him out of the 
subsistence farming and introduce him into commercial farming. 
c. Credit facilities; The function of agricultural credit is to pro­
vide the farmer with the means to finance agricultural operations and im­
provements which otherwise he could not be able to undertake. The facili­
ties to obtaina loan, the term for which it is given and the price to be 
paid for it greatly influence the use of credit by the farmers. 
The type of credit facilities envisaged here is essentially orientated 
toward development and well aware of the poverty and backwardness situation 
of the farmers. That is to say, credit is looked upon as an instrument to 
promote one type of crop rather than another, one type of improvement rather 
than another an over-all view of agricultural production planning for 
development. At the same time credit cannot be managed on the traditional 
commercial lines. In other words, it has to be cheap for the farmer, it 
has to be readily available when needed and it has to involve risks. The 
risks involved in innovations that the farmers undertake with credit should 
fall upon the credit agencies rather than upon the farmers, otherwise they 
will not innovate. 
A credit system not established in these lines favors only a very 
small minority of farmers who can afford to pay the high interest rates 
^For instance if there is surplus labor that cannot be transferred 
elsewhere, the credit should favor innovations which require labor in­
tensive use. 
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and have the collateral demanded by the Commercial Banks, This type of 
credit does not help substantially the agricultural development in the 
conditions of underdeveloped countries. 
d) Technical assistance and education facilities; Technical assistance 
to the farmers means a transfer of knowledge and technical skills about 
cultivation methods, livestock raising, farm building techniques and so on, 
as well as making available to the farmers the embodied technical innova­
tions like machines, improved seeds, fertilizer and so on. The main pur­
pose of technical assistance is to improve the production efficiency. 
Cultivation and livestock raising methods are so primitive in the 
Central Sierra that the slightest improvement is liable to have an effect 
more than proportionate to the cost. Expressing the same thing in a more 
formal way, in most of the Central Sierra farms the production function 
with respect to technical innovations is in the more than proportional in­
creasing returns segment. 
In Peru as in most of the underdeveloped countries the limiting factor 
to technical assistance is not so much the cost of it as the availability 
of competent extensionists. Therefore, the technical assistance visualized 
here includes the organization effort to carry on an extension work by any­
one capable of communicating his knowledge to others; therefore, farmers 
who might not have any formal training but know exceptionally well some 
cultivation technique and are able to communicate their knowledge to other 
farmers can be enlisted on the technical assistance team. A group of uni­
versity trained extensionists, agriculturists and animal husbandry men would 
lead the effort and train others. This group should be especially gifted 
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and trained in human relations, capable of understanding and leading the 
farmers. Intermediate and low level extensionist training should be pro­
vided to farm people of the area who could be capable of assimilating the 
knowledge and capable of communicating it to others. 
Education means to bring up, to develop and train the intellectual as 
well as the manual capabilities of a person. Economically it can be con­
sidered as an investment in the man power factor to make it more efficient.^ 
Education completes technical assistance and in a sense conditions it. 
The basic aim of the education facilities contended here is to train 
rural people in simple and useful skills needed for development and in how 
to get their minds to work as well as teaching them reading, writing and 
arithmetic. 
Education plays a main role in the increased agricultural production 
as well as in the resources transfer, particularly manpower transfer from 
agriculture to other occupations. 
Further ideas on the importance of education in the economic develop­
ment effort are developed by authors like John Kenneth Galbraith in Chapter 
V of his book "Economic Development in Perspective" (11), Clifton R. Wharton 
Jr. in Chapter 10 "Education and Agricultural Growth; The Role of Education 
in Early-Stage Agriculture, in the book "Education and Economic Develop­
ment" (40), Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers in their book "Education, 
Manpower and Economic Growth. Strategies of Human Resource Development'.' (13) 
^For a further discussion of this point see for instance, T. W. Schultz 
"The Economic value of Education" (31). 
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IV. ACTION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION MODEL 
The targets and the structures which could most likely help to attain 
the targets were presented in the preceding Chapter, The present Chapter 
will deal with the implementation stage in which the new structures are 
established and used as instruments to attain the targets. It is assumed 
that the targets previously identified and the instruments are embodied in 
an agrarian reform process and, therefore, the model to be presented here 
will refer to the agrarian reform implementation stage. 
Many technically good agrarian reform laws prove quite inefficient or 
become completely paralyzed at the implementation stage. Apart from the 
positive action of large landowners and opposition groups to stop or make 
difficult the implementation of the agrarian reform, there is an intrinsic 
reason for the agrarian reform failure at the implementation level. This 
is the lack of a consistent and realistic action plan, with the consequence 
of improvisations, poor use of scarce resources, mistakes, delays and 
repetitions. 
Much of the problem could be solved with the application of a good 
action planning model. This type of planning model should have the 
following qualities. 
1) It should give an overfall view of the complexity of the practical 
application process of agrarian reform to allow an accurate evaluation of 
the magnitude of the undertaking at the starting point. 
2) It should enable the agrarian reform policy makers to foresee all 
the resources needed in a time perspective, namely what resources and when 
they will be needed. 
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3) It should point out the possible bottlenecks, the series of ac­
tions which will require longer time and consequently delay the completion 
of the program. 
4) It should estimate the time and cost each action will require for 
its completion. 
5) It should provide for a continuous and effective evaluation of the 
program's progress during the execution period. 
The planning and implementation model presented here intends to re­
spond to the quality requirement stated above. The model has been inspired 
by the GPM (Critical Path Method) and PERT (Program ^ Valuation Review Tech­
nique). The essential elements of these methods have been retained and 
adapted to the specific needs of agrarian reform action programs. 
GPM (Critical Path Method) had its beginning in 1956 when the Construc­
tion Division of E. I. duPont de Nemours became interested in developing a 
more effective method of planning, scheduling and coordinating new plant 
construction and in coordination with engineers of the Sperry-Rand Corpora­
tion developed a method designated as "Project Planning and Scheduling Sys­
tem" ( duPont report No. 6959) which formed the basis of what is now com­
monly known as GPM (Critical Path Method). 
About the same time duPont was working on its method, another parallel 
mathod, but of different approach, was developed by the firm Booz-Allen and 
Hamilton working under the sponsorship of the Special Projects Office, 
Bureau of Ordinance, U.S. Navy, which method was to be used for management 
control over contracts for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program. This method, 
formerly called "Program Evaluation Research Task" was later changed to 
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"Program Evaluation and Review Technique" and is commonly known by the short 
title of PERT. The successful completion of the Polaris Missile develop­
ment, some two years ahead of anticipated time, is largely credited to the 
effective application of the PERT system of control. 
In its initial development PERT was intended to effect control over 
many separate contracts involved in a single program. To a large extent 
these contracts involved research development work and the manufacture of 
components and parts that had never before been built. For this reason 
neither time nor cost could be estimated accurately. Cost, in fact, was 
not a part of PERT initially; later, however the method was revised to in­
clude costs resulting in the publication of a standardized method called 
PERT COST, which has been adopted for control of contract work in research 
and development programs administered by the Department of Defense and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (DOD and NASA). 
CPM, as distinguished from PERT, may properly be classified as a de­
terministic rather than a probabilistic program as it is PERT (from the 
nature of determining the time of occurrence of events). In the full ap­
plication of CPM both time and cost are controlling variables, and it re­
quires and presumes that both cost and time can be estimated (or determined) 
with reasonable certainty and accuracy. Furthermore CPM concerns itself 
principally with "activities" rather than "events" and hence it may be 
described as "activity orientated", rather than "event orientated" as is 
PERT. 
Of the two systems there seems to be general agreement that for research 
and development programs, PERT is more applicable, while CPM serves as 
a more useful purpose and is best suited for construction work and needs 
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of the construction industry. 
The model proceeds through the following steps; 
1, The objectives intended to be accomplished by the program are dis­
tinctly stated. 2. A clear and specific knowledge of the starting point 
is acquired. 3. The logical steps of all the actions needed to go from 
the starting point 2, to the objectives 1, are constructed. 4. Time for 
the accomplishment of each step is specified. 5. Cost of accomplishing 
each step is also specified. 6. Needed resources for the fulfillment of 
the entire program are assessed. 7. A periodical review of the progress 
of the program is done once the program is under way and the preceding steps 
have been taken. 
Now a more detailed exposition of each step will be presented. 
Step 1) Statement of objectives; Oftentimes agrarian reform objectives 
are expressed in a retorical and vague way by politicians mainly interested 
in capturing the imagination of the people. However, if effective planning 
is wanted, the objectives have to be clearly and specifically stated in a 
clear-cut and nonambiguous way. 
The determination of the objectives can be made at any level provided 
it can be done clearly and precisely. For example, at a national level, 
one objective could be to divide the whole country into agrarian reform 
zones on geographical and ecological basis. At a local level the objective 
could be to expropriate farm "A" and distribute the land among "X" number 
of farmers. 
An agrarian reform is a sum of a number of partial objectives at dif­
ferent levels. Some objectives are to be attained before others can be 
attained. Some are of vital importance while others are only secondary. 
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Therefore, a priority list of objectives has to be developed and work 
should start with the top priority ones assuming as it is the normal case, 
that there are limited resources available for the agrarian reform imple­
mentation. 
Step 2) Clear and specific knowledge of the starting point; Once 
an objective has been specifically stated it becomes the target or end-in-
view of the project. No useful planning, however, can be done until the 
departure point is well known. If, for instance, the objective is the re­
distribution of the land in zone B, the actual land distribution, the region 
land resources, the population numbers, qualification and needs, the legal 
statutes of the land and water rights, etc. have to be known. The first 
part of the planning will be, therefore, to find out how much do we know 
of these basic facts. From the actual situation as it is now known the 
planning steps will start. 
Step 3) Construction of the logic steps of all actions needed to go 
from the starting point (actual knowledge) to the objective; The target 
has been established as well as the departure point on the basis of the 
existing knowledge of the reality. The model requires now the construction 
of a complete network of steps or actions necessary to go from the actual 
situation to the objective. The steps have to be set in logical order. 
The essential qualities of the network construction are: 
1) strict logic in the ordering of the steps, 2) complete break­
down of actions, avoiding aggregates of actions in a single step, and 3) 
no action to be omitted. 
Let the thought be clarified with an example; 
84 
First, refer to strict logic in the ordering of.steps. Before land 
can be distributed, land must be acquired and its production potential as­
sessed, the necessary legal steps have to be taken and the land has to be 
valued. 
Second, refer to the complete breakdown of actions. Contract person­
nel for implementing an agrarian reform project is an aggregate of actions. 
The personnel to be contracted has to be specified in every category. It 
might also happen that not everyone has to be contracted at the same time, 
nor will it take the same time to find personnel of each category. The 
breakdown demands, therefore, to put the general statement into specific 
actions, as for example, contract two agronomists, contract a secretary, etc. 
Third, refer to no action can be omitted. For instance, if a legal 
investigation is omitted, or a financial arrangement is omitted, the net­
work will be incomplete. Then the necessary arrangements for the omitted 
actions will not be made and the whole program will be in fault because of 
these actions that were overlooked. 
The network will normally have parallel lines, namely a group of ac­
tions that can be accomplished concurrently in time. 
Often the same things can be accomplished in different ways and conse­
quently alternatives are opened in the planning. In action planning the 
most obvious alternatives, at least, should be considered to allow flexi­
bility in the distribution of the use of the scarce resources. The decision 
as to what alternative is taken will come after all groups of action that 
can and have to be accomplished concurrently in time are established. 
Then it is possible to find the alternatives which can make the best use of 
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the scarce resources. 
Step 4) Time evaluation; Once the network of actions or activities 
has been completed, and graphically represented, the time required for the 
completion of each action has to be estimated. Obviously, the estimates 
will not be easy in many instances due to the lack of previous experience 
and the many psychological perturbing factors often involved in the action 
imp1ementat ion. 
The procedure used to obtain estimates of the activity time (t) and 
the variance of the activity time (o^ t) is through interrogating the per­
sonnel involved at each action. Ideally, from them a probability density 
function should be obtained. In fact, however, a distribution approximated 
by three parameters is the most that can be expected. The three parameters 
are ; 
1. The most likely time necessary to complete the action. 
2. An optimistic activity time. 
3. A pessimistic activity time. 
The estimated t and t have been given by Malcolm, Roseboom, Clark 
and Fazar (20) as; 
1. t=j[2m+ %(a + b)] and 
2- t = [|(a - b)]2 
where; m = most likely activity time; a = pessimistic activity time; and 
b = optimistic activity time. 
Equation 1 can be put in a more simplified way as follows; 
t = a + Am + b 
6 
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The meaning of the equation is now easier to understand. What it has 
done in reality is to give different weights to the different parameters. 
The most likely time is given 4 times more weight than each of the ex­
tremes because it is supposed that the distribution approaches the normal 
curve. 
The total time needed for the completion of the program is the sum of 
the time required for the completion of each action in the longest time 
requiring series of actions. The Critical Path is the series of actions 
which require the longest time for its completion. 
To clarify what has been said a simplified example is demonstrated in 
the Critical Path diagram, Figure 9. 
The encircled numbers are called events, while the connecting lines 
from an event to another or from one encircled number to another are called 
activities. The numbers above the connecting lines represent the time in 
months to complete the activity. 
In the example there is an independent event 5 , all others start 
with event 0 . This could represent an action that can start or has al­
ready started independently of the actual program but it is needed for the 
completion of the actual program,. The calculation of the time for each 
series of events and activities is done separately from the starting event. 
The highest addition shows the total time needed for the completion of the 
program and indicates at the same time where the Critical Path is. 
Therefore, there are four series of actions; three starting from 
event 0 , and one starting from event 5 . 
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FIGURE 9. A. LOGICAL CONNECTIONS 
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(a) (b) Cc) (d) 
0 to 1, mo. 0 to 1, % mo. 0 to 1, % mo. 5 to 7, 3 mo. 
1 to 2, 2 mo. 1 to 3, 1 mo. 1 to 4, 2 mo. 7 to 9, 3 mo. 
2 to 6, 1 mo. 3 to 6, 2 mo. 4 to 7, 4 mo. 
6 to 8, 2 mo. 6 to 8, 2 mo. 7 to 9, 3 mo. 
8 to 9, 3 mo. 8 to 9, 3 mo. 
Total 8% mo. 8% mo. % mo. 6 mo. 
Series (c) is the one that requires more time for its completion and 
consequently is the series that determines the total time of the project 
and the Critical Path. If the time could be shortened one month, there 
would be no Critical Path and no delays. The series (d) can start, if 
it is convenient, three months and a half later than the program. Series 
(a) and (b) can be delayed one month at the most convenient stage after 
event one. 
In the Critical Path Series the time can often be shortened by using 
more factors, unless, of course, the delay is due to some intrinsic reason 
impossible to alter, for instance a 60 day period given to the landlords 
by the Law between the announcement of expropriation and the expropriation 
itself. 
Whenever the time reduction is possible the choice will be between the 
time saved and the cost of saving this time. The cost has to be considered, 
however, in the context of the entire program not in the time reduction ef­
fort only. It is quite possible that the time reduction could save a sub­
stantial amount of money in the other series, avoiding delays and being able 
to make a full use of the resources involved in the Program. 
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Once the time has been determined for each action or activity, there 
is a more practical and useful way of presenting the graph namely in a time 
dimension as shown in the Critical Path diagram, Figure 10. 
Every activity is represented with the length of the time required. 
The horizontal measure bar can express not only time in abstract but the 
specific time starting from the first day of the Program, say July 15 or 
August 1. 
Step 5) Cost evaluation; The cost evaluation can be done the same way 
as the time evaluation. The variables relevant to the cost are the time 
each activity will need, the resources involved in each activity, and the 
prices of the resources to be used. Double counting has to be avoided when 
some resources contribute to several activities at the same time. 
Step 6) Resources evaluation; It is not difficult to get a list of 
resource requirements in a time sequence revising the Program after the time 
requirements have been established and the cost estimated. Now the policy 
maker and the Program implementors have a clear picture of the Program or 
Project requirements in terms of resources, time and money. They now see 
the complexity of the Project and consequently they can plan the adequate 
strategies for securing the resources, for avoiding the unnecessary delays 
and bottlenecks, or, at least they can plan ahead for the use of the re­
sources in something else during the slack periods. Further, the policy 
makers are now able to coordinate the Project with other projects. 
Incidentally, the Model could be of great help in preparing the yearly 
budgets, showing clearly to the legislators for what purposes the money is 
asked, how waste of resources is avoided, and what the consequences would 
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be in the different projects if there is a budget cut at any specified 
level. 
i 
Step 7) Progress review; The diagram of Figure 10 helps to make a 
periodic examination of the work accomplished and to detect delays or ad­
vances over the plans as well as other anomalities. This progress review 
will allow the personnel responsible for executing the program to make the 
necessary adjustments to avoid waste of resources and time delays. 
After the examination, a green sign over the activity line would in­
dicate that the project proceeds according to plans; a red sign would indi­
cate that there are delays in the activity performance. A blue sign would 
indicate that the activity is proceeding at a faster speed than the one 
estimated in the plan, and finally an amber sign would indicate that some­
thing is not proceeding well, although a clear diagnosis cannot be made with 
the available knowledge and, therefore, further investigation is required.^ 
A practical application of the Model will be presented in the next 
chapter in connection with the Central Sierra agrarian reform project. 
Three programs were planned under the guidelines of the Planning Model just 
presented. The success was very limited due to the fact that only one of 
the programs got into the implementation stage and even this one suffered 
fundamental changes shortly after it started and the essential steps of the 
Model were neglected. The failure, however, could not be attributed to the 
Model itself but rather to the unstable attitude of the policy makers toward 
the use of the Model. The lesson is that a successful application of the 
Model requires the conviction, the stable support and the personal involve­
ment of the policy makers. 
^The selection of colors is arbitrary, although here it has been tried 
to follow the conventional color use in other purposes. 
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V. THE APPLICATION OF THE MODELS TO THE 1964 AGRARIAN REFORM 
LAW IN THE CENTRAL SIERRA 
The need for an agrarian reform in Peru became obvious through 
identification of the problems in the first and second chapters of the 
present study. The Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law clearly states that one 
of the principal ends-in-view of the agrarian reform is economic develop­
ment of the country. It was pointed out that economic development through 
agrarian reform would be attained if adequate new structures were estab­
lished. In Chapter III the targets and the structures to achieve the tar­
gets were identified. In Chapter IV an implementation model was presented 
which is expected to help in the critical stage of carrying on the agrarian 
reform. 
In the present chapter the Central Sierra area will be analyzed in 
terms of the accomplishments achieved through the agrarian reform process 
which is taking place. The efficiency and action planning models will be 
the yardsticks to measure the failure and success elements and will prepare 
the way for the final chapter in which recommendations will be made. The 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter II will be also tested in this chapter 
through the use of the models as means. 
A. Nature of the Agrarian Reform and Its Application to the 
Central Sierra 
Early in 1962, land invasions took place in the Central Sierra, The 
Army was called to the scene and some invading farmers were killed. The 
National Council of Agrarian Reform had emergency meetings on March 10, 
14 and 20, 1962, where it was decided to initiate a study of the area to 
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ascertain the causes of the unrest. The study was done by agrarian reform 
personnel in April and May, 1952, using available data of official sources, 
like the Community Census and the Demographic Census, and completing the 
data with field observations on 62 Comunidades and 27 haciepdas of the 
Pasco-Junin area. The data collected in the study were not very accurate 
as further studies and analysis have proved. It did however, give some 
idea of the real situation. 
In August, 1963, agrarian reform personnel were sent to the Central 
Sierra and in November the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Project was 
created and the headquarters of the Project established in Tarma. One of 
the first jobs the agrarian reform directors decided should be done was to 
gather data from the Comunidades and haciendas of the area in view of re­
distribution of 78,417 has. of haciendas' land in fulfillment of the Supreme 
Decree No. 11, of August 9, 1963, and later in view of the acquisition and 
distribution of the Algolan haciendas consisting of 309,000 hectares. The 
data collected from the haciendas were almost exclusively for land, build­
ings and cattle appraisal. The data from the Comunidades were of more de­
tailed and comprehensive nature and was collected starting with the Comuni­
dades neighboring Algolan. 
The farmers were not too reluctant to answer the questions, though 
the accuracy of the answers depended a good deal on the ability of the 
questioning personnel. These personnel were agronomists, veterinarians and 
social assistants helped by auxiliary personnel. All were living in the 
area, strategically located in different Comunidades. However, they had 
no special training apart from a few lectures on the meaning of the question­
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naire and what was intended with it and how they should ask the questions. 
The questionnaires once filled out by the agrarian reform personnel on the 
post, were sent to Tarma where more specialized personnel revised and 
codified the answers. In some cases it was necessary to repeat the survey 
because of the inconsistencies of the data. 
The quality of the data has been improving over time, especially since 
the moment that the Department of Economics of the Central Sierra Agrarian 
Reform Institute had its own personnel trained for data collecting. It is 
obvious, therefore, that the reliability of the data is uneven. The less 
reliable data are the ones referring to the family income. For instance, 
the income gained by members of the family working outside agriculture were 
normally not recorded. Families engaged in nonagricultural activities 
normally declared a much lower income than they actually received. A better 
approximation was obtained for the farm income, especially livestock income, 
because the number of sheep and cattle could be checked on the spot and on 
this basis the income given in the answer could be checked. 
Once the questionnaires of a Comunidad had arrived in the Department 
of Economics of the central office in Tarma and were checked, all data were 
put together and averages calculated. The families were stratified in 9 
groups, taking as a base the occupation of the head of the family and of 
the other members of the family. The eight first strata referred to 
families having to do with agriculture and only the ninth strata referred 
to families who did not work in agricultural activities. 
After the data were codified and averages taken, a report was written 
for each Comunidad giving for each of the nine strata the total net income, 
the number of families, the number of individuals, the mean family income 
and the mean per capita income. Finally, and overall average for the whole 
Comunidad was given for the preceding items. The report presented also a 
detailed analysis of the population, including number of individuals per 
family, number of children per family, marital status, age and sex distribu­
tion of the population pyramid, active population (who actually were work­
ing) and outlook for the future needs of the Gomunidades' population. 
The report presented also the cultural situation of the Comunidad, number 
and percentage of illiteracy. There are also in the report comments on 
the economic situation of each strata on the basis of the net income data, 
and on the basis of the livestock number and distribution. The report ends 
with a study of the productivity of the total estimated invested capital 
in the agricultural activities in the Comunidad, 
It has not been possible so far to establish exactly the number of 
hectares each Comunidad has, it seems that not even the comunidad leaders 
know it for sure. We have been working with approximate numbers. That 
lack of knowledge is not surprising in the conditions of the Central Sierra 
because the Comunidad land titles, when they exist, do not give acreage but 
point the limits of the Comunidad land, limits that often are difficult to 
identify. A cadastral survey of the Comunidad lands has never been made. 
Even many of the haciendas do not have accurate acreage figures, Algolan 
had a cadastral survey of the haciendas and it was bought by the Agrarian 
Reform Institute for two and a half million soles, considering that the 
price was low. According to the Agrarian Reform Institute, the estimated 
cost of making this cadastral survey of Algolan in 1964 would have been 
6,580,052.06 soles. It is understandable then that the Comunidades never 
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had cadastral surveys taken and that even now the Agrarian Reform Insti­
tute is reluctant to expend much money in making them. Often the cadastral 
survey is more expensive than the price of the land itself. 
The main purpose of the establishment of the Central Sierra project 
was to implement Decree No. 11 already mentioned. This Decree was issued 
after new land invasions took place in the Central Sierra. It intended to 
expropriate all the hacienda land which had been invaded by the Indians of 
the Gomunidades in the Pasco and Junin Departments and to distribute the ex­
propriated land among the neighboring Indian Communities. It was clear, 
however, that this limited action would not suffice to calm down the spirits; 
consequently it was expected that the Central Sierra agrarian reform project 
would continue and expand. Two specific reasons supported this expectation; 
the advanced stage that the debate of the agrarian reform bill had reached 
in the Camera and in the Senate and the imminent purchase of the Algolan 
haciendas by the Peruvian government for agrarian reform purposes. The 
Fernandini family, owners of Algolan haciendas, agreed to sell the 309,000 
has., located most of them in Pasco Department, to the Government. Under 
Decree No. 11 a part of Algolan was to be expropriated, however, the 
Algolan owners preferred to sell the entire property. The actual purchase 
of Algolan took place in March, 1964, only a month and a half before the 
Agrarian Reform Bill was passed in the Camera and signed by the President. 
The transaction, though criticized by the opposition, was a wise step to 
speed agrarian reform because there was no complete assurance that the Law 
would pass so soon, and even in the eventuality of the immediate passage 
of the law, a delay in its application was foreseeable because the writing 
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of the regulations, the approval of land valuation methods and other tech­
nicalities would necessarily require time. If then the agrarian reform 
leaders wanted to start right away, the Algolan purchase offered them a 
very good opportunity. The form of payment for the land was decided would 
be done according to the provisions that the Agrarian Reform Law would 
establish. Installations and livestock were paid for in cash. The purchase 
of good livestock and good installations was an advantage for the execution 
of an agrarian reform that would go further than the mere redistribution of 
land. 
Although the 1952 and 1953 land invasions had some political overtones 
and represented the old vindicating spirit of the Gomunidades over the land 
that the Gomunidades claim was taken from them in the past, land invasions 
were also an effect of the need the Gomunidades felt for more land. Land 
in the eyes of the rural population is not only a means of production and a 
source of income, but also a means for power and prestige. In the case of 
the Central Sierra, however, land was very strongly looked upon by many of 
the Gomunidades as an economic need. In the specific circumstances of the 
Gomunidades a larger extension of land seemed the only practical road of 
survival. The reason was clear; the increasing population of the Gomuni­
dades and its consequent increase in food needs were met by an increased 
number of sheep. Land, however, remained fixed. The pressure of sheep on 
the land was destroying the pasture and increasing the problem. New land 
on which to put the sheep seemed an absolute need to the Gomunidad people. 
The agrarian reform directors who used the 1962 study also put the 
emphasis on the land factor as the first step toward a solution of the 
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Central Sierra problems. In 1964, it was written "The studies conducted 
(in the Central Sierra) demonstrate that the agricultural revenue of the 
majority of the Gomunidades, is positively related to the land/family 
ratio" (15, p. 52). 
The statistical evidence of the 1962 data and the collected data sub­
sequently do not, however, support this positive correlation; rather they 
question it very strongly. 
How could this apparent contradiction be solved? It can be demon­
strated that at least some Gomunidades need more land but at the same time 
it can also be demonstrated that land is not the main solution and it can 
even be no solution at all, if nothing else is changed. This is in fact 
the first hypothesis (Chapter II, C, 3) which stated "a) Agrarian Reform 
conceived as mere land redistribution is not going to solve the problem 
of the agricultural sector in the Central Sierra". This hypothesis is 
going to be tested now. 
If the quoted statement of the agrarian reform directors would have 
been accurate, the correlation between the average acreage of pasture land 
per family in each Comunidad and the average gross revenue from livestock 
per farm family also in each Comunidad, should have been high and positive. 
That was not so. Correlating these two terms in 25 Gomunidades of the Pasco 
2 
Department for which reliable data were available it was found a coefficient 
^The author does not want to imply that the Agrarian Reform Directors* 
statement was contrary to the evidence they had at the moment of formulating 
it. They probably based the statement on a statistical error, 
^The number of families was a weighted number; families full time occu­
pied in livestock operations equalled one; families with primary occupation 
in livestock but with a secondary occupation in something different, equalled 
0.75; families with livestock as only secondary occupation, equalled 0.50. 
99 
of correlation of .149816 with a standard deviation of 8^=126.2974 for the 
acreage per family, (x = 105.93 92) and 3^=1,903.5389 for gross revenue per 
farm family (Y=2,777.5184). On this evidence it can be concluded that the 
correlation is not significant. 
More surprising than the latter result was the outcome of correlating 
total pasture land acreage and total livestock revenue in ten Gomunidades 
of Pasco (using the 1962 data), the result was a negative correlation co­
efficient of -.78. This would mean that, ceteris paribus, an increase in 
acreage would decrease the total gross revenue. The selection of the ten 
Gomunidades was done on the basis of proximity to Algolan haciendas. Tak­
ing a broader base and using more reliable data (1964 Central Sierra 
Agrarian Reform Project), in fact, taking the same 25 Gomunidades of the 
first correlation reported her a, the acreage of these 25 Gomunidades was 
correlated with their gross agricultural income and the result was a co­
efficient of correlation positive but low .357265, with a standard devia­
tion Sx.=7,422.5982 for the acreage (x=6,779.16) and Sjj.=343,169.41 for the 
gross income Y=312,006.48). 
In order to test these results another correlation was run taking 36 
Gomunidades and including all land, pasture and crop^, and the total agri­
cultural revenue (gross). Here the result was a positive and high corre­
lation. The coefficient of correlation was .917533, but there were signifi­
cant exceptions or points dispersed from the correlation line. The standard 
deviation for the acreage was 3^=57,442.7713 (x=33,975.3611) and for the 
gross revenue Sy=l,22 7,063.122 (Y=895,467.61). 
^Grop land was transformed into pasture land equivalents by multiply­
ing number of crop hectares by 15 (coefficient found and used by agrarian 
reform technicians in the Gentral Sierra). No other allowances were made 
for eventual crop or pasture land quality differences for lack of informa­
tion. 
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These facts taken by themselves would certainlyItend to discourage an 
agrarian reform in the area based on land redistribution exclusively. 
What is the reason for these unexpected results? In the search for 
an answer the problem can be approached from another point of view; namely, 
the land productivity differences among Gomunidades, In the gross produc­
tivity of the pasture land of the 2 5 Gomunidades mentioned before, (the 
result of dividing the total gross revenue from livestock by the number of 
hectares of pasture land in each Gomunidad) a variation is found that goes 
from S/ 179.27 to S/ 4.80. What is the reason of such variation? Would 
it be the different quality of the pasture land? The answer appears to be 
negative. According to the soil specialists of the Gentral Sierra 
Agrarian Reform Institute the pasture land and the pasture itself of the 
Gomunidades does not differ significantly, and certainly not so much as to 
give an adequate explanation for the differences. A closer examination of 
the productivity differences discloses interesting facts. Vilcabamba is 
the Gomunidad with the highest productivity S/ 179.28 per hectare. The 
following Gomunidad has only a productivity of 79.02 soles per ha. This 
fact places Vilcabamba well ahead and in a unique situation with . re­
ference to the other Gomunidades in the area. There is no available clear 
cut explanation for this fact; it could however be that Vilcabamba had 
rented or invaded land, (the calculation was done on the basis of the 
Gomunidad acreage). This explanation is supported by the fact that Vil­
cabamba has an average of 10.53 head of sheep per hectare (pasture land in 
the Sierra can adequately support only one head of sheep per hectare on the 
average). Further support for the hypothesis that Vilcabamba has more land 
than the acreage officially recorded is that an explanation for the high 
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productivity could not be found in the quality of sheep. Vilcabamba sheep 
were classified by the 1962 census as of poor quality, producing only 1.9 
pounds average of wool per sheared sheep and 11 kilos average of meat per 
year per slaughtered sheep. The only explanation left is the high number 
of sheep per hectare or the fact that more hectares than the officially 
calculated area were available to Vilcabamba, 
There is a high negative correlation between the productivity of the 
land (pasture land) and the average acreage per farm family; therefore, the 
more land is available per farm family the lower is the productivity of 
the land. Population pressure on land seems therefore to give an explana­
tion of the productivity differences. Next question is, of course, how the 
differences are obtained. It seems that there are no substantial differ­
ences in the technical levels, sheep quality, farmers' skills and farmers' 
organizations which can effect land productivity. The differences are 
obtained through intensive use of the factors with the same techniques. 
This can be demonstrated by the data available. The Comunidades with a 
higher pasture land productivity have also, with very few exceptions, the 
larger number of head of sheep per hectare, have also higher percentage of 
sheared sheep and animals slaughtered. What that means in fact is that 
the intensive practices are of a disinvestment type. The overgrazing 
of pastures is very apparent in the Gomunidad land in the Central Sierra. 
This was in fact one of the main reasons that pushed Comunidades to invade 
hacienda land. The Gomunidad land in many cases could no longer support 
the high number of sheep. The reduction of the flock, unless it is re­
placed, will be reflected in the next year's gross revenue of the Gomunidad. 
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It is clear, that a sound productivity increase cannot be based on 
disinvestment practices. Gomunidades of high pasture land productivity 
could continue obtaining the same results without destroying the land by 
improving the sheep breed, reducing sheep diseases and mortality. Of 
course this presupposes the improved breeds and the better techniques are 
available, the capital to pay for them is available and the expected results 
and prices make the investment attractive. 
It will be clear by now why Gomunidades with a low ratio of pasture 
land per farming family and a consequent high ratio of head of sheep per 
hectare, urgently wanted more land. For them pasture land is a substitute 
for intensive practices that are destroying their pasture, or an absolute 
necessity because the pasture is already deteriorated. If nothing else is 
changed however, more pasture land would not mean in itself an increase in 
income insofar as pasture land substitutes for intensive practices; it 
would certainly mean a higher production potential over time because pasture 
land would be better conserved. 
Looking at the crop land we find also a high and increasingly negative 
correlation between the gross average productivity per hectare of crop land 
and the ratio of average hectares of land per farming family. This fact 
suggests again the hypothesis that land scarcity, or the pressure of people 
on land, stimulates a greater albeit temporary productivity. 
Central Sierra data (24) reveal another interesting fact which seems 
to indicate that pressure of people in the families determine the level of 
agricultural production of the family. Taking the average yearly family 
and per capita net income of the exclusively farm families, a higher range 
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of variation is found among family income than among per capita income. The 
test is made in the two regions already mentioned in this study of the De­
partment of Pasco; Yanahuanca and La Quinua. In Yanahuanca, the range for 
the average family net income of 12 Gomunidades is 2,821 soles (from 705 to 
3,526 soles variation) or an absolute dispersion of s=800 soles and a rela­
tive dispersion — gg 0.4; while the range for the average per capita net in­
come in the same 12 Gomunidades and for the same group is only 3 52 soles 
(from 327 to 675) or an absolute dispersion of s=113 and a relative dispersion 
of ^ 0,21. In La Quinua region the range for average family net income of 18 
Gomunidades in 7,746 soles (from 1,692 to 9,438 soles), or an absolute dis­
persion of 8=2,000 and a relative dispersion of ^ 0,42 ; while the range of 
the average per capita net income is only 2,305 (from 3 54 to 2,659 or an ab­
solute of s=800 and a relative dispersion of ^0.48), This fact suggests 
the typical pattern of subsistence farming, very clear in the poorer region 
which is Yanahuanca, where the populatbn needs commands production. In a few 
Gomunidades a correlation was made between the net income of the families and 
the number of children, the correlation was positive and high, confirming 
the fact just presented. 
The average net income of the exclusively farm family groupé in 30 
Gomunidades in Pasco is consistently lower than the net income of any other 
groups. This finding confirms the studies made elsewhere of income 
differences in the agrarian sector with respect to other sectors (4), 
^Gombining the nine strata presented before into four, on the basis 
of the principal and secondary occupation of the head of the family (first 
strata: principal and secondary occupation is farming; second strata; 
principal occupation farming but secondary elsewhere; third, principal 
occupation not farming, secondary farming; fourth, no farming occupation). 
The results show that the income of the first group is always lower than 
the income of any other group, and so it is for the second in respect to 
the third and fourth; and so also (but with many exemptions probably due 
to unrecorded data in the fourth strata), with the third group with re­
spect to the fourth. See Table 6, page 49. 
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B, Use of the Efficiency Model to Test the Structures 
The main reason why agrarian reform conceived and implemented as mere 
land redistribution is not going to solve the economic problems of the 
Central Sierra (the ones presented in Chapter II) is that mere land redis­
tribution does not improve in itself the economic conditions of the farm 
population as it has been shown in A of this Chapter. The psychological 
good effects that the farmers might experience in receiving a piece of land 
will not last long nor will be satisfying enough if it is not accompanied 
with an improvement in their level of living,- This of course does not mean 
that land should not be redistributed. It only means that land redistribu­
tion has to be accompanied with other complementary actions which could se­
cure economic betterment. Which complementary actions should they be, and 
how should they be implemented will be dictated by the economic development 
goal of the agrarian reform. From this, the second hypothesis stated in 
Chapter II, C, 3, namely b) "Agrarian reform if it is to help in any sig­
nificant way to solve the problems of the Central Sierra has to be conceived 
primarily as an instrument for economic development of the area and the 
nation" follows as a logic consequence. 
It has been seen that the Agrarian Reform Law of Peru is in accord 
with this hypothesis and with the hypothesis discussed in A of this Chap­
ter. Hie problem, therefore, is not in the theoretical level but rather 
in the practical level of how to make agrarian reform a successful instru­
ment for the economic development. Here the third hypothesis stated in 
this study (Chapter II, C, 4) has its place. This third c) hypothesis 
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states that "Agrarian reform will be a successful instrument to bring about 
economic development insofar as the new structures thus created are care­
fully selected and adequately constructed. An efficiency model can help 
to test the structures as to their adequacy to contribute to the economic 
development goal". 
The model was presented in Chapter III and will be now used to test 
the structures that the agrarian reform process is creating in the Central 
Sierra. 
The model stated that first the economic objectives have to be deter­
mined. ïhe objectives established in Chapter III as targets for the Cen­
tral Sierra agricultural sector were; A) Increase of agricultural produc­
tion, B) Increase of the efficiency of the production factors, and C) 
Transfers of production factors within the agricultural sector and to other 
sectors of the economy consistent with the needs of the agricultural sector 
and the other sectors, in other words, consistent with the needs of the 
general economic development of the country. 
It was assumed in Chapter III that these objectives constitute the main 
contribution that the agricultural sector of the Central Sierra can make to 
the development of Peru and at the same time the main contribution to the 
development of the agricultural sector of the Central Sierra itself. 
Once the objectives are determined the model postulates the establish­
ment of the instruments to attain the objectives or targets. The four key 
agrarian structures presented as instruments in Chapter III to attain the 
targets were a) Land tenure arrangements, b) Marketing facilities, c) 
Credit facilities, d) Technical assistance and education facilities; 
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A diagramatic presentation of the model under discussion and the im­
plementation model of Chapter IV, applied to the Central Sierra objectives 
and instruments is presented in Figure 11. 
As will be seen, the objectives and the instruments mentioned are in 
general terms adopted in the Central Sierra, though the lack of specifica­
tion and consistency in the establishment of the targets and in the instru­
ments, together with the hesitance in the different steps to be taken is 
jeopardizing somehow the entire agrarian reform process. From the very 
beginning the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform directors felt the need of 
creating new land structures, of giving technical aid and education to the 
farmers and of facilitating credit as well as doing something to improve 
the market system. 
It will be seen and analyzed now what has been done in the Central 
Sierra in the establishment of the mentioned structures and what else seems 
should be done In each of these key structures consistent with the attain­
ment of the targetsi 
The procedure for the analysis of each structure will adhere to the 
following pattern. First, the general problems related to the establishment 
of the structure in the specific circumstances of the Central Sierra will 
be presented. Secondly, the solution given by the Agrarian Reform Insti­
tute^ will be shown. Thirdly, the advantages of the solution given by the 
Agrarian Reform Institute will be considered. Fourthly, the problems of 
the Agrarian Reform Institute's solution will be presented. Fifthly, other 
^The Agrarian Reform Institute title is used for the sake of simplicity. 
As it was said in Chapter I, D, the Institute has had two official titles, 
IRAC up to the time the Agrarian Reform Law was signed and ONRA afterwards. 
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solutions, or corrections to the solution given, will be suggested. 
The criteria in accord with the postulates of the model, for the third, 
fourth and fifth points are the degree the structure seems able to help to 
the attainment of the targets. 
Land tenure structure; There is always a great concern about the ef­
fects of the agrarian reform on the agricultural production. Some sad ex­
periences have shown that after an agrarian reform, production has de­
creased substantially (for instance in Bolivia after the 1952 agrarian re­
form). Reasons for this concern do exist. Some of the expropriated land 
in the Central Sierra had been efficiently cultivated before expropriation 
took place. Would this efficiency be maintained by the new farmers? If 
not, production will necessarily decline. The haciendas were producing (at 
least some of them) an agricultural production surplus which was sent to the 
cities. Will the new farmers use for themselves this agricultural produc­
tion surplus? If they do, the production available for the non farm popu­
lation will diminish substantially. 
It is therefore a problem of maintaining efficiency, and a problem of 
avoiding the agricultural sector to become largely a subsistence farming 
operation. 
The solution of the two problems is, though not exclusively, a function 
of the new land tenure structures. To find out the adequate solution of 
the two problems an analysis of the success elements determining the effi­
ciency of the haciendas and the failure elements determining subsistence 
farming has to be made. 
In general terms the success elements of the efficient haciendas con­
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sist of an adequate size of the operation, the technical and managerial 
skills available to them, and a relatively high technical level of operation 
and organization and the incentive to produce. In general terms also the 
failure elements of the subsistence farming is the small size of the opera­
tion, the lack of technical and managerial skills (or the lack of oppor­
tunity of using any technical and managerial skill) and a low technical 
level of operation and organization and little incentive to produce more 
than needed for direct family consumption. 
The contribution of the land tenure structure to maintain (or substi­
tute for better ones) the success elements of the hacienda, and avoid the 
failure elements of the subsistence farming could be very important. 
First, the new structure could provide adequate farm size. Adequate 
farm size, however, cannot be defined in absolute terms because there is 
never an absolute optimum farm size. There is a substitution ratio between 
acreage and other elements, like special cultivation techniques, seeds and 
livestock quality and so on, that defines isoproduction lines at different 
acreage levels. The economics of scale of the large operations can also 
be substituted, at least in some important aspects, for technical agencies 
financed by a group of farmers (substituting for haciendas technicians), 
by production cooperatives substituting for multiplied managerial ability 
required for the operation of each small farm, and by marketing cooperatives 
for bargaining position that a large operation can have in the market, etc. 
Up to a point, therefore, size of farms can be made a function of other require­
ments like need of accommodating the larger possible number of farmers. More 
will be said about this point when the Agrarian Reform Institute solution 
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for the Central Sierra is discussed later. 
Second, the new structure could provide the stimulus for development 
of managerial skills and entrepreneurship ability. For these two things 
to develop security of tenency and avoidance of rigidities in the structure 
that could put a ceiling to the farmers income and aspirations are needed. 
The land tenure structure does not in inself resolve the problem of 
improving the technical level of production but can provide the stimulus 
for seeking new techniques and applying them when the land tenure struc­
ture gives security and does not put a limit on the farmer's aspirations. 
The incentive to produce depends largely on the input output prices 
and consequently on the market organization.' The land tenure structure, 
however, can provide the farmers with the opportunity to enter the market 
with favorable terms. 
The specific problems of the Central Sierra in connection with the 
land structure are 1) the type of agriculture operation (especially live­
stock) which must be by physical necessity of an extensive type, 2) the 
existence of an special institution, the Comunidad, 3) the excess number 
of farm people in the area with regard to the available land and the rela­
tively few opportunities that exist for these people to work elsewhere. 
The solution presented by the Agrarian Reform Institute has been to 
create agrarian structures in the form of communal enterprises consisting 
of a minimum amount of land (in the case of livestock which is the only 
type of enterprise created so far by the Agrarian Reform Institute) capable 
of supporting 5,000 sheep units equivalent, (from 5,000 to 7,000 heads of 
sheep). The ownership title to the land and to the livestock (purchased 
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by the Comunidad on credit) will be given to the Comunidad. The Goaiunidad 
appoints a 6-man board of administrators. (Junta de administraction) and an 
administrator. The Board of Administrators appoints the personnel who will 
run the communal enterprises as paid workers and employees. While the 
Comunidad has not paid in its entirety for the land and the sheep, the 
title is not given to the Comunidad. During the interim, the Agrarian Re­
form Institute exerts a tight control over the enterprise. The former farm 
workers of the haciendas are also receiving the same enterprises when they 
group themselves together to form special production cooperatives. 
When the Agrarian Reform Institute started taking data family by family 
in the Comunidades it looked like the land distribution would be made to the 
families or individuals and not to the Comunidad as a whole; if they had 
thought in terms of giving the land to the Comunidad it seems there would 
not have been necessary the long work of collecting family and individual 
information, because general data for the whole Comunidad would have suf­
ficed. It has been to the Comunidad however, that the land is being given. 
All the available land through expropriations will be divided among the 
Comunidades (on the basis of the total population and the land they pre­
viously had) and among the former farm workers of the haciendas. 
The advantages of the new land tenure structure viewed from the point 
of view of the targets (namely to increase production and productivity of 
the production factors and flexibility to allow transfer of production 
factors when necessary) appears to be present for the transfer of production 
factors. Manpower will be easily transferred when the opportunity comes 
because no individual is tied to the land. Capital might also be easily 
transferred in case of communal enterprises because the communal enterprise 
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is not the only source of income for the Gomunidad and therefore the in­
come obtained from the communal enterprise can be used where it might seem 
more convenient. Of course, this is not true for the cooperative enter­
prises of the former farm workers; for them the enterprise will be the only-
source of income. 
In terms of the increases of production and productivity, is not too 
clear that these targets will be obtained by the enterprises. Two points 
have to be considered. One is the size of the enterprise (minimum of 5,000 
sheep units equivalent); another is the relations between the workers and 
administrators of the enterprise and the enterprise structures itself. 
As far as the size is concerned the problem is not too serious be­
cause factor substitutions are possible. There are, however, doubts about 
the advantages of large size when economies can be made through common 
veterinarian services and through cooperative services for buying inputs 
and selling outputs. All of this of course is under the assumption that 
the land could have been given to individuals in family size farms. On the 
actual state of affairs it seems the same could have been obtained by keep­
ing the hacienda organization, and distributing the results to the Gomuni-
dades without the needs of fabricating the mosaic of enterprises of about 
5,000 has. The actual number of people that the communal enterprises will 
occupy is very small and could be integrated in the former hacienda organiza­
tion. Technical control and supervision on the part of the Agrarian Reform 
Institute would have been much easier and the distribution could have been 
done rapidly and economically. Each Gomunidad would have received the title 
to one or more, or to a part of one of the Algolan haciendas (or other 
haciendas). 
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The main problem, however, is not the size, but the relationship created 
in the new structures which does not seem to stimulate the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the farmers. This is especially true in the communal enterprises. 
Those who directly operate them are not the owners in a strict sense, they 
are paid and the payment is not strictly dependent on their performance. 
The Gomunidad through its leaders controls the operation, but they are well 
aware that the survival of the Gomunidad does not depend on the enterprise. 
Moreover, the tight control of the Agrarian Reform Institute lessens the 
sense of responsibility, more so when decisions are made mostly by the 
Agrarian Reform Institute personnel, especially with reference to the ad­
ministration and the distribution of the enterprise revenue. In many re­
spects the structure formed for the former farm workers of the hacienda has 
advantages over the communal enterprise. The workers are the owners of the 
enterprise and their survival depends on the economic results of the enter­
prise. State overprotection however, can blur these advantages, especially 
considering that these farm workers did not have any opportunity to develop 
their responsibility and initiative under the hacienda structure and if they 
are not helped to develop it now because the state maintains the same hacienda 
policy in this respect, little achievement and economic success can be ex­
pected from the farm workers in the operation of the farm enterprises. 
Without the sense of responsibility and spirit of initiative no economic 
development and achievement can be expected. 
Advantages and problems of the Agrarian Reform Institute have been re­
viewed and a solution of the size problem has been insinuated in the as­
sumption that the land has to be given to the Gomunidades. This solution 
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was to give to the Comunidades the haciendas or part of haciendas, main­
taining the former hacienda organization and improving it. This solution 
might seem a temporary one, and so it is. But any solution is temporary, 
the circumstances continually change and the economic structures have to 
change to accommodate themselves to the new circumstances. There is never 
an end to an agrarian reform as far as adjustments of land tenure structures 
are concerned. Advanced nations are a vivid example. The size of farm 
and the farm organization is constantly changing in the USA and so it is in 
Europe. To transfer the ownership of the haciendas as they are (always with 
the necessary and convenient improvements) would be the easiest and quickest 
way of a rapid transformation of the agrarian structure in the Central 
Sierra, Farming and especially farm land has to be viewed more in the 
mobility pattern of the industrial sector for example. There is no doubt 
that immobility and slowness in changes is one of the main reasons to ac­
count for the lower income of the agrarian sector with respect to the other 
sectors of the economy. 
The other thing that urgently needs to be corrected is the over-
protection of the State, It is true that farmers need help and assistance, 
but not the kind of pseudo-help that would perpetuate them as minors. 
It has been pointed out by Richard W. Patch (26, p. 11) that there is 
a contradiction in the agrarian reform law between Article 100 "written in 
the context of a society which enjoys freedom and accepts the responsibility 
upon which that freedom is based" and Articles 103 and 104 which violate 
the spirit of article 100, "These two articles (which purport to estab­
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lish the duties of the Institute to the persons who purchase land under 
the reform law and the responsibilities of those persons) are a reversion 
to traditional government paternalism and "protection" of the purchasers 
by restriction of their freedom to choose and act". These comments were 
written in the context of those articles which refer to land acquired by 
individuals to form family farm units, where as Patch says "the campensinos 
are to be considered near-wards of the state, with the expectation that 
they will continue as small farmers, socially immobile, and geographically 
tied to their plot of land". As mentioned before, the Institute's solution 
of giving the land to the Gomunidad does not tie the individuals to the 
land, but at the same time the individual attitudes and aspirations of the 
members of the Gomunidad are ignored assuming that they are happy with the 
ideal of common ownership so often violated "de facto" in the real Gomuni-
dades of the Gentral Sierra. Article 129 of the agrarian reform law con­
secrates the socialistic or collectivistic ideal of the "socialistic empire 
of the Incas" as it is called by Louis Baudin (2). 
Art. 129 states "The sales of lands to the Comunidades will be with 
the express condition that in no case can direct ownership be transferred 
to members of the Gomunidad or to third parties. Community members may 
individually enjoy the use of land in a system compatible with cooperative 
organization. Pastureland, water, and forest will be for the common use 
of all and in benefit of the Gomunidad and all its members". Does this 
article of the law correspond to the reality and to the aspirations of the 
members of the Gomunidad? Does it help or can it help the economic develop­
ment of the Gomunidad? How can the Gomunidad values be preserved while at 
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the same time economic development is aggressively pursued? Again it is not 
in this study the place to solve the problem of the future of the Comuni­
dad as an Institution, but it seems appropriate to point out the economic 
consequences of the policy makers' decisions at the governmental level. 
Little research has been done on the attitudes and aspirations of the 
members of the Comunidades. There is a significant fact observed also in 
other countries of the similar background, that the economically successful 
members of the Gomunidad tend to abandon the Comunidad and go to live else­
where. Manning Nash (21, p. 295) observed that "Anybody who begins to 
orient his activity to economic self-interest begins to detach himself and 
his family from the local community." Would that mean that the cultural 
climate and organization of the Comunidad is found inappropriate for per­
sonal development? If that could be proved to be so, could it be expected 
to improve the general economic standard of the Comunidades keeping intact 
the actual cultural climate and organization? There is no case that we 
know of where a rural community has made rapid and significant economic 
progress without a profound cultural and organizational change. 
Credit; An agrarian reform conceived as something more than a mere 
land redistribution, needs to be able to establish the ways and means to 
supply credit to the new farm owners to buy the right kind of inputs, like 
improved seeds and animal breeds; to get loans to build or improve in­
stallations; to try new technology in the production process, and so on. 
In the Central Sierra the need to supply credit to the farmers for live­
stock operations was seen from the beginning and it has been implemented 
for the acquisition of livestock. In view of thé need of good livestock 
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breeds, especially sheep, the State acquired for the Agrarian Reform 
Institute the livestock of the Algolan haciendas and it is planning to ac­
quire more from other haciendas. 
The livestock of the Comunidades is in general of poor quality and 
disease ridden; the acquisition therefore of the new lands by the Gomunidad, 
without acquiring at the same time good quality livestock to put on these 
lands, would decrease the former production level of the land and would 
certainly not help the economy of the Comunidades. 
Money for loans to the small farmers (and to the Comunidades) to allow 
them to buy livestock has been obtained in Peru from international sources. 
An expeditious use of this money could permit the Agrarian Reform Institute 
to acquire more livestock on a rotation basis and rapidly improve the live­
stock breeds of the Comunidades. 
The credit system established in the Central Sierra assumes that the 
Comunidades as well as the former farm workers of the.haciendas do not 
have the capital to pay for the livestock. The assumption is probably 
true for the farm workers, but it is not all too certain for the Comuni­
dades. There is evidence of hoarding practices among the farm people of 
the Comunidades though the extent and amount is not known. If hoarded 
money exists in the Comunidad, the Comunidad authorities have the means to 
collect that money from the members of the Comunidad for communal purposes. 
Theoretically then the Comunidad could pay at least for part of the live­
stock they would be receiving with the land. In fact, there were in the 
Central Sierra some instances of Comunidades offering the Agrarian Reform 
Institute to pay in cash not only for the sheep but also for the land. On 
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the other hand some Comunidades and most of the former farm workers of the 
haciendas did not want to expend their own money for the acquisition of 
livestock because they were afraid that the investment might prove a fail­
ure. With this attitude of mind however, not even long term, low interest 
credit can attract and stimulate investment, very especially if the invest­
ment looks risky to the farmer. On these premises it can be said that the 
problem of credit in conditions of backwardness is not so much the lack of 
capital (it is of course) but rather the unwillingness of the farmers to 
risk their own money (or borrowed money) in innovations. The risk involves 
not only the loss of the money invested but also the loss of income that 
the traditional production practices would provide. 
The credit in these circumstances should be not merely a loan but an 
insured loan and an income insurance in case of failure of the new tech­
niques, In other words, credit given for innovations and improvements with 
which the'farmer is not familiar and consequently look too risky to him, 
should be insured credit that the farmer has to repay only and insofar as 
the experiment proves successful, provided, of course, that the farmer plays 
his own part. The insurance moreover would provide the farmer with the in­
come he would get if he had followed his traditional techniques. The condi­
tion that the farmer must play his own part has to be handled with extreme 
care, otherwise it might have negative effects if the farmer gets suspicious 
that he will be accused of the failure no matter what he does. 
This type of credit is not provided in the Central Sierra or anywhere 
else that we know of. The potentialities of this type of credit are so 
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great for economic development of primitive agricultural communities that 
it would be worth while to try even with the risk of total loss of the 
money. When so much money is used in all kinds of experiments it does not 
seem unreasonable to use it for experiments on human and economic promo­
tion. Besides, the risk can be reduced to an insignificance if the tech­
niques recommended have been previously tested, if good technicians are 
available and if the extension agency promoting the innovation can be made 
responsible for any undue risk and for verifiable negligences. 
The farmers have to pay seven percent interest per year for the credit 
they are provided in the Central Sierra., The international financing 
agencies are supplying the credit at much lower rates of interest (the part 
of money provided by AID, Agency for International Development is at 3/4 
of one per cent per year) but the inefficiencies of the administrating 
agency (The Banco de Fomento Agropecuario del Peru) unduly increase the 
interest rate. An interest of seven percent per year is, in the Central 
Sierra circumstances, much too high; it will suffice to remember that in­
vested capital in the Algolan haciendas, was yielding net returns of the 
order of 4.45 per cent or less. This was of course the overall return. It 
cannot be denied that some specific investments could, and in fact, have 
higher returns in the Central Sierra Agriculture but it has to be remembered 
too that the new farm owners do not have the ability and the organization 
of the haciendas and that the new farm owners should get from the land an 
income which could be equivalent to a higher salary that the one the 
hacienda was paying to its workers. 
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As stated before, credit can be a powerful instrument for economic 
development if it is used to encourage the type of investments which are 
more strategically needed for development and are compatible with the labor 
supply situation and the type of products demanded in the markets. The 
channeling of credit on those lines is possible only when a careful overall 
development plan has been worked out. Unfortunately this plan does not 
exist in the Central Sierra and consequently the full opportunities that 
credit offers for economic development go unused. 
Technical assistance; The evidence of the data available clearly show 
the low technical level of production in the Central Sierra. This low tech­
nical level appears to be one of the main reasons for the differences in 
production between the Comunidades and some of the haciendas. 
In order to rise the technical level and to improve the production 
techniques three things are required. First is research to find out what 
techniques are more adapted to the circumstances of the region. Secondly, 
is the economic means to do the research and to apply the techniques. 
Third, is the ability to transfer the knowledge to the farmers. 
The Central Sierra program has had in mind the three requirements. 
It has established a research operation in a part of Algolan to maintain 
and improve the livestock breeds. It has provided some economic means for 
conducting the research, which are supplied by the State in the form of 
salaries to the technicians and direct financing the first years of opera­
tion until the selling of livestock can provide the research center with a 
secure source of income. It has also provided for the transfer of know­
ledge to the farmers through a network of extension centers called "Gentros 
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de Reforma" and "Unidades Basicas de Asistencia", strategically located in 
the entire geography of the Central Sierra, and establishing a Center for 
training farmers in one of the former Algolan haciendas, "La Quinua". 
The shortcomings of the solution offered by the Agrarian Reform In­
stitute are both in the implementation stage and in the form and organiza­
tion of the technical assistance. In the latter an important improvement 
could be made if the whole extension effort could be more directly dependent 
on the farmers themselves and less on the Agrarian Reform Institute. The 
dependence on the farmers could be achieved if the farmers (in the Gomunidad 
or elsewhere) would directly hire or at least decide whether they want the 
specific personnel offered by the Institute or some other. The personnel, 
however, would have to be paid mostly by the Institute in the beginning, 
while the farmers are not yet economically strong enough, A token payment 
by the farmers though, is necessary, to give a greater sense of reality to 
the system and to prepare the farmers for a later full payment when their 
incomes will be high enough. At that moment the whole extension operation 
would be maintained by the farmers themselves alone. This important modi­
fication would have very relevant implications. First it would give the 
farmers a greater sense of independence and responsibility and secondly it 
would stimulate the technicians to work well and to please and respect the 
farmers. 
The defects in the implementation stage of technical assistance are 
found in the fact that the Institute personnel who are performing the ex­
tension work are not always well acquainted with the Central Sierra problems 
and the psychology of the Central Sierra people. Also these personnel were 
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not always well trained in the university for the work in the conditions 
of the Sierra. Another reason of failures is the fact that the extension 
workers are not receiving clear-cut instructions and plans of operation 
from the Institute headquarters in Tarma. The means of stimulating the 
personnel to work at their best are often missing in the promotional 
organization and salaries ranks of the Institute. On the other hand the 
farmers themselves, partly because of Institute personnel's poor performance 
and partly because of their distrust of anything run by the Government, 
have not, generally speaking, always been very cooperative. 
A great improvement could be achieved with a better selection of the 
personnel and an intensive training on the area before sending them to 
the Gomunidades. A good and well thought plan of action should be worked 
out in the headquarters to serve as a guideline of action to the personnel 
on the spot. Frequent consultation and exchange of ideas and experiences 
between the personnel working in the extension work and the personnel in 
the direction of the project would be very useful for both and would increase 
the sense of responsibility of the extensionists. The extensionists should 
try to associate the farmers themselves with extension work, utilizing all 
available talent for an intensive transfer of knowledge. Funds should be 
available to pay farmers with skills to teach those skills to others. 
Education; On the basis of the collected data in the Central 
Sierra no correlation exists between the percentage of illiteracy (heads 
of family illiterate) in each Gomunidad and the gross average agri-
cultural income per active farm worker in each Gomunidad, nor 
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with the mean per capita income derived from agriculture, nor even with 
the percentage of land cultivated from the total available cultivated land. 
Some more detailed research was done in some Gomunidades, correlating 
the degree of instruction of individuals and their income, or their level 
of techniques used, the result has not given any indication that a correla­
tion exists between education and economic performance. Assuming that the 
data are correct, this finding would indicate that the type of education 
the farmers have is not relevant to their economic success; or that there 
are other conditions in the Gomunidades that invalidate the positive ef­
fects of education. Our hypothesis is that the two elements do exist. 
First the type of education is not significant because it is not adapted 
and useful to the needs of the farmers. Secondly, the Community structures 
does not encourage the use of knowledge for progress and change. The better 
educated people of the Gomunidades do not work at farming and often abandon 
the Gomunidad. We did not find anyone in the Gomunidades who had been in 
Gollege, and very few who have any secondary education. 
The Agrarian Reform Institute could not initiate any vast plan of 
education because of the limitation of its budget. In the farmers training 
center, however, some education is being given aimed at the preparation of 
the leaders of the Gomunidades who could help to introduce in the Gomuni­
dades the necessary change of attitudes for the acceptance of the new ideas 
involved in technical innovations and agrarian reform. In the Gomunidades 
some teaching has been imparted by social workers ("Asistentas Sociales" 
y "Mejoradoras del Hogar") to the housewives for better housekeeping. 
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A whole new type of education for the population of the Central Sierra 
is needed which could be capable of providing the adult farmers as well as 
the young population in the schools, the basic ability to adopt the new 
techniques useful and practical in the area, develop their natural skills 
and above all open up their minds to new attitudes toward work, social and 
economic progress and personal achievement. This type of education that 
raises the expectations of the people is dangerous when the rigidities and 
inadequacies of the structures of the society frustrate those expectations 
and desires. It does not seem, however, that the actual structures of the 
Central Sierra would be strong enough to contain a genuine desire of advance­
ment and a determination to improve conditions through personal effort. 
Furthermore this new type of education has to provide the needed skills 
and flexibility for the full utilization in agriculture and elsewhere of 
the tremendous potential hidden in the Central Sierra manpower. Human in­
genuity of a negligable minority of mankind that has had the opportunity of 
education has made possible the many wonders of today's world. What could 
we have if the large masses of people could have a chance to get the right 
kind of education to put their minds and abilities to work? 
It has become fashionable to blame the "excess number" of people, 
(the effect of the so-called "population explosion") for most anything, 
even before this excess number could start doing anything actively or 
passively. We had discovered in the Central Sierra that population pres­
sure on the land has in some instances achieved high productivity yields 
(though the means used do not give any confidence that the productivity 
could be continued for a long period of time). 
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Ester Boserup discovered the same fact that we have discovered and 
has gone as far as to affirm that "primitive communities with a sustained 
population growth have a better chance of getting into a process of genuine 
economic development than primitive communities with stagnant or declining 
populations" (5, p. 7, 118). She qualifies this statement saying that it 
might not be true of communities with a very high rate of population growth 
which are already densely populated, and which are unable to undertake the 
investment necessary for introducing still more intensive methods of agri­
culture cultivation. 
For the Central Sierra we would rather qualify the statement saying 
that it might not be true if the actual education system is not improved, 
general education of the population for genuine progress and advancement is 
not established, and finally the structure of the Gomunidad that impairs 
development cannot be changed and consequently the more talented people born 
in the Gomunidad are wasted for the Gomunidad, whether they abandon it or 
remain in it inactively. The base of our qualification is 1) the fact 
observed in the Central Sierra and pointed out before, that education (the 
actual education) does not seem to have any effect on income and on the 
technical means .used in production, (we share with Dr. Schultz the view that 
the transformation of traditional agriculture requires mainly investment in 
human resources (education) and in modern forms of material inputs (32, p. 
175, 145), and 2) the observed fact that due to the structural climate of 
the Comunidades people with entrepreneurial spirit abandon the Gomunidad. 
Marketing; Few studies have been made in the Central Sierra on market­
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ing. The only relatively serious effort was done on the research of horti­
cultural marketing for the purpose of establishing a marketing cooperative 
in Tarma. Marketing problems in the Central Sierra are severe handicaps 
to the economic prosperity of the farmers. Insecurity of prices, surpluses 
and shortages, excessive shares of the revenue taken by the middle man, are 
all effects of the defective market system prevalent in the Central Sierra. 
The Agrarian Reform Institute has been planning to organize the market­
ing of the wool through the facilities existing in Algolan. It has also 
been thought to establish a slaughter house for the whole area and explored 
the possibility of establishing marketing cooperatives for potatoes. The 
Economica Department of the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Institute in­
itiated a study Comunidad by Comunidad of the actual marketing channels, 
amount marketed every week and prices received. Unfortunately this study 
was not encouraged enough by the Institute directors and was never com­
pleted. This study was to be completed with a research project on the de­
mand for the agricultural products of the Sierra in the area and in Lima. 
Prospective good prices for the products that are most needed in the 
markets would certainly encourage production. Competition with a common base 
of market and prices would stimulate productivity and quality. As the things 
are now, price often is not a reward to higher productivity and better quality 
but rather the result of the opportunity to get the right connections at the 
right time in the inefficient marketing channels. The farmers who are mar­
ginal to the actual marketing process because of their geographic situation 
or their inability to make the right connections, have no stimulus to 
abandon their subsistence farming system and enter the market. 
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The Institute should try to encourage the studies initiated. It is 
important to know well the supply and demand situation and the mechanism 
of the actual marketing system before any marketing improvement can be made. 
The short experience of the horticultural marketing cooperative of 
Tarma can teach very important lessons with reference to the practical dif­
ficulties of altering the old marketing channels and systems. One lesson 
is that the substituting system might prove to be as inefficient as the 
old or more as far as bringing higher incomes to the farmers, especially, 
as it happened in Tarma, the amount of produce commercialized through the 
new system is not large enough in relation to the fixed costs of the opera­
tion. The small amount commercialized in Tarma was due to the distrust 
of many farmers who did not want to participate and to leakages into the 
old channels of part of the product of the participant farmers. The high 
fixed cost was due partly to the high interest the cooperative had to pay 
for the loan (7 per cent) and the inefficiencies on the part of the manage­
ment as well as to the fact that the structure had been designed for a much 
larger operation. Another hard lesson is that it is not easy to find honest 
and capable men to administer and manage the new marketing system. Finally 
it is not easy to substitute the former middleman and forget about him. He 
will fight for his job and can prove a major obstacle in securing markets 
and good prices. Besides the farmers are often willy-nilly allies of the 
middleman, because they are tied to him through loans (the middleman is 
often the source from which the farmer borrows money), or simply because 
the farmer does not quite trust anybody more than he trusts the middleman. 
The new marketing system therefore, has to be accompanied with sound and 
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trustworthy credit institutions which could advance money at reasonable 
interest to the farmer, set minimum prices for the products and pay in 
full, or at least in a large part, for the product to the farmer at the 
moment the farmer is delivering it to the marketing agency. 
G. Implementation Stage and Use of the Action Planning 
and Implementation Model 
So far the structures that would seem necessary to make agrarian reform 
a success have been analyzed on the lines of hypothesis c) and with the aid 
of the efficiency model of Chapter III. Now the fourth hypothesis d) will 
be tested. This hypothesis states that "The implementation stage of the 
agrarian reform proves to be a difficult undertaking, but can be expedited 
with the use of an action planning model in the vein of Critical Path and 
PERT methods". 
The Central Sierra agrarian reform project is a clear illustration that 
the implementation stage of the agrarian reform proves to be a difficult 
undertaking, in fact the project has been characterized with all sorts of 
inefficiencies, slowdowns and long detours. Of course some of all this 
could be expected and it might be said it was probably inevitable due to 
the lack of experience of the directors and to the pressures with which 
they had to work. 
It remains to be proved that the difficulties of the implementation 
stage can be expedited with the use of an action planning model in the vein 
of Critical Path and PERT methods. The model was presented in Chapter IV. 
The first steps to use it were taken in the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform 
Project in early 1964. In fact three major projects were elaborated with 
the model. One was the Algolan acquisition and subsequent distribution 
which included the establishment of a breeding farm run by the Agrarian 
Reform Institute to provide the new farm-owners with good quality sheep. 
The diagram of the project is shown in Figure 12, The project starts with 
the legal acquisition of Algolan [1]^ and the consequent reception of the 
livestock [2], buildings [3], accounting books [5] and storage [6] and the 
evaluation of the natural resources of the hacienda [ 9], Once the recep­
tion is completed a temporary administration of the hacienda by personnel 
of the Agrarian Reform Institute is established [12]; this administration 
of the hacienda will continue until the hacienda is distributed to the new 
farm owners. A part of the hacienda will be kept under the Agrarian Reform 
Institute control for the operation of a livestock breeding program [24]. 
The necessary steps for the establishment and proper functioning of this 
operation once the side is selected [17] are the financial arrangements (28] 
and the contracting of personnel to operate it [29]. The purpose of this 
operation is to improve the livestock of the Comunidades. 
Several parallel actions take place in the project: the establishment 
of credit facilities [13] and a commercialization center to service the new 
farm owners [7]; the establishment of centers of technical assistance [8]; 
the evaluation of the natural resources of the neighboring Comunidades [10] 
and a socio-economic survey of these same Comunidades and the former Algolan 
^The numbers in brackets correspond to the numbers in the flow chart 
of Figure 12. 
Figure 12. Plan Algolan 
1. Escritura de compra-venta de Algolan 
2. Recepcion del ganado 
3. Recepcion instalaciones 
4. Medicion y ubicacion de servicios 
5. Recepcion de la contabilidad 
6. Recepcion de saldos de almacen 
7. Establecimiento de centrales cooperativas de compra-venta 
8. Establecimiento de siete unidades de asistecnica 
9. Evaluacion de recursos naturales de la hacienda 
10. Evaluacion de recursos naturales de las comunidades vecinas 
11. Encuesta économico-social de las comunidades vecinas y servidores de 
Algolan 
12. Administracion temporal 
13. Constitucion y organizacion del credito a las comunidades, servidores de 
Algolan y otros 
14. Trabajo de siete unidades de asistencia 
15. Trabajo de trece unidades de asistencia 
16. Estudio economico y sociai de las comunidades y servidores de Algolan 
17. Ubicacion y linderacion de 5,000 Has. para Plantel 
18. Ces ion temporal de edificios e instalaciones al IRAC 
19. Venta de ganado a las comunidades, servidores de Algolan y otros 
20. Constitucion de cooperativas de servicios multiples 
21. Estudio legal de las comunidades en relacion conlos organismes estatales 
22. Estudio juridico de formas alternativas de tenecia de tierras 
23. Determinacion de beneficiarios 
24. Adjudicacion de 5,000 Has., editicios, instalaciones y ganado al.IRAC 
para utilizarlo como plantel. 
25. Traspaso de instalaciones a las comunidades, servidores de Algolan y otros 
26. Organizacion de las comunidades para la recepcion de tierras y ganado 
27. Estudio economico de formas alternativas de tenencia de tierra y 
utilizacion optima de los recursos de Algolan y de las comunidades 
2b. Finauciacion 
29. Contratacion de personal tecnico y administrative para el plantel 
30. Formacion de cooperativas de produccion y comercializacion 
31. Determinacion de la forma de pago de las tierras 
32. Determinacion de la distribucion de las tierras 
33. Financiamiento 
34. Reorganizacion de las comunidades para elevar su nivel de vida 
35. Aprobacion en Lima 
36. Servicio a las comunidades y otros para el mejoramiento del ganado 
3 7. Comercializacion de los productos 
38. Adjudicacion legal de las tierras 
39. Linderacion de las tierras por transferir. 
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farm workers [il]. The evaluation of the resources and the survey once 
! 
completed, supply the necessary information for a socio-economic study of 
the Gomunidades and farm workers [16] which will determine who could be the 
recipients of the Algolan hacienda [23], 
The results of a study of the different tenure forms permitted by the 
Peruvian laws [22] together with the results of the evaluation of the natur­
al resources of the hacienda [9] and the Gomunidades [10] and the assessment 
of the needs of the population of the Gomunidades and the former farm­
workers of Algolan [16], supply the elements for a study of the different 
land tenure forms possible and workable in this specific case [27], 
The legal study of the Gomunidades [21] in a more broad and compre­
hensive way forms the base for the organization of the Gomunidad for the re­
ception of the livestock and land [26] and for a future deeper reorganiza­
tion of the Gomunidades for economic development [34]. 
In the project it is assumed that the enterprises formed with the 
Algolan hacienda will be in the form of cooperatives of production and 
commercialization [30]. In fact it resulted in the communal enterprise 
already described and analyzed. 
The second plan was for the implementation of Supreme Decree No, 11, 
which included the expropriation and subsequent distribution of 78,417 
hectares. The diagram of this second project is shown in Figure 13 and 
contains essentially the same elements of the Algolan project, except the 
establishment of the breeding farm. 
The third plan was set up for the acquisition of the hacienda 
"Conocancha" and subsequent distribution of part of the hacienda land to 
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neighboring Gomunidades while using the other part of the hacienda land and 
all the hacienda buildings for the establishment of a farmer's training 
center specializing in livestock care. The diagram of the project is shown 
in Figure 14. The flow chart has the same elements that the Algolan one 
had, plus the actions necessary for the establishment of the training center 
like the accommodation of the hacienda buildings for the training center 
needs [26]; contract personnel [38, 39]; select the students [40]; and buy -
the furniture and materials needed for the center [41]. 
The planning of the three projects went as far as the establishment 
of the network of actions, as it can be seen in the diagrams. Two of the 
projects were never implemented (Supreme Decree No. 11 and "Gonocancha"). 
The third was partly implemented but little attention was paid to the pre­
vious planning. The apparent failure might seem very discouraging and so 
it was for the planner when the plan was practically abandoned. Still it 
can be affirmed that the results of the attempt were not altogether nega­
tive. 
It was not the fault of the planning itself that two of the projects 
never got off the ground. Other reasons prevented their implementation,. 
Neither was it the fault of the planning that the Algolan project was im­
plemented without consideration of the plan. Much before the plan could be~ 
finished and become practicable it was abandoned. But why was it abandoned? 
An answer to this question would be very helpful in view of future use of 
the model in similar circumstances and the proof of the hypothesis that 
the use of the model could ease the difficulties of the implementation 
stage. The answer will be attempted but before the attempt is made it will 
Figure 14. Plan Conocancha 
1. Evaluacion de los recursos naturales de las comunidades colindantes 
2. Encuesta socio-economica de las comunidades colindantes y los servidores 
de Conocancha 
3. Estudio economico social de las comunidades y servidores de Conocancha 
4. Determinacion de beneficiarios 
5. Estudio legal de las formas aiternativas de tenencia de tierras 
6. Estudio economico de formas aiternativas de tenencia de tierras para la 
utilizacion optima de los recursos. 
7. Determinacion, planeamiento y distribucion de tierras. 
8. Aprobacion en Lima 
9. Ubicacion y linderacion de las tierras por transferir 
10. Establecimiento de cooperatives de compra y venta 
11. Establecimiento de unidades basicas de asistencia tecnica 
12. Trabajo de las unidades de asistencia tecnica 
13. Estudio legal de las comunidades 
14. Constitucion y organizacion del credito a las comunidades y servidores 
de Conocancha 
15. Reorganizacion de las comunidades y servidores de Conocancha para la 
recepcion de las tierras 
16. Determinacion de la forma de pago de las tierras 
17. Adjudicacion legal de las tierras 
18. Reorganizacion de las comunidades para elevar su nivel de vida 
19. Escritura de compra-venta de Conocancha 
20. Recepcion de instalaciones 
21. Medicion, clasificacion y ubicacion de los pianos 
22. Recepcion de los saldos de almacen 
23. Administracion temporal de 12,000 hectareas 
24. Administracion de 5,000 has. reservadas para el Centro de Capacitacion 
Campes ina . 
25. Evaluacion de recursos naturales de la hacienda 
26. Adaptacion de les edificios existentes para el Centro 
27. Determinacion y linderacion de 5,000 has. para la granja del Centro 
28. Estudio economico de la utilizacion optima de los recursos 
29. Establecimiento y contratacion del personal para la granja del Centro 
3 0. Negociacion del credito de compra de ganado, materiales y equipo para 
la granja 
31. Compra del ganado, materiales y equipo para la granja 
32. Funcionamiento de la granja 
33. Servicios de la granja a las comunidades 
34. Comercializacion de la produccion de la granja 
3 5. Servicios de la granja al Centro 
36. Establecimiento del Centre de Capacitacion Campesina 
3 7. Contratacion del personal directivo del Centro 
38. Contratacion del personal auxiliar del Centro 
3 9. Organizacion définitiva de los planes de estudio y formacion para el Centro 
40. Seleccion de los alumnos 
41. Compra de los materiales necesarios para el funcionamiento del Centro 
42. Funcionamiento del Centro 
43.•Nuevas construcciones para el Centro 
44. Funcionamiento pleno del Centro. 
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be convenient to analyze the steps taken and the positive results derived 
from them. 
The first step the planner had to take was to sell the idea of the 
planning model to the agrarian reform directors. This first part did not 
prove difficult at all, in fact it was perhaps too easy. This easy ac­
ceptance of the planning model might be responsible for not explaining 
better the need for planning and the advantages of the use of the model 
to the directors, and consequently not obtaining from them a full and 
stable support of the planning in a later stage. 
The second step was the selection of the most important and urgent 
projects, and this second step was easy too. 
The third step consisted in the patient work of the planner to find 
out what exactly the Agrarian Reform Institute intended to do in each of 
the projects where the project should start, and how much was already done. 
This part was not so easy, in fact many things remained unspecified simply 
because nobody seemed to know them for sure. However, at the end, a reason­
able specification for the planning could be obtained as to the starting 
point and target. 
The fourth step consisted of a series of consultations with the di­
rectors and other people who had some experience and knowledge of the nec­
essary action to be accomplished to get from the starting point to the 
targets. With this information a tentative network of action was elaborated 
which had to belaltered and reshaped practically after every new consulta­
tion. The draft of the network had to be written many times over before a 
satisfactory final draft of the three projects was accomplished. The 
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directors seemed pleased and even enthusiastic with the plans, ordered them 
to be printed and put them in the general report the central office in 
Lima had prepared to show the progress and plans of the agrarian reform in 
Peru with the remark that this type of planning was applied for the first 
time to agrarian reform projects. 
Strange as it might seem, once the plans were printed, the interest 
in finishing them (estimates of time and further detailing of many actions 
were necessary before the plans could be considered ready for use) and ap­
plying them faded out. 
Important things, no doubt, had been accomplished already with the 
planning work done in the three projects. The directors had discovered in 
advance the complexities of the projects they were undertaking, realized 
the need for some more resources, and up to a point they even discovered 
the importance and need for planning. 
Nevertheless thé directors abandoned the planning model at the moment 
that could prove most useful and rewarding. From a scientific point of 
view the opportunity of testing the full advantages of the planning 
experiment was lost and full experience of the model for application in 
other agrarian reform and regional development programs was not obtained. 
Some experience,however, has been gained both positive (how to start 
the planning and what steps are required) and negative (why the directors 
lost interest in the model). Something has been said of the positive ex­
perience, it will be attempted now to search for answers as why the experi­
ment was discontinued. These answers could help to gain experience on how 
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to avoid, if possible the negative aspects. 
One reason for abandoning the planning has already been given. The 
directors of the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Program never did com­
pletely understand all the advantages and the value of the planning model, 
because it was not sufficiently explained to them. This reason, however, 
does not seem sufficient. Another more forceful reason is found in the way 
the work in the Central Sierra Program had to be done. The directors were 
pressed, mainly for political reasons, to do things fast and reach spectacu­
lar achievements. This pressure impeded the directors to pose and ponder 
things, and led them to take shortcuts which in fact turned out often to be 
long detours and even irrepairable dead ends. 
Still another important reason can be found in the confluence of two 
forces on the agrarian reform leadership: the politicalization of the 
agrarian reform program and the so-called "personalism" where the director 
and only he, decides and plans. As it can easily be seen both forces con­
verge into isolationism of the directors and into an unwillingness to share 
the plans and the key decisions with anybody else. These attitudes explain 
sufficiently the erratic and unpredictable way the program has been conducted. 
It is not easy to overcome these difficulties whenever they are found, 
and consequently it will not be easy to plan successfully when these diffi­
culties are not removed. The planner needs to know all the important de­
tails relevant to the plans as well as the probable problems that might 
arise, if he wants to do meaningful planning. The planner moreover has to 
be able to check the progress of the plan and the obstacles that block it. 
The directors therefore must trust, communicate and share all the relevant 
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knowledge if they want successful plans for action. 
D. Alternative Solutions 
The final hypothesis (e) states that "There are some suitable alterna­
tives for the solution of the problems that the present application of the 
Agrarian Reform Law encounters in the vital aspects of land expropriation 
and land valuation". These alternatives will be presently analyzed. 
An alternative to land purchase; The agrarian reform in Peru was from 
the beginning decidedly orientated to the expropriation of land with com­
pensation or to the purchase of land by contract. This orientation was 
not easy to change then, and less easy after the Agrarian Reform Bill was 
passed. It seems appropriate, however, to consider an alternative to the 
buying or expropriation of the land. This alternative is the expropriation 
of the use of the land only. The author made the proposition of this al­
ternative after considering the low productivity of the land in the Sierra 
and after hypothesizing that the land was not the key factor in the solution 
of the low income problem of the farmers. Why then expend time and large 
quantities of money in the appraisal and payment of a factor which in itself 
could not solve the problem and which, due to the limitations of the re­
sources at the State's disposal, would prevent the acquisition of more 
strategic factors? 
Apart from avoiding the tieing of large quantities of money in the 
first stages of the agrarian reform (not only in the payment for the land 
which could be done mostly in bonds in accordance with the Peruvian Agrarian 
Reform Law, but in the appraisal work) the expropriation of the use only, 
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would allow more flexibility to the agrarian reform process taking or 
leaving land according to its capacity to satisfy the needs of the new 
farmers. With this system the process would be as follows; 
Once the use of the land is expropriated, the State through the 
agrarian reform organization, offers the land expropriated to farmers who 
would fulfill certain conditions and would agree to follow certain techni­
cal norms and pay a rent for the land they are receiving. If in the period 
of the first five years the farmers or group of farmers (the land could be 
assigned and rented to a cooperative group or to the other forms of col­
lective land exploitation) had fulfilled the requirements and achieved 
certain standards of performance, they would be entitled to buy the land 
from the owner, or directly under the supervision of the agrarian reform 
organization or through the agrarian reform organization. Special legal 
provisions would then force the landlord to sell the land. 
The system would also help the selection of the farmers on the basis 
of their entrepreneurship and their standard of performance, and conse­
quently would be a stimulus to obtain the most from the land in a rational 
way. 
This system would have transformed the Central Sierra hacienda land 
into individual, private type of farming entreprises. This would have meant 
that the Comunidades would have lost the claim to these lands in favor of 
individuals from the Gomunidad or from elsewhere though the individuals 
would compensate later the Comunidad with amortization payments. Further­
more, this system could have been the beginning of a profound transformation 
of the Comunidad itself. The comunidad leaders who benefit from the actual 
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organization would no doubt oppose the system and also some intellectuals 
who, though they have never lived in a Gomunidad, have idealized it and 
its systems. Obviously, this is not the place to discuss the Gomunidad 
problem in its entirety because it involves other aspects besides the 
economic point of view which is primarily considered here. One point, how­
ever, is relevant. The Indian Gomunidad in the Central Sierra is very 
much in an economic stagnation and the dynamic force to get the Gomunidad 
out of this dilemma does not seem to be the acquisition of more land for the 
Gomunidad but rather the transformation of the production techniques and 
economic systems of the Gomunidad and the economic integration of the now 
isolated Gomunidades with other Gomunidades and with the rest of the nation. 
The relevant problem is not whether the Gomunidad has to change (it has to 
if it wants to survive) but rather how it has to change; how to achieve the 
necessary economic transformation without losing the positive values that 
the Gomunidades' system might have. 
When only the use of the land is expropriated, a direct confrontation 
with the problem of land valuation with all its emotional overtones, is 
avoided. If a compensation to the landlords for the use of the land is 
thought desirable, it can be established at a rather low level without fac­
ing too much opposition, especially if the expropriation is presented as an 
extraordinary measure demanded by the common good and the State invokes 
the eminent domain it has over the land and reminds the social function of 
the property according to Article 34 of the Peruvian Constitution "the 
property must be used in harmony with the social interest".^ 
^Very little has been done in Peru by way of preparing public opinion in 
favor of necessary measures taken to implement the agrarian reform. 
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Not all the land need be expropriated; the landlord could retain a 
part for himself which would be large enough for a successful farming enter­
prise. The State would buy the livestock the landlord could not be able to 
support in the reduced area after the expropriation. The State would sell 
the livestock to the new farmers who are renting the land. 
After the five year period when the successful farmers would be allowed 
to purchase the land, objective criteria of its economic value could have 
easily been established on the basis of the productivity the farmers were 
able to obtain. 
To appreciate better the advantage of the system of land use expro­
priation it will help to discuss land valuation a little further. 
Valuation of agrarian reform lands; The land valuation problem in the 
context of an agrarian reform consists in determining objective values of 
the land, based on the economic consideration of the land productivity or 
in other words, based on the participation of the factor of production 
land, in the production results. It presupposes, therefore, that land con­
tribution in the production can be isolated from the contribution of the 
other production factors and that other considerations than the economic 
productivity of the land itself, like speculation on the demand for land 
because of need and/or prestige, are put aside. 
The recent land valuation history in Peru shows that the ideal is 
hard to attain. The land valuation method used by the Agrarian Reform 
Institute in the appraisal of Algolan failed in isolating land sufficiently 
from the other factors and consequently incorporated them in the land 
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values. Land prices therefore did not correspond to the land productivity. 
In the negotiations for a more objective method presented by the Agrarian 
Reform Institute to the approval of the National Council in September 1965 
the landlords failed to understand that the land values should not reflect 
the high land demand and scarcity but only the real contribution of land to 
the production. The Agrarian Reform Law itself is another example of the 
kind of problems involved in land valuation in Peru.; 
The Agrarian Reform Law determines in Article 75 the items to be con­
sidered in the land valuation. 
The price of the expropriated land will be established averaging the 
following factors; 
1) The mean value of the land declared (by the landlords) in the 
last five years before the affectation (designation as subject to appli­
cation of agrarian reform law) took place,, for the purpose of assessing 
rural property taxes (Impuesto Predial Rustico). 
2) Valuation according to the appraisal performed by the technical 
personnel of the Agrarian Reform Institute of the potential yield of the 
land. 
3) Direct appraisal according to the quotations of the Technical 
Appraisal Body of Peru (Guerpo Tecnico de Tasaciones del Peru). 
For pasture land for instance, it was assumed that land contributed 
35 per cent of the revenue. When the revenue was high because of the good 
quality of the livestock or the ability of the management, the livestock 
and management values were incorporated in the land value. In the final 
assessment concessions were obtained from the Fernandini family and the 
final land price was reduced. However, had only the method been considered, 
higher prices would have been paid. 
146 
This system has proved unworkable. Item 1 often is non existent and 
item 3 gives an arbitrary value based on the demand and scarcity rather 
than on land productivity. For item 2, a method has been established. 
The method has two parts. One is technical, (determination of the quality 
of the land and potential physical production) and the other economic 
(determination of the expected income dependent exclusively on the land 
factor). 
The Agrarian Reform Institute method was disapproved of by the land­
lords not because of any technical defect they could find in it, but rather 
because they felt the resulting prices were too low._ 
After a year and one half of the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform 
Law a workable solution to the land valuation problem was not found yet and 
consequently the Government presented an amendment to the Agrarian Reform 
Law, according to which the Article 75 would read; "The price of the ex­
propriated land will be determined according to the actual economic capacity 
of the land, considering the real participation of each of the factors inter­
vening in the production". 
The amendment has not been approved as of July, 1966, more than two 
years after the Agrarian Reform Bill was passed, and consequently the whole 
agrarian reform process has been retarded seriously. 
It is not easy to isolate the factor land and assess its real partici­
pation in the production. Tâe new method presented by the Agrarian Reform 
Institute for valuation of pasture land is based on a budget of a livestock 
farm with 5,000 head of sheep of the average quality found in the haciendas 
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of the Central Sierra and using good technical methods and disease control. 
The budget was hypothetical but the data were real and reasonable. To the 
operation cost it was added a return to the fixed capital (total invested 
in livestock and installations - land exempted) consistent with the current 
interest earned by capital deposited in the Banks (9 per cent) and an enter­
prise profit (a return to management in the form of a low percentage (5 
per cent) of the gross profit). The remaining net profit was considered 
to be solely attributable to the land, this net profit capitalized at the 
current interest rate (9 percent as above) gives the value of the land needed 
to support 5,000 head of sheep. The objection to this procedure is that with 
the economies or dis-economies of scale the result would vary. Therefore, 
it has to be assumed that a farm with 5,000 head of sheep is the economic 
desirable one, which is certainly open to question. 
In spite of this shortcoming the prices obtained did not seem un­
reasonable except to the landlords who were expecting high prices among 
other things, in order to compensate for the loss in the purchasing power 
of money, inasmuch as the land would be paid for in bonds that would mature 
over 20 to 22 years with interest rates of 6, 5 or 4 per cent per year, 
depending on the rating of the former management of the expropriated haciendas. 
To solve the land valuation problem a few considerations might help to 
clarify the issue. First, it has to be remembered that we are dealing with 
agrarian reform and with land that has been expropriated by the State for 
the common good. Therefore, it is clear that the price of the land is not 
a reward to the landlords or a result of a normal transaction but rather a 
strict compensation. A strict compensation should cover the actual loss of 
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income that the factor which is being expropriated, was providing. This 
means that if a landlord had his land abandoned, the price of the expro­
priation should not provide him with a higher income than the one he was 
getting with his land. Strictly speaking therefore, the price of the land 
conceived as a strict compensation should be tied to the former level of 
use of the land. 
Secondly, the price of land serves two purposes: 1) to determine the 
payment the Agrarian Reform Institute (the State) has to make to the land­
lords, and 2) to assess how much the new farmers have to pay to the 
Agrarian Reform Institute for the land they are receiving.. It has been 
too easily accepted that the two payments do not need to be equal, that the 
price the new farmer has to pay can, and even should, be lower than the 
price paid by the State to the landlord. We do not agree with the differ­
ence in payment because there is no valid reason for it. The difference is 
a loss to the State and a hardly justifiable use of the public money, very 
especially in a country like Peru where a large part of the State's money 
is collected through indirect taxes which are paid mostly by the less af­
fluent sector of the population which happens to include the large majority 
of the people of the country. If the farmer cannot pay the price paid by 
the State to the landlord because the land is not providing him a correspond­
ing return, it is clear that the price paid to the landlord was beyond the 
economic value of the land as production factor. We assume, of course, 
that the farmer is paying for the land when the land is in full production. 
Article 100 of the Agrarian Reform Law, allows the new farmers as much as 
5 years grace before they start paying for the land in 20 year installments. 
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An alternative approach, to agrarian reform; Maybe it is now the right 
time after all these considerations on land valuation and agrarian reform 
problems to explore another approach to agrarian reform, namely an agrarian 
reform performed through taxation. 
The right of the State to Impose taxes on personal income and on per­
sonal property as a means of obtaining the money the State needs for its 
functioning and for providing for the common good, has been accepted prac­
tically everywhere. It is also accepted that the State may use taxes to 
encourage or discourage a determined activity. What will be proposed here, 
therefore, is not a new principle but rather a new application. The funda­
mental reason behind the use of a property tax here -i'- ra ensure that the 
land will be used according to its social function which is to produce 
agricultural products in the quantity and quality required for the national 
needs and at prices consistent with factor costs while maintaining the pro­
duction potential of the land. 
However, if only the production aspect of this social function were 
considered, the optimum farm size could be so large or such cultivation 
methods would be used that only a few number of farm families could be ac­
comodated with the available land. Without getting too far away from the 
economic optimum, accommodations are necessary in order to increase the 
number of owners, distribute the income and give opportunities to as many 
farmers as possible, because of the Peruvian manpower surplus in the agri­
cultural sector which cannot be easily transferred elsewhere in large 
quantities over a short period. 
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The tax therefore is going to encourage this qualified optimum size 
of farm in every cultivation or combination of cultivations and in every 
class of land, but will discourage larger farms establishing an upper limit 
like the Peruvian agrarian reform determines the maximum unexpropriable. 
The tax will be progressive and up to the upper limit a function of the 
net income which technically and economically seems feasible. In Figure 
15, the point "a" indicates the optimum size farm which is encouraged; at 
this point the difference between the income received and the tax paid 
f = Cg-d) is at maximum. At no other point is the net income, after taxes 
1 
are paid, greater. Point "b" is the limit, or maximum non-expropriable. 
At that point tax equals income and consequently no net profit remains for 
the landlord. At that point and more so at any further point (larger 
acreage) it pays the landlord to dispose of his land and reduce it to point 
"a".. 
If the land is abandoned, the larger the acreage the higher the loss 
and consequently the sooner the owner will try to sell it. If the owner 
does not pay the tax on the land, the land is taken from him by the State 
as tax compensation. If the land is not cultivated efficiently the income 
line will be at a lower position, as shown in Figure 16 and the tax will 
force the landlord to improve his cultivation practices, suffer the loss 
or sell the land. On the other hand if the efficiency is increased beyond 
what was considered normal when the tax was determined (normal income of 
^Note that optimum is modified through the tax. Note also that after 
the point "a" the tax increases more than proportionally to the acreage. 
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Figure 16), the income line will be at a higher position while the tax 
line remains at the same position and consequently the net income will be 
greater up to point "i" which will be situated a little further beyond the 
establishment maximum limit of point "b". 
In the case of abandoned land, the normal tax would have very little 
discouraging effect on the landowner to work or dispose of the land up to 
the optimum size "a". To avoid the possibility of maintaining any amount of 
abandoned land unworked, the tax in this case would start at level "P". 
If the land is not only abandoned but its production potential is also 
severely deteriorated because of non cultivation and lack of conservation 
practices, the tax would start at level Q, Figure 17. 
With this method the State would have a new source of revenue to dedi­
cate entirely to agricultural promotion and to buy lands from the landlords 
who offer them for sale. Most likely, this new source of income would not 
be enough for an aggressive agricultural promotion and for the acquisition 
of lands that will be offered to the State, but will be a substantial help. 
Further with this method the agrarian reform could be carried out with less 
cost for the State even in the acquisition of the land because the landlords 
would be anxious to dispose of the land which would be causing them a yearly 
loss. That fact would put the State in a strong bargaining position. 
The main advantage of the method, however, is that it stimulates agri­
cultural efficiency from the start while at the same time the land structure 
is reformed. 
To ensure the success of the tax method, land transactions should be 
carried out only through the Government or with the Government approval to 
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avoid higher prices paid by the small farmers to the landlords. It is 
also important and admittedly difficult to estimate accurately the normal 
income function for every type of cultivation and combination of cultiva­
tions and for every class of land. The income function estimate, there­
fore, should be on the low side rather than on the high side to avoid 
penalizing unduly the landowners and to discourage agricultural invest­
ment because the returns might seem too low. The correspondent tax 
should be flexible so to adjust to poor years and to crop losses due to 
natural calamities. 
Still a more important difficulty for the application of the method 
is the tax evasion common in underdeveloped countries and the strong politi­
cal and economic position of the landowners. Probably only strong and ex­
tremely able Governments with a good control system capable of detecting 
and eradicating corruption can successfully apply the tax method presented 
here. 
The discussion about the expropriation of the use rather than the 
land itself and the problem of land valuation, as well as the suggested 
agrarian reform accomplished in its first stages through land taxes may 
appear as digressions from the main point of this study. Tîiey are, how­
ever, subjects very relevant to the general problem of agrarian reform and 
consequently to the general theme of this chapter. In fact, the expropria­
tion of the land and the land valuation have proved formidable obstacles in 
the agrarian reform process in Peru up to now. A more radical approach, 
like the land tax, is suggested to get around the obstacles and delays 
155 
that the present agrarian reform approach in Peru is involved with. 
If so much energy, time and money has to go in the first step of the 
agrarian reform, which is the acquisition of the land by the State, little 
time and capital remain for the more important steps which are the dis­
tribution of the land and what is more important, the establishment of 
land structures capable of attaining the targets through which the increase 
in income to the farmers and the participation of agriculture in the nation­
al development has to come about. 
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VI. STMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The general objective of the study has been to analyze the conditions 
under which the agrarian reform in the Central Sierra could be instrumen­
tal in economic development. 
This general objective presupposed and suggested several hypotheses, 
namely a) That agrarian reform conceived as mere land redistribution is 
not going to solve the problem of the farm sector of the Central Sierra, 
that is to say, the problem of the low income level of the farm popula­
tion. b) That in fact, agrarian reform if it is to help in any signifi­
cant way to solve the problems of the Central Sierra of Peru has to be 
conceived primarily as an instrument for economic development of the area 
and the nation. 
The main task of the study has been,' therefore, to find out under 
what conditions the agrarian reform in the Central Sierra could be in­
strumental in the economic development of Peru. For the accomplishment 
of this main task hypothesis c) has been central. This hypothesis stated 
that agrarian reform will be a successful instrument to bring about economic 
development insofar as the new structures thus created are carefully se­
lected and adequately constructed. An efficiency model can help to test 
the structures as to their adequacy to contribute to the economic de­
velopment goal. 
Chapter V has been largely devoted to the analysis of this hypothesis 
c), with the help of the model presented in Chapter III. 
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The agrarian reform targets for the Central Sierra were related to 
the economic development of the area and of Peru. They expressed specifi­
cally how the agricultural sector of the area could contribute to the gen­
eral economic development of the country. 
Four agrarian structures to be established through the agrarian re­
form process were proposed as key instruments for the attainment of the 
targets. These agrarian structures involved land tenure, credit, educa­
tion and technical assistance and market facilities. 
The implementation stage of the agrarian reform where the instruments 
are set up and used for the attainment of the targets is very critical 
and difficult. Hypothesis d) refers to that stage and states that "The 
implementation stage of the agrarian reform proves to be a difficult under­
taking, but can be expedited with the use of an action planning model in 
the vein of Critical Path and PERT methods." 
The planning model was presented in Chapter IV and the experience of 
its application in the Central Sierra was analyzed in Chapter V. 
The history of the Central Sierra Agrarian Reform Project has con­
firmed the first part of hypothesis d). The second part, however, namely 
that this stage can be expedited with the use of an action planning model, 
has remained unproven because the experiment conducted in the Central Sierra 
was not concluded. Some distinct advantages, however, were clearly ob­
tained. Moreover, the identification of the failure elements in Chapter 
V might well contribute to succeeding analysis as the experiment proceeds. 
In an agrarian reform process there are certain things that have to 
be done necessarily before anything else can be done, like the expropriation 
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of the land and the land evaluation. Many difficulties have been found in 
Peru in this first step of the agrarian reform process. To this effect 
the last hypothesis e) was formulated which states that "There are some 
suitable alternatives for the solution of the problems that the present 
application of the agrarian reform law encounters in the vital aspects of 
land expropriation and land valuation," 
The alternatives have been presented in Chapter V, and were 1) ex­
propriation of the use of the land, 2) valuation of land on the basis 
of its participation in the production results and 3) land tax. 
The difficulties of implementing these alternatives have been pointed 
out as well as their advantages. Among other things new legislation would 
be required to modify the actual Agrarian Reform Law concerning expro­
priation, land valuation and the possibility of establishing a land tax. 
The Peruvian Government has already made a formal proposition to change 
Article 75 of the Agrarian Reform Law (concerning land valuation) on the 
basis of the suggestions made here. 
The findings of the study could be summarized in the following points; 
1) That the targets of the agrarian reform (a) should be primarily 
economic development in nature and (b) capable of contributing effectively 
to the agricultural economic development as well as to the general economic 
development of Peru. 
2) That the targets cannot be attained unless the relevant structures 
are adequately selected, constructed and implemented, 
3) That the present agrarian structures in the Central Sierra of Peru 
are not adequate for the attainment of the type of targets stated in number 
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1. The steps taken by the Agrarian Reform Institute to create new struc­
tures, though some of them are in the right direction, in the whole are 
not satisfactory. Several suggestions for the improvement and changes of 
these new structures have been presented and discussed at length in Chap­
ter V. 
That the four structures presented in Chapters III and V are 
vital for the attainment of any economic development target. 
5) That the setup of instruments and the details of each instrument 
have to be guided by the targets and the adequacy to attain the targets 
in accordance with the model outlined in Chapter III. 
6) That the implementation stage remains critical and that the use 
of the implementation model presented in Chapter IV and partially applied 
in the Central Sierra agrarian reform process can be useful and should be 
tried again. 
B. Recommendations 
Though the three targets (stated in Chapter III and V), namely , 
increase agricultural production, increase the efficiency of the produc­
tion factors, and transfer production factors, especially manpower, intra-
sectorally and extra-sectorally according to the different sectors' needs, 
and consistent with a balanced national development, seem necessary and 
sufficient as far as the contribution of the Central Sierra agricultural 
sector to the general economic development of Peru, they might be comple­
mented with other targets and above all they should be further specified. 
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The necessary steps for this further specification include the need 
of collecting additional information. A well-developed plan for data 
collection is needed to ensure reliable and homogeneous information on all 
relevant points and to get this information in the shortest time possible 
and at the lowest possible cost. 
In order to specify further the target of agricultural production 
increase for instance, a better study of the physical capabilities of the 
Central Sierra land and the potential improvements in the livestock is 
needed. A study of the market is also needed to find out the actual and 
prospective supply and demand of the agricultural products of the Central 
Sierra. 
For efficient development planning of the Central Sierra, further re­
search would be required on the apparent success and failure elements in 
the haciendas and in the Comunidades. The hypothesis advanced in this study 
that the reason for the productivity differences between Comunidades is the 
population pressure on the land should be further tested and other pos­
sible explanations explored. 
A study on the prospectives of demand and supply of labor in the area 
and outside it, specifying the type of jobs and the abilities required 
should also be carried out to plan the right forms of formal education and 
training. 
Much more research and testing is required on the relevant instruments 
to attain the targets, especially with respect to the recommendations made 
in Chapter V. 
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The study has dealt only with one form of land tenure, specifically, 
namely the communal enterprise because this is the type of structure that 
the agrarian reform process is creating for the moment in the Central 
Sierra. The other types of land tenure structures established in the 
Agrarian Reform Law, however, require special attention, like the family 
farm whose rigidities pose a problem of very serious economic consequences 
because the land tenure structure under family farms becomes solidified, 
whereas the changing circumstances require land tenure structures of a 
flexible and dynamic nature. (See Article 96, Agrarian Reform Law.) 
Also with the implementation of the agrarian reform law Title 15, a large 
minifundia problem has already been created in Peru.^ 
C. Conclusions 
The complexities and frustrations of the implementation process of 
the Peruvian Agrarian Reform might at times overcome the Peruvian policy 
makers and the people of good will involved in the daily activities of 
the Agrarian Reform Institute. The slowness of the implementation process 
and the inadequacy of the solutions might bring despair to the rural land­
less population of Peru. Both groups might be tempted to take short cuts 
and drastic measures. The real solution, however, will not likely come 
^Agrarian Reform Law, Title XV, Articles 244 through 247. Preferen­
tial rights of the farm workers in the haciendas. These rights transform 
the farm-workers into owners of the land they occupy permanently in the 
haciendas. This land consists normally of small plots of often marginal 
land, which use is given to the farm workers by the landlord as a form of 
payment for the services performed in the hacienda. 
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any other way than through sound economic policies, well developed pro­
grams and perseverance. 
These policies and programs, in turn, must arise from studies and a 
broader understanding of agrarian reform as being applied in P^u, This 
study, hopefully, is a step in this direction. 
163 
VII. LITERATURE CITED 
1. Banco Central de la Réserva. La renta nacional del Peru. Lima, Peru, 
Banco Central de la Reserva. 1960. 
2. Baudin, Louis. L'empire socialiste des Inkas. Paris, France, Insti" 
tute d'Ethnologie. 1928. 
3. Belaunde, F. El Peru construye. Lima, Peru. Editorial Minerva. 
1964. 
4. Bellerby, J.. R. Agriculture and industry; relative income, London, 
England, Macmillan. 1956. 
5. Boserup, Ester. The conditions of agricultural growth; the economics 
of agrarian change under population pressure. London, England, George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1965. 
6. Encyclopedia Britannica. Hypothesis. Vol. 12. p. 24Ba. Chicago, 
Illinois, William Benton, Publisher. 1960. 
7. Food and Agriculture Organization Nutritional Series No. 11. 1964. 
8. Food and Agriculture Organization Nutritional Series No. 15. 1965. 
9. Food and Agriculture Organization. The Production Yearbook, 1964. 1965. 
10. Food and Agriculture Organization and World Health Organization 
Nutrition Meetings Report Series No. 37. 1965. 
11. Galbraith, John Kenneth. Economic development in perspective. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 1962. 
12. Georgescu-Roegen, N. Economic theory and agrarian economics. Oxford 
Papers 12: 1-40. 1960. 
13. Harbison, Frederick and Charles A. Myers. Education, manpower and 
economic growth: strategies of human development. New York, N.Y., 
McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1964. 
14. Hicks, J. R. Value and capital. 2nd edition. Oxford, England, 
Clarendon Press. 1950. 
15. Instituto de Reforma Agraria y Colonizacion. Como se ha realizado la 
adquisicion del latifundio Algolan. Unpublished report. Lima, Peru, 
Oficina Nacional de Reforma Agraria, March, 1964. 
164 
16. Institute de Reforma Agraria y Golonizacion. Proyecto Sierra Central. 
Datos economico-sociales de 60 Comunidades. Unpublished survey. Tarma, 
Peru, Oficina Nacional de Reforma Agraria, May, 1962. 
17. Institute Nacional de Planificacion. Primer Censo Nacional Agropecuario, 
2 Julio 1961. Lima, Peru, author. 1963. 
18. Institute Nacional de Planificacion. Sexto Censo Nacional de Poblacion, 
1961. Lima, Peru, author. 1964. 
19. Kuznets, Simon. Economic growth and the contribution of agriculture; 
notes on measurements. International Journal of Agrarian Affairs 3: 
69-75. April, 1961. 
20. Malcom, D. G., J. H. Roseboom, G. E. Clark and W. Fazar. Application of 
a technique for research and development program evaluation. Operations 
Research 7: 646-669. 1959. 
21. Nash, Manning. Capital saving and credit in a Guatemalan and Mexican 
Indian peasant society. In Firth, Raymond and Yancy, B. S. Capital 
Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies, pp. 287-304. Chicago, Illinois, 
Aldine Publishing Company. cl964. 
22. Nicholls, William H. An agricultural surplus as a factor in economic 
development. Journal of Political Economy 71; 1-29. 1963. 
23. ONERN [oficina Nacional de Evaluacion de Recursos Naturales]. Clasi-
ficacion de suelos del Peru segun su capacidad de uso; Tercera aproxi-
macion. Lima, Peru, author. 1965. 
24. ONRA [Oficina Nacional de Reforma Agraria]. Programa Sierra Central. 
Unpublished data. Tarma, Peru, author. 1964. 
25. Owen, W. F. The development squeeze on agriculture. American Economic 
Review 56 ; 43-67. 1966. 
26. Patch, Richard W.• The Peruvian Agrarian Reform Bill. West Coast 
South America Series 11; 263-282. 1964. 
27. Peru Ministerio de Agricultura. Direccion de Economia Agraria, Datos 
sobre el Mercado, 1963-64. Lima, Peru, author. 1965. 
28. Peru Ministerio de la Salud Publica. Oficina de Huancayo. Unpublished 
data. Huancayo, Peru, author. 1964. 
29. Raup, Philip M, The contribution of land reform to agricultural de­
velopment: an analytical framework. Economic development and cultural 
change 12, No. 1; 1-21. 1963. 
30. Schultz, T. W. The economic organization of agriculture, New York, 
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1953. 
165 
31. Schultz, T. W. The economic value of education. New York, New York, 
Columbia University Press. 1963. 
32. Schultz, T. W. Transforming traditional agriculture. New Haven, 
Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1964. 
33. Timmons, J. F. Agricultural development through modifying land tenure 
arrangements. Economic Development of Agriculture, Iowa State Univer­
sity of Science and Technology Center for Agricultural and Economic 
Development Special Report No. 5; 81-98. 1965. 
34. Timmons, J, F. and John O'Byrne. Economic development through agrarian 
reform in Peru. Ames, Iowa. Mimeographed. Iowa University's Mission 
in Peru, Department of Economics, Iowa State University of Science and 
Technology. 1963. 
35. Tosi, J. A., Jr. Zonas de vida natural en el Peru. Organizacion de 
los Estados Americanos. Institute Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas. 
Zona Andina (Lima, Peru) Boletin Tecnico No. 5. 1960. 
36. Universidad Agraria de la Molina y Peru Ministerio de Agrioultura. 
Estadistica Agraria, Peru, 1963. Lima, Peru, author. 1964. 
3 7. United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1964. 1965. 
38. Van de Metering, H. Some projections of dietary levels and needs in 
Peru. Iowa State University of Science and Technology Iowa Mission in 
Peru Special Progress Report219. July 12, 1966. 
39. Viner, Jacob. The economics of development. In Agarwala, A. N. and 
Singh, S. P., editors. The economics of development, pp. 9-31. New 
York. New York, Oxford University Press. 1963. 
'40. Wharton, Clifton R., Jr. Education and agricultural growth; the role 
of education in early-stage agriculture. In Anderson, C. Arnols and 
Bowman, Mary Jean,, editors. Education and Economic Development, pp. 
202-228. Chicago, Illinois, Aldine Publishing Company. cl965. 
166 
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The basic research and experience in agrarian reform problems that 
have enabled the author to write this dissertation were gained mostly 
during his two year assignment in Peru in the Iowa-Peru Project (Iowa 
Universities-USAID Contract). The author wishes to express, therefore, 
his gratitude to the persons responsible for the Project and especially 
to those who invited him to participate in it, and to the Iowa Mission 
Staff in Peru during the period December 1963-65, who in many ways helped 
the author in the preparation of the material for this dissertation. 
The author is particularly indebted to Dr. John F. Timmons for his 
guidance, assistance, understanding and encouragement during the writing 
of this dissertation. 
Further the author is grateful to the Peruvian Agrarian Reform In­
stitute personnel, both in Lima headquarters and in Tarma, for their con­
stant assistance and collaboration. It is not possible here to mention 
all of them by name; however, the author feels that he cannot omit the 
names of Dr. Enrique Torres Llosa, former Minister of Agriculture and 
present General Director of ONRA, and Ing. Cesar Fuentes, Director of the 
O.NRA Central Sierra Program, for their special friendship and cooperation. 
Other people have helped the author in the preparation of this study, 
especially typing and correcting the drafts. To all of them, the author 
wishes to express his gratitude. Particularly, he is in 'debt to Mrs. 
Lye11 D. Henry for the final typing of the dissertation and to Mrs. Connie 
Holmes for her patient and neat work in drawing the graphs and diagrams. 
167 
IX. APPENDIX 
A. Articles of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law Relevant 
to the Preceding Study 
The following translation of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law was 
done by Dr. Fred L. Mann of the Iowa University Mission in Peru, on July 
16, 1964 and published in ditto form in a Joint USAID/Embassy Airgram 
AIDAT TOAID A-106. 
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AGRARIAN REFORM LAVJ 
LAW No. 15037 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
VJHEREAS: 
Congress has enacted the following law; 
DIE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU 
Has enacted the following law: 
AGRARIAN REFORM LAM 
PRELIMINARY TITLE 
Article 1. Agrarian Reform is an integral, peaceful and democratic 
process for changing the agrarian structure of this country and promoting 
our economic and social development by substituting the system of 
excessively large and small estates for a just system of land owner­
ship, tenure . aJTid operation that wHl serve to increase the production 
and productivity of the land, complemented with timely,and adequate 
credit, technical aid and marketing and distribution of the products 
in such a manner that the land becomes a basis for economic stability, 
the foundation of progressive welfare ejid the guarantee of the dignity 
and-frcedcm of the man who works the land. 
Article 2. In accordance with the purposes specified in the 
preceding article. Agrarian Reform Legislation must: 
a) Guarantee and regulate private rights in land so that they may 
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be used in accordance;with the public interest, and establish the 
limitations and characteristics to which rural real property is sub­
jected in accordance with the Constitution; 
b) Diffuse and consolidate small and medium sized estates of 
owner-operators ; 
c) Guarantee the property rights of Indian communities in their 
lands and transfer to them the areas they require to satisfy the 
necessities of their population; 
d) Promote the organization of cooperatives and develop model 
community systems of land use; ' 
e) Insure the adequate conservation, use and recovery of natural 
resources, especially of irrigation water; 
f) Regulate agricultural contracts, tending to progressively eliminate 
indirect forms of operation so that the person who works the land may become 
its owner. 
g) Progressively improve the systems of agricultural labor and social 
security, bearing in mind the special characteristics of agricultural work, 
and abolishing all relationships that de facto or de jure, link the granting 
of usufructary rights in land with the rendering of personal services; 
h) Promote agricultural and livestock development for the double 
purpose of increasing production and improving the distribution of income 
within the farm sector; and 
i) Organize agricultural credit so that it is available to the farmer. 
Article 3« The State, through its own measures and in cooperation with 
private initiative, is obligated to: 
a) Increase the cultivable area through development and improvement of 
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irrigation systems, as well as to progressively incorporate into the economic 
development of the country the inefficiently utilized areas or those in­
accessible to reasonable and technical operation due to lack of communi­
cations systems, sanitation facilities or similar factors; 
b) Establish and improve public services necessary and adequate for 
transforming rural living conditions and for assisting farmers to fulfill 
the obligations imposed by this law; 
c) Create the bases and necessary conditions for the expansion of the 
domestic market, for the processing and marketing of farm products and for 
expansion of foreign markets; and 
d) Relate Agrarian Reform to the industrial development of the 
country. 
Article 4. The State assumes the obligation to carry forward the financing 
of Agrarian Reform and the plans of agricultural development, and shall 
include every year, in the Functional Budget of the Republic, the financing 
necessary to cover the obligations incurred in fulfilling this law. 
Article 5* The expropriation of rural privately owned land, under the 
conditions expressly established by the present law, for purposes of agrarian 
reform, is hereby declared to be of public utility and in the social interest. 
TITLE I 
LIMITATIONS AND OBLIGATIONS OF RURAL PROPERTT 
CHAPTER I 
AFFECTATION 
Article ?. All rural lands in the national territory, regardless of 
ownership and location, are subject to the Agrarian Reform Law, and to the 
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the extent said Law is not applicable, to the general law. 
Article 8. For the purposes of this law, "affectation" .is a 
restriction to the right of property in rural lands, as established expressly 
and specifically for Agrarian Reform purposes, applicable to all or any . 
part of a rural landoi^mership unit, for its expropriation by the State, 
and its later transfer to small farmers duly qualified under this law. — 
Partial affectation shall not limit the free right of alienation of the 
remainder of the property. 
CHAPTER III 
RURAL LANDS RfNED BY PRIVATE ENTITIES 
Article 13. For purposes of enforcing Article 3^ of the Constitution, 
rural lands are considered not to be used in accordance with the public 
interest in any of the following cases: 
a) Deficient operation or abandonment of the land, as well as poor 
management and conservation of renewable natural resources; 
b) Existence of antisocial or feudatory land use forms; 
c) Unjust or unlawful labor conditions; 
d) Concentration of land ownership in such manner that it is an 
obstacle to the diffusion of small and medium sized rural land units, ejid 
which creates an extreme or unjust dependence of the population on the owner; 
and 
e) Minifundio (very small plots)* or fragmented holdings such that 
* Materials in brackets are explanatory editorial additions and not a direct 
part of the law text. 
/ 
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cause poor use or destruction of natural resources, as well as low returns 
to the factors of production. 
Article 14. Idle or uncultivated lands shall be affected in their 
totality, based on a previous declaration of the Institute for each zone. 
T ' l T L S a  
..CHAPTER III 
LAND VALUATION 
Article 75• Just compensation for expropriated land shall be determined 
by averaging the following factors: 
1. That which corresponds to the average value declared during the 
• immediately proceeding 5 years prior to the affectation, for purposes of 
determining the amount of the Rustic Land Tax (impuesto Predial Rustic©). 
2. Valuation based on the increase in the potential yield of the land, 
as determined by technical personnel of the Institute of Agrarian Reform and 
Promotion. 
3. Direct valuation based on the latest standards of the Technical 
Corps of Appraisers of Peru. 
Article 76, Livestock, permanent crops and appurtenances shall be 
valued separately and paid in cash. The valuation shall be made considering 
average market prices, actual production, and data from the owner's books 
and records. 
Article 77» The value of uncultivated or idle lands shall be based on 
potential productivity, from which value the amount of investment required 
to reach such potential shall be deducted. 
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TITLE III 
INCORPORATION OF NEW LANDS AND IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING LANDS 
Article 78. The financing and execution of irrigation improvements 
on the Coast and in the Sierra, and the reclamation of new lands in the 
Jungle, is hereby declared to be of national utility and necessity. 
TITLE IV 
ALLOTMENTS 
Article 91. Allotments of Agrarian Reform Lands shall be made in 
accordance with the regulations contained in this Law. 
Article 92. Ownership allotments shall be made by the Institute to 
landless peasants (campesinos) or peasants with insufficient land. In 
accordance with the provisions of Article 211 of the State Constitution, 
Indian Communities, as well as Cooperatives, as the case may be, are 
entitled to the same priorities. 
Article 93» Lands occupied by feudatarlôs* and small renters, on the 
^Article 17. For purposes of this law, feudatarios are colonos (tenant 
farmers), yanaconas (feudatory tenure), aparceros (sharecroppers), arrendires 
J^share tenancy), allegados (sub-share tenants) and other similar feudal tenure 
relationships that include as a condition to the use of the land, the render­
ing of personal services, whether or not with payment of wages. 
I 
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date of affectation, shall have absolute priority for the allotment of the 
lands they are working. When there has been an excessive fractionation or 
fragmentation of agricultural vmits, and the Institute decides to execute a 
reparcellation of the land, the feudatories and small renters not receiving 
an allotment shall have absolute priority to other allotnents •vrithin the same 
zone or in the nearest colonisation projects. 
Article 9^. Allotments shall be made only to natural persons, to 
Indian Communities and to Cooperatives previously qualified by the Institute. 
The method of allotment shall be determined by the Institute, considering 
the sociological characteristics, the economy of the zone, the amount of 
land, stA the type of crop or livestock operations established or to be 
established. 
Article When allotments are made to natural persons, ^ey shall be 
family size farm units. In exceptional cases, only where the lands were 
A 0 
occupied by feudatdries or small renters, can miniiaum agricultural units 
be established, provided, however, that the income therefrom is supplementary • 
in nature. 
>/hen dealing with new land colonizations, the Institute is authorized 
to allot to natural persons land units which permit the establishment of 
medium-sized crop or livestock enterprises. The area of such units cannot 
exceed ten times the size determined for family size farm units. In no case 
can more than 30^ of a colonization area be used for this type of units. 
Article 96. The family sise farm unit is hereby defined as the area of 
land that can be directly worked by the farmer and the members of his family, 
under reasonable conditions of efficiency, which also fulfills the follcwing 
requirements ; 
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a) Absorbs all the work force of the family and not require outside 
labor except during certain periods of the crop year, and in a proportion 
not greater than one-fourth of the annual work capacity of the fanily; 
b) Provides the farcier with sufficient net income for the maintenance 
of his family with an adequate standard of living, and to fulfill the 
relevant obligations for purchasing the allotment, as well as to accumulate 
a certain margin of savings. The areas alloted as family sise farm units 
csxi be neither divided nor combined» 
The IgJid area required for establishment of family-size livestock units, 
in cases where applicable, shall be fixed by the Institute, taking into 
account the provisions of subsection b) of this Article. 
Article 97* The Institute shall determine the area of the family size 
farm unit for each zone, using as a basis the work capacity of the average 
family, expressed in labor units, as well as the economic capacity of each 
class of land. 
Article 98. Allotments shall be made as a part of an entire colonization 
project, planned by the Institute, when the nijaber of settled recipients so 
justifies, as well as in any case of allotment of affected lands with a 
significant productivity level. 
Article 99* Colonization is understood to be the organized settlement 
of groups of farmers in agricultural units as contemplated in the present 
Law, with the granting of technical, economic and social aid to such groups 
during the necessary period until they can continue without assistance, 
including as well the provision of ordinary public services. 
Colonization projects shall be executed in new lands as well as in lands 
already occupied and operated, and can include new recipients or established 
farmers. 
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Article 100. Allotments shall be made by a buy-sell contract, with 
reservation of title, for a price fixed pursuant to the economic capacity 
of the agricultural unit allotted. In no case can the contract price be 
greater than the cost of acquisition of the land, plus the cost of improve­
ments to the unit. 
The purchase price shall be paid In twenty annual installments from 
the date of allotment, with right of prepayment, at the option of the 
recipient of the allotment. The Institute is authorised, in special cases, 
to declare a moratorium, which in no case can be for more than five years. 
The Institute is also authorized to establish the interest rate to be paid 
on the outstanding balance. 
The Institute shall take measures to contract or organize collective 
life insurance, premiums for which shall be paid prorata by all interested 
parties, such insurance fund to be, usad to pay the balance due on the 
purchase price for an allotment if the recipient should die. 
Article 101. The Institute shall select allotment recipients by a 
point classification/system which shall take into consideration; a) age 
of the applicant; b) his family's work capacity; c) family obligations; 
d) experience in agricultural work; and e) school grade completed. In 
exceptional cases, the Institute may select by lots from among those who 
satisfy the minimum required conditions. 
Article 102. To be admitted as a candidate for allotments, the 
requirements are: 
a) To be a Peruvian 
b) To be not less than 18 nor more than 60 years of age, unless, in 
the latter case, the candidate has a 17 year old son to work 
with him; 
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c) To be capable of agricultural work; 
d) To be a farmer or farm worker. Graduates of agricultui'al schools 
or Institutes shall also have an option to new lands; 
e) Not be a landowner or else ovm less than a family-size farm 
unit. 
Article I03» The management organizations established by the Institute 
in colonization projects shall have the following principal functions: 
a) Install farmers in the units allotted to them and provide them 
with technical, economic and social aid; 
b) Promote the formation of cooperatives; 
c) Allocate irrigation water. Open and maintain community roads and. 
public services in collaboration with the appropriate Government agencies, 
d) Supervise the fulfillment of the obligations connected with the 
acquisition and operation of the unit; 
e) Cooperate with farmers in the marketing and processing of their 
products; 
f) Promote the various aspects of community life, encouraging 
appropriate activities and services, procuring the installation of civil 
and political authorities as soon as environmental conditions permit; 
g) Mediate irijffconflicts between the land recipients. 
Article 10^. The recipients of family-size farm units obligate them­
selves in their contracts to comply with the following essential conditions; 
a) Directly and personally work the land; 
b) Live with their family on the allotted farm unit or nearby; 
c) Not to sell, encijimber or transfer for any reason, the ownership 
interest in the allotted unit before payment of the purchase price, and 
V 
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even in such case, not for 10 years after the date of the allotment. In 
special cases and especially when dealing with minimum agricultural units, 
the Institute may authorise the transfer of oimership before the expiration 
of the period specified in the preceding sentence if transferred to an 
established recipient of another allotment, or, if the person to whom it 
is transferred satisfies all of the conditions required in this law for 
eligibility; 
d) Personally or economically contribute in a proportional manner to 
the labor and services of common interest executed in-the nucleus corres­
ponding to his unit; 
e) Pay, when due, the amortization installments for the purchase of 
the allotted unit, and fulfill the obligations contracted with the 
institutions authorized by the Institute; 
f) Become a member of the cooperatives promoted by the Institute; 
g) Obey directives. of a technical and administrative nature issued 
by the Institute, 
Article 105. Breach of contractual obligations referred to in the 
preceding Article shall be sufficient cause for the Institute to exercise 
its authority to rescind the relevant contract. The contract also shall be 
rescinded when the recipient owes two consecutive yearly installments. 
Rescission proceedings against contracts for the preceding causes shall be 
instituted before the Land Judge by summary proceeding, and the Judge will 
not hear prior interpositions. Once rescission or ejectment has been 
ordered, the allotment recipient is entitled to the recovery of the install­
ments paid by him, after deducting amounts due from loans made by the 
Institute or by institutions authorized by it, as well as the estimated 
rental value for the time he operated the allotment tract. 
The decision of the Land Judge can be appealed to the Superior Court 
within three days, and its decision cannot be appealed. 
The time of ejectment, if there are growing crops or livestock to be 
removed, shall be fixed by the Judge, with a maximum period of ninety 
days. 
TITLE VI 
INDIAN COMMUNITIES 
Article 12?. The system of rural land tenure of Indian Communities 
shall be subject to the provisions of this Law, with the guarantees and 
limitations specified in the Constitution of the Republic. 
Article 128. To fulfill the provisions of the present Law, the 
Institute of Agrarian Reform and Promotion shall promote, by all means 
available to it, cooperative organizations in the Communities, and shall 
assist int'thsir technical, economic, social and cultural development. 
Article 129. Allotments of lands to Communities shall be granted with 
the express condition that in no case can the fee o^imership be tr^sferred 
to members of the Community or to third parties. The members of the 
Community can obtain only an individual usufruct to the land, within 
systems compatible with community or cooperative organization. Lands used 
as pastures, waters and forests shall be common lands benefitting the 
Community and all its members. 
Article I30. Lands of Communities which came into the private 
possession of one or several of its members after January 18, 1920, shall 
continue to be owned in fee by the Community, without changing such 
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possessory right, hereby making such lands inalienable and nontransferable, 
whether by contract or by inheritance. 
Lands allocated to members of the Community before the Constitution 
of 1920 shall be subject to the provisions of affectation, as specified 
in this Law, for the benefit of the Community, 
Article I3I. All acts of transference of the fee interest to lands 
belonging to Communities, executed in favor of third parties, whose 
original document of transfer was executed subsequent to 1920, are without 
legal effect. 
Furthermore, grants of lands from the Government to private individuals 
for irrigation purposes, which are detrimental to the land interests of 
Indian Communities, and to lands that are communally operated, are 
without legal effect, and such lands shall hereby revert to their 
original owners. Said reversion shall be effected after indemnization, 
as specified in the provisions on land expropriation in this Law. 
Article 134. The State, through the Institute, shall see to the 
development of technicians, at different levels, providing for their 
education, after which they shall be obligated to work in the Community 
of their origin. 
Article 135» The Community shall reassert its possession of 
abandoned and idle parcels of land not directly operated by members of 
the Community, as well as abandoned parcels, upon payment for necessary 
improvements that have been executed on them. 
Article I36. The Community Cooperative Bank shall be created, 
with contributions by the State, by Indian Communities, and by domestic 
and foreign organizations- that participate in it. The Bank shall serve 
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as a Supervised Credit financing agency, dirost3.y serving the Indian 
communities• 
The Law shall fix its capital and special conditions for its 
operation. 
Article 137. A Special Statute shall govern the organization and 
functioning of Indian Communities, regulating their economic system, form 
of government, community services and other characteristic institutional 
struct'ores. 
Article I38. The use of waters corresponding to the lands of 
Indian Communities are included among the rights fully guaranteed by 
the Constitution. 
Article 139. In cases where no legally recognized communities 
exist, but where there exist ayllus, parcialidades (group arrangements) 
and other similar methods of community operation, these shall be subjected 
to the provisions of this Law applicable to Indian Communities, 
TITLE DC 
TECHNICAL. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Article I66. Provision of technical, economic and social assistance 
to small and medium size farmers, Indian Communities, and to cooperatives, 
constitutes an essential part of the Agrarian Reform program. Indian 
Communities and cooperatives shall be given preference in receiving such 
assistance. The Institute shall participate, together with the appropriate 
state institutions, in the organization of such assistance in the Agrarian 
Reform zones. 
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Article l67« It is the direct responsibility of the Institute to 
provide the services referred to in this Chapter to farmers in colonization 
projects of new lands, and in those lands made available through Agrarian 
Reform pursuant to the present law. For these purposes, the Institute 
shall employ its own resources or contract for appropriate state services 
or act in collaboration with other state sources. 
Article l68. All public agencies, state services and quasi-public 
services, sTe hereby obligated to collaborate in the provision of Technical, 
Economic and Social Assistance in those fields within their competence. 
Article I69. Technical assistance shall consist fundamentally in the 
work of orientation, counselling and demonstration of systems and practices 
which serve to increase productivity and guarantee the proper conservation 
of natural resources, for the benefit of the farmer and the national 
community. 
Article 170. The Institute in collaboration with the Universities, 
and the Institutes of higher education, shall formulate plans for the 
training of technica]. personnel at an intermediate level in numbers required 
for adequate execution of its functions. Centers shall also be established 
for the training of farm leaders to collaborate with the agricultural 
extension services, social assistance, and, in general, the work of 
community development. 
Article 171. Technical Assistance shall be aided and complemented 
by the diffusion of education at all levels, that is: primary education 
oriented to agriculture, vocational education, basic adult education, 
practical courses and circulating agricultural extension instructors. 
For this purpose, the Institute shall coordinate its action with the 
Ministry of Public Education and the Institutes of Agricultural Training, 
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as regards the plans and programs of study, as well as the location and 
types of schools to be established. 
Article 172. Economic Assistance shall comprise, fundamentally: 
a) The granting of credit in various forms to the Indian 
— communities, to small and medium indiv3.dual farmers, as 
well as to cooperative societies formed by them. 
b) Financial assistance in the form of reimbursable credits 
for the provision of initial capital for credit, production 
or service cooperatives, as well as for the establishment 
of warehouses, silos, machinery pools, transport services, 
processing plants for agricultural or livestock products, and 
other similar facilities for such cooperatives. 
c) Direct investments made by the Institute for the establish­
ment of plants for the processing of ag^cultural products, 
for making them available for marketing or for preliminary 
processing. 
Article 173. The provision and supervision of credits to medium and 
small farmers shall be in charge of the Agricultural Development Bank. 
Said credits shall be divided into two main groups: 
a) Ordinary loans that the Bank shall grant for its own account, 
and with the form, periods, guarantees, interest rates and 
other conditions established in its Organic Law and other 
legal dispositions. 
b) Special loans designated as "Agrarian Reform Credits", 
granted for the account of the Institute, and with funds 
made available by the Institute. 
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Article 1?^, The Institute shall be authorized to execute the 
operations referred to in subsection b) of the previous article, through 
the medium of the Community Cooperative Bank, and Cooperative Societies 
that are previously qualified. 
Article 175* The Institute shall deliver an additional guarantee in 
favor of the Agricultural Development Bank or the Community Cooperative 
Bank to cover up to 20^ of the amount of each ordinary loan referred to 
in subsection a) of Article 172, granted to cooperative societies or 
Indian Communities, 
Article I76. The Institute shall allocate annually in its budget, 
a sum, based upon the magnitude and nature of projects underway, for the 
formation and increase of a Trustee Fund in the Agricultural Development 
Bank for granting loans designated as "Agrarian Reform Credits," The adminis­
tration of these credits and the Fund shall be undertaken by a Council 
formed by three representatives from the Institute and two from the Bank. 
The form and manner of granting of these loans, as regards legal documentation, 
amount, term, interest, guarantees and other conditions, shall be established 
by the Council of the Fund. 
The dispositions of this Article also are applicable to the Community 
Cooperative Bank. 
Article I??. Social Assistance essentially shall comprise counseling 
in the organization and development of civic life, sanitation, hygiene 
domestic economy, improvement of the home, family education and religious 
services. 
Article I78. Technical, Economic and Social Assistance services shall 
be provided through centers established in accordance with the number of 
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families comprised in each project. Each center shall have, without 
exception, resident personnel. 
Article 179. The Institute shall assist farmers in the marketing of 
their products. For this purpose, the Institute shall provide: 
a) Guidance as regards crops and livestock with respect to 
the situation in domestic and foreign matters. 
b) Instruction in technical preparation and conservation of 
crops and animal products. 
c) Encourage the construction of silos, refrigeration units and 
other types of storage. 
d) Stimulate the construction of, or invest directly in, 
processing plants for agricultural and animal products, or 
in the primary processing of such products. 
e) Collaborate with the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
municipal authorities in the establishment of markets for 
products. 
f) Establish, in collaboration with the Agricultural Development 
Bank, loans guaranteed by products. 
g) Collaborate with the Ministry of Agriculture and other 
state organizations in all matters related to marketing of 
agricultural and animal products. 
TITLE X 
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
Article 181. The State shall encourage, in all ways, the organization 
and operation of agricultural cooperatives for credit, production, mechcziiza-
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tion, marketing, services and other similar objectives related to crop and 
livestock production. 
Article 182, The State shall promote the organization of courses of 
instruction derding with agricultural cooperatives, preferentially in 
Rural Schools, in Crops and Livestock Institutes, in Agricultural 
Organizations, and other similar establishments, and shall organize 
training and pilot project programs with reference to agricultural 
cooperatives. 
Article 183. The State shall sponsor the creation of Rural 
Cooperative Banks, which shall assist in .the appropriate diffusion of 
agricultural credit and savings among small and medium farmers, and in 
the establishment of handicraft industries in,rural areas. 
Article Agricultural cooperatives shall be governed by the 
Cooperative Legislation and its regulations, 
TITLE Xn 
THE ORGANS OF EXECUTION 0? AGRARIAN REFORM 
CHAPTER I 
THE INSTITUTE OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND PROMOTION 
Article 191. The Institute of Agrarian Reform and Promotion is hereby 
created as an organ of the Executive Power. Said Institute shall comprise 
a part of the Ministry of Agriculture, and is adsinistratively dependent 
upon it. Its functions and powers and duties are specified in the present 
lat-r and its regulations. 
Article 192. The Service of Agrarian Investigation and Promotion 
187 
(SIPA) shall be a part of the Institute of Agrarian Reform and Promotion» 
Its administration and direction shall be executed by the National Agrarian 
Council and the Director of said Service. 
Article 193» The plans and programs elaborated by the Institute shall 
form a part of the National Development Plan. 
Article 19^. Organisms of the Institute of Agrarian Reform and 
Promotion are ; 
National Office of Agrarian Refozro, and Service of Agrarian Investi­
gation and Promotion. 
Article 195* The Institute of Agrarian Reform and Promotion shall 
be governed by the National Agrarian Council, consisting of the following 
members; 
The Minister of Agriculture, who shall preside; 
Ts-ro delegates from the Ministry of Agriculture, one of whom shall act 
as Vice President; 
One delegate from each of the following institutions; Ministry of 
Labor and Indian Affairs, the Agricultural Development Bank, the 
Agrarian Reform Finance Corporation, the National Office of 
Cooperative Development. 
Members of the Council shall also include; 
One delegate from the Agricultural Societies, 
One delegate from the Livestock Associations, 
One delegate from the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP) and 
One delegate from':,the National Federation of Campesinos (Fencap) 
With voice, but without vote, the following shall be members of the 
Council; one delegate from the Senate, one delegate from the Chanber of 
Deputies, the Director of the Service of Agrarian Investigation and 
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Promotion, and the Director of the National Office of Agrarian Reform, the 
latter who shall act as Secretary. 
Article 196. The manner of designation of the members of the National 
Agrarian Council shall be specified in.the Regulations to the present law. 
Article 197. Functions and attributions of the National Agrarian 
Council are as follows: 
1) Direct the policy of Agrarian Reform and Promotion, 
2) Comply with and require compliance with legislation relative to 
Agrarian Reform and Promotion. 
3) Prepare regulations for this law and remit them to the executive 
Power for approval. 
4) Investigate the agrarian problems of the country, study their 
solution and propose or execute, as the case may be, appropriate 
measures for their solution. 
5) Propose to the Executive Pa-rer, after appropriate studies, the 
declaration of Agrarian Reform zones and the approval of respective 
plans for expropriation, as well as the financing of the same, 
6) Prepare plans for execution of the programs of Agrarian Reform as 
regards the acquisition, administration and parcelation of lands, 
selection and installation of recipients of land allotments, and 
initial organization of the economic and social life of colonization 
projects. 
7) Provide technical, economic and social assistance to land recipients 
during the time the coloniaationis under the jurisdiction of the 
Institute; 
8) Receive, administer and account for funds assigned to it in the 
form and manner specified in this law and in other laws relative 
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to the management of public funds, 
9) Evaluate colonisation projects being carried out by the State or 
by private interests, 
10) Appoint and remove the Directors General of the National Office 
of Agrarian Reform and SIPA (Service of Agrarian Investigation 
and Promotion), Zonal Directors or Chiefs, and other personnel 
whose administrative category is above that of 3rd official. 
11) Approve its budget and that of its organisms, as provided in the 
Organic Law of the Functional Budget of the Republic. 
12) Enter into all classes of contracts with public or private 
entities, national, foreign or international, and execute all 
administrative acts, civil and commercial, that the law permits, 
for complying with its objectives, 
13) Resolve in the final administrative instance matters that are 
within the competence of the Institute, and the petitions appealing 
against the decisions of the office of the Director General of the 
National Office of Agrarian Reform, 
14-) Grant land titles, as representative of the Agrarian Reform Finance 
Corporation, 
15) Represent the Institute in all proceedings, of whatever nature, 
settle such actions or abandon them. 
16) Prepare and publish an annual report of its activities, 
17) Delegate to the Directors General and the Zonal Directors the 
functions and powers conferred by this law and its Regulations, 
always provided, however, that such powers are delegable. 
18) Impose the fines provided in this law for violation or non­
compliance with its provisions. 
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19) Prescribe General Regulations for the Institute and its dependencies. 
20) Prescribe the necessary provisions for prevention of river water 
contamination with ore tailings; by miners or mining companies 
causing damage to bordering lands and killing the fish life in 
said waters, 
21) Other functions, powers and duties as specified in this law. 
Article 199. The National Office of Agrarian Reform (ONRA) shall 
consist of; 
a) Office of the Director General. 
b) Offices of Zonal Directors. 
c) Zonal Councils. -
Article 200. The Office of the Director General of the National Office 
of Agrarian Reform shall be headed by a Director General who shall have 
the follos-d.ng powers: 
a) Exercise the representation of the Office. 
b) Direct the operations of the Office and adopt the pertinent 
resolutions and dispositions. 
c) Organize the Zonal Offices and install the respective Zonal 
Councils. 
d) Name, promote and remove the officials and employees not included 
in subsection 10) of Article 197» 
e) Organize programs of training for the officials, and technical 
and administrative employees, of his dependency, 
f) Formulate zonal projects, annual programs and budgets, as well 
as the annual report of activities of the Office, 
g) Comply and enforce compliance with the Resolutions of the National 
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Agrarian Council, with respect to the Office, as well as with 
his OTO Resolutions. 
h) Other powers specified in the law and the Regulations. 
i) Review on appeal the decisions of the Zonal Offices. 
CHAPTER II 
TECHNICAL COUNCIL OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND PROMOTION 
Article 207. The Technical Council of Agrarian Reform and Promotion 
is hereby created as a consultative organ of the Executive Power and of 
the Institute in all matters pertaining to the application of the present 
law, having the following powers and duties: 
a) To examine periodically, in ordinary sessions, the activities 
developed by the Institute, and to formulate observations which it deems 
advisable. 
b) To present to the Executive Power and the Institute reconiaendations 
regarding the orientation of Agrarian Reform in the various zones, where the 
activities of the Institute should be extended, and the procedures that 
should be employed, 
c) Serve as consultant for the Executive Power and the Institute ; 
d) In general, study the agrarian policy of the nation and propose 
measures in connection with it which it deems desirable. 
TITLE XV 
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS OF FBUDAX^RIOS 
Article 244. Yanaconas. aaarcsros (partners) arrendires (renters) 
allegados (sub-renters) colonos. ne.joreros (all terms applicable to various 
forms of feudatory tenure or share-cropper arrangements), sub-lessees, small 
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lessees, and other feudatory operators of agricultural lands, upon prior 
payment by the Institute of the price of the land pursuant to the provisions 
of this law J shall be converted into omers of the parcels of land which 
they permanently occupy, without the necessity of the zone in which such 
lands are located being declared a son© of Agrarian Reform, providing, in 
all casese that said parcels of land do not exceed 15 hectares on the 
Coast and JO in the Sierra ànd Selva. 
Those who occupy and operate various such parcels cannot avail themselves 
of the benefits of Title XV of this law except for an area which does not, 
in total, exceed the area specified in this Article. 
Occupants of State lands in the Selva who are cultivating a minimum 
area of five hectares, and who have filed a claxm to such land, shall be 
coverted into owners of such parcels as they occupy, up to a maximum of 
30 hecta'T^ s. 
Excepted from the application of this Article are land ownership units 
of less than fifteen hectares on the Coast and thirty hectares in the Sierra 
and Selva, providing, in all cases, that the o:fners thereof o'm no other 
rural lands. 
Article 24^. The Institute shall initiate immediately the appropriate 
legal processes to comply with the objectives specified in the preceding 
Article, considering the areas thus transferred as part of the quota of 
affectation corresponding to such owner. 
Article Zk6, Furthermore, the Institute shall proceed to take action 
for the concentration of parcels and the relocation of the new owners when 
the necessities of efficient operation so require, and to fix the corresponding 
allocations of water, and to provide for the maintenance of the existing 
access roads. 
